CHAPTER 13

The Cultural Psychology of Development: One Mind, Many Mentalities

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Cultural psychology, no longer a new field, may be more accurately depicted as a renewed field (Jahoda, 1990, 1992), approaching the study of mind from deep historical antecedents in the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars such as Johann Gottfried von Herder, Giovanni Vico, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Wilhelm Wundt.

Herder and Vico pioneered comparative research with the aim of identifying the distinctive characteristics of particular folk and historical traditions. Dilthey raised

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questions about the contrast between the natural science approach and the spiritual or moral science approach to human understanding and the explanation of behavior. Wundt, who is often heralded as the father of modern scientific psychology, also thought deeply about the limits of psychology as an experimental discipline and about its possibilities as an investigation of folk psychologies. Herder's premise that "to be a member of a group is to think and act in a certain way, in the light of particular goals, values, pictures of the world, and to think and act so as to belong to a group" (Berlin, 1976, p. 195) presents a starting point for the contemporary discipline of cultural psychology.

Cultural psychology aims to document historical and cross-cultural diversity in the processes and products of the human mind. The psychological side of cultural psychology is the study of how individual persons think and act in the light of their particular goals, values, and pictures of the world. This is a genre of psychological study based on a definition of the psychological or of the mental as consisting of what individual persons want, feel, think, know, and value. The cultural side of cultural psychology is the examination of socially assisted processes of learning and schema activation associated with becoming a member of a particular group. The discipline of cultural psychology gives special attention to the particular wants, feelings, knowledge, reasoning, and values required for normative or competent participation in the local customary practices of some historically identifiable community, especially though not exclusively, cultural communities that have a capacity to recruit new members through processes of kinship and marriage and wish to perpetuate a particular way of life.


The field has been conceptualized, reconceptualized, and reviewed from many perspectives: in a book-length history (Jahoda, 1992), in a book-length program for a cultural psychology rooted in sociohistorical theory (Cole, 1996), in Handbook chapters (Greenfield, 1997; Greenfield et al., 2003; Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996; J. G. Miller, 1997b), in the Annual Review of Psychology (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Greenfield et al., 2003), in the Minnesota Symposia on Child Psychology (Masten, 1999), and in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Markus & Kitayama, 2003).

Moreover, the publication of this chapter, which has been updated and revised after its initial publication in the last edition of the Handbook, itself signals a continuing appreciation of the value and relevance of cultural psychology to developmental studies. The last edition was the first time that the Handbook of Child Psychology included a chapter under the name cultural psychology. It should be acknowledged, however, that this chapter continues a broader conversation about culture and individual development that began in previous editions of the Handbook, beginning with Margaret Mead’s contribution to the first edition, published in 1931. The section of this chapter on the interpersonal worlds of childhood provides an update of Robert LeVine’s chapter in the third (1970) edition of the Handbook. And, the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition’s (LCHC) chapter on culture and cognitive development in the fourth (1983) edition of the Handbook is an important predecessor to this chapter, especially the section on cognitive development. We carry forward LCHC’s emphasis on the semiotic mediation of experience and on a unit of analysis that does not abstract the individual from his or her social and cultural context or focus exclusively on what is “inside the skin” or “inside the head.”

In this chapter, we selectively discuss the cultural psychology of individual development, with special attention to the way in which culture and psyche “make each other up” in the domains of self-organization, thinking, knowing, feeling, wanting, and valuing. The chapter is organized into five sections: an introduction, which lays out major conceptual issues, followed by four topical areas—the cultural organization of early experience, language and socialization, self-development, and cognitive development—although issues concerning moral development and the value-laden nature of mental functioning are addressed throughout the chapter.

We see these topical areas as paradigmatic in the cultural psychology of development, yet we are also keenly aware that several topics of vital interest receive only passing and scattered attention—gender, play, feelings and emotions, spirituality, and physical development. Without any pretense of representing all relevant research agendas or conceptions of the field, we characterize some of the things cultural psychologists have learned about the interpersonal, ideational, and social communicative dimensions of psychological development. In keeping with cultural psychology’s commitment to comparative inquiry within and across cultures, we make a special effort to draw from the empirical record in a way that represents the range of
cultural variety in psychological functioning across human groups.

CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY: HOW IT DIFFERS FROM OTHER APPROACHES TO CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

The main wager of cultural psychology is that relatively few components of the human mental equipment are so inherently constrained, hardwired, or fundamental that their developmental pathway is fixed in advance and cannot be transformed or altered through cultural participation. The bet is that much of human mental functioning is an emergent property that results from symbolically mediated experiences with the behavioral practices and historically accumulated ideas and understandings (meanings) of particular cultural communities. This was the bet of Herder and Vico in the eighteenth century, of Wundt and Dilthey in the nineteenth century, and of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Edward Sapir, and many other psychological anthropologists in the first half of the twentieth century. It is a bet that the renewed discipline of cultural psychology, informed by contemporary research from several disciplines, is still prepared to make today.

Orienting Definitions

At least since the time of Herder and Vico in the eighteenth century, cultural psychology has been a label for the reciprocal investigation of both the psychological foundations of cultural communities and the cultural foundations of mind. It has been a designation for the study of how culture and psyche make each other up. Alternatively stated, cultural psychology is the study of all the things members of different communities mentally experience (know, think, want, feel, value), and hence do, by virtue of being the kinds of beings who are the beneficiaries, guardians, and active perpetuators of a particular cultural tradition.

As a first approximation, we shall define culture as a symbolic and behavioral inheritance received from out of the historical/ancestral past that provides a community with a framework for other-directed vicarious learning and for collective deliberations about what is true, beautiful, good, and normal. Although it is important to distinguish between the symbolic and the behavioral in-

heritances of a cultural community (understandings and behaviors are not always fully coordinated from either a socialization or developmental point of view, and actions do sometimes speak much louder than words), given the complexity and richness of culture, any genuine cultural community is always the beneficiary of both symbolic and behavioral inheritances (Shweder, 2003b).

In analyzing the concept of culture, most definitions extant in the literature have tended to be either purely symbolic in emphasis (culture as the beliefs and doctrines that make it possible for a people to rationalize and make sense of the life they lead) or purely behavioral in emphasis (culture as patterns of behavior that are learned and passed on from generation to generation). In our view, the most useful definitions of culture try to honor both inheritances. Such definitions focus on units of analysis that are simultaneously symbolic and behavioral (e.g., Robert Redfield’s 1941 definition of culture as “conventional understandings, manifest in act and artifact, that characterize societies,” p. 132). Later in this chapter, we discuss in detail a two-sided unit of analysis for cultural psychology called the custom complex (J. W. M. Whiting & Child, 1953), and we try to acknowledge and honor both the symbolic and behavioral inheritances of any cultural community.

The symbolic inheritance of a cultural community consists of its received ideas and understandings, both implicit and explicit, about persons, society, nature, and the metaphysical realm of the divines. To illustrate, ideas and understandings that are part of the symbolic inheritance of many enlightened secular folk in the European American cultural region include:

- The understanding that infants are born innocent, naive, and free of any prior sins or inherited evils
- The idea that individual wants, preferences, and tastes matter and should be openly expressed and accommodated
- The belief that the main justification for rules, regulations, and any other forms of authority is to promote social justice and enable individuals to pursue their self-interest free of harm and to have the things they want
- The conviction that, other than human nature, the material world is devoid of intentionality and has no will of its own
The doctrine that God and divinity are archaic notions that should be displaced in the contemporary era

- The related idea that the era in which we live is the most advanced, enlightened, and exceptional in human history and should be classified and heralded as an age of reason

The behavioral inheritance of a cultural community consists of its routine or institutionalized family life, social, economic, and political practices. To illustrate, a few of the routine or institutionalized family life practices that are popular among many rural folk in the South-Asian Hindu cultural region include:

- Joint family living (adult brothers co-reside in the same family compound or dwelling space with their living parents and their wives marry in)
- Co-sleeping arrangements of children with their parents
- Separate eating arrangements for husband and wife (no family meal)
- Sexual division of household tasks
- Time-out and seclusion for females during their menstrual period
- Parental hand-to-mouth feeding of children long past infancy and well into middle childhood
- Prohibitions on premarital dating and sexuality
- Physical punishment for unruly or bad behavior
- Arranged marriage between young men and women of similar social status (primarily based on caste, local region, and relative wealth)

Of special import for the cultural psychology of individual development is that human beings are the kinds of beings who benefit from and carry forward a cultural tradition. They try to promote, promulgate, and share their understandings and practices with their children, their relatives, and their community at large. They are active agents in the perpetuation of their symbolic inheritance, largely because (among other motives) the ideas and values that they inherit from the past seem to them to be right-minded, true, dignifying, useful, or at least worthy of respect.

They are also active agents in the perpetuation of their behavioral inheritance. They try to uphold, enforce, and require of each other some degree of compliance with the practices of their community, largely because (among other motives) those practices seem to them to be moral, healthy, natural, rational, benefit promoting, or at least normal.

A noteworthy example of the combination of symbolic and behavioral approaches in cultural psychology is Alma Gottlieb’s recent book (2004) about reincarnation beliefs in West Africa and their role in the patterning of infant development. Among the Beng people of Cote d’Ivoire, newborn children are comprehended and perceived as old souls—spiritually powerful, psychologically complex, socially sophisticated, and retaining a memory of previous lives and halcyon times spent dwelling in the abode of the spirits. They do not enter the world naive, at least not according to the Beng. Gottlieb’s *The Afterlife Is Where We Come From* offers an eye-opening interpretation of the local cultural meanings of developmental milestones such as the transition from crawling to walking (which is actively discouraged by Beng parents) and the child’s early articulation of intelligible speech (which is greeted with anxiety). Her study of Beng infant development and its connection to local beliefs about reincarnation provides an expose of the dangers of presumptively universalizing culture-specific ideals for human development, as she argues that infant development is not, and perhaps ought not to be, the same wherever you go.

From the viewpoint of cultural psychology, the most satisfactory definition of culture presupposes the existence of an active mental agent who not only is the recipient and guardian of a cultural tradition but also is motivated and engaged in some specific way of life. Thus, our definition of culture emphasizes both symbols and behavior. Such an approach also means that a major prerequisite for conducting research in cultural psychology is an imaginative capacity to suspend our disbelief (e.g., one’s disbelief that the animating force in the body of an infant is an old soul) and a willingness to set aside (at least temporarily) our own negative moral and emotional reactions (e.g., of anxiety, disapproval, indignation, or disgust) to other people’s understandings and practices. To practice cultural psychology, we must be willing and able to enter into other peoples’ conceptions of what is right-minded, normal, beautiful, and true (Shweder, 1996b), and we must at least try (we may fail, but that is itself an informative outcome of the methodological effort) to translate their goals, values, and pictures of the world into an intelligible (and perhaps even rationally defensible) account of their behavior.

Thus, cultural psychology is the study of the mental life of individuals in relation to the symbolic and behav-
ioral inheritances of particular cultural communities. It is the study of the way culture, community, and the psyche instantiate one another and are mutually sustaining; and, thus, how they become coordinated and make each other possible. A cultural tradition dies (it exists only in a canonical text or in an ethnographic book on a library shelf) if there is no community that lives its doctrines, makes manifest its shared understandings, or inhabits its way of life. Similarly, some designated category of persons (e.g., Latinos, non-Hispanic Whites; residents of the Pacific Islands; citizens of the United States) is not a cultural community unless its members actively inhabit, think about, and hold each other accountable to some symbolic and behavioral inheritance from out of some historical/ancestral past that they identify with as a people, and claim as their own.

WHY CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NOT CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

Many proponents of cultural psychology distinguish it from cross-cultural psychology. This is what a few of those authors have to say about the aims of a renewed cultural psychology, and the ways in which it differs from the discipline or research enterprise known as cross-cultural psychology.

Shweder and Sullivan (1993; also Shweder, 1990a) identify the aim of cultural psychology as the study of ethnic and cultural sources of psychological diversity in self-organization, cognitive processing, emotional functioning, and moral evaluation. They describe cultural psychology as a "project designed to reassess the uniformitarian principle of psychic unity [which they associate with cross-cultural psychology] and aimed at the development of a credible theory of psychological pluralism." They argue that performance or response differences between populations arise from differences in the normal meaning of stimulus situations and materials across populations (the problem of "partial translation" or "limited commensurability"). They suggest that a special feature of cultural psychology is its recognition that "through the methodical investigation of specific sources of incommensurability in particular stimulus situations (so-called thick description) a culture’s distinctive psychology [the way people think and act in the light of particular goals, values, and pictures of the world] may be revealed." For example, Shweder et al. (1997; also see Jensen, 2005: Shweder et al., 1990) describe the different moral developmental pathways and patterns of moral judgment for children in societies privileging an "ethics of autonomy" (where individualism, having the things you want, and harm, rights, and justice concepts predominate) in contrast to societies privileging an "ethics of community" (where notions of duty, sacrifice, loyalty, and hierarchical interdependence and other social roles based on communitarian moral concepts predominate) or societies privileging an "ethics of divinity" (where notions of sanctity, purity, pollution, and the connection between the sacred order and the natural order predominate).

A similar point is made by Greenfield (1997) who notes, "It is the human capacity to create shared meaning that produces the distinctive methodological contribution of cultural psychology." She goes on to argue that it is a mistake of modern psychology in general and modern cross-cultural psychology in particular to treat perspective (the shared meanings of a group is a type of perspective) as a form of bias that should be eliminated from research procedures. She contrasts the methodology of cultural psychology with that of modern cross-cultural psychology as follows:

The methodological ideal of the paradigmatic cross-cultural psychologist is to carry a procedure established in one culture, with known psychometric properties, to one or more other cultures, in order to make a cross-cultural comparison (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). In contrast, the methodological ideal of the paradigmatic cultural psychologist is to derive procedures for each culture from the lifeways and modes of communication of that culture.

This ideal explains why interpretive methods, especially ethnographic methods, have been so important to many cultural psychologists. Ethnographic approaches were devised originally by cultural anthropologists as a means of understanding other cultures on their own terms—not as projections of the researcher’s own ethnocentric assumptions (Malinowski, 1922). The goal is to understand what people say and do from the perspective of insiders to the culture, to render them intelligible within their own collectively shared interpretive frameworks. From this standpoint, comparisons within and across cultures make sense only when they are grounded in descriptions of the local meanings of the people being studied. At the same time, these approaches carry with them the reflexive recognition that researchers too are members of particular communities and cultures: that they may come to see their own local meanings in a new light by way of studying people who construe the world differently.
For further discussion of interpretive and ethnographic methods as applied to the study of children, see C. D. Clark (2003); Corsaro and Miller (1992); Erickson (1986); Jesser et al. (1996); P. J. Miller, Hengst, and Wang (2003).

One useful metalanguage or theoretical framework for the nonethnocentric identification and comparative translation of culture-specific aspects of mental functioning has been developed by the anthropological linguists Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard (Goddard, 1997, 2001; Goddard & Wierzbicka, 1994; Wierzbicka, 1986, 1990, 1993, 1999; see also Shweder 2003a, 2004). Wierzbicka and Goddard have identified a core set of semantically simple, intuitively obvious, universal folk concepts (such as good, true, want, feel, do) that can then be used to elucidate the particular ways the mental states of members of different cultural groups vary. For example, in the domain of feelings and emotions those authors have effectively made the provocative point that the contemporary American notion of “sadness” has several cultural specific features (not even shared by various Northern European subcultures), and they have proposed that the very idea of an emotion (in contrast to the idea of a feeling) is not a semantically simple, intuitively obvious, or universal folk concept.

To return to Greenfield, one powerful (and somewhat ironic) implication of her analysis would seem to be that the genuine existence of different cultural realities is incompatible with the methodological assumptions of cross-cultural psychology. More specifically, if your research procedures and instruments travel readily and well (e.g., they are easy to administer and they display the same psychometric properties from one test population to another) then you probably have not traveled far enough into a truly alternative cultural world.

This may explain why long- and short-term fieldwork, language learning, naturalistic observation, detailed ethnography, and the analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of everyday discourse and communication are central to the study of cultural psychology, yet have played a minimal role in cross-cultural psychology. It may explain why much of the evidence in cross-cultural psychology (yet relatively little of the evidence in cultural psychology) is derived from observations in university laboratories, or from inventory or test procedures administered primarily to relatively cosmopolitan university students in other lands.

The Western institution of the university carries with it many features of an elite cosmopolitan culture wherever it has diffused around the world. University students in Tokyo, Nairobi, New Delhi, and New York may be far more like one another (and like the Western researcher) than they are like members of their respective societies whose life ways are embedded in less familiar indigenous understandings, institutions, and practices. Even if you have traveled 10,000 miles to get there, a university setting in another land may be much closer than you think.

Much (1995) drives home this point with the following observation:

It is especially important to be clear about one distinction. Cultural psychology is not the same as “cross-cultural psychology,” which is a branch of experimental social, cognitive and personality psychology. The chief distinction is that most of what has been known as “cross-cultural psychology” has presupposed the categories and models that have been available to participate in experiments or even to fill out questionnaires. . . . The argument often assumed to justify the tactic of studying mostly student behavior is based upon a sweeping and gratuitous universalist assumption—since we are all human, we are all fundamentally alike in significant psychological functions and cultural (or social) contexts of diversity do not affect the important “deep” or “hard wired” structures of the mind. There are several problems with this position. One is that there have been few if any satisfactory identifications of deep, hard wired and invariant mental structures which operate independently of the context or content of their functioning; the “method variance” problem in experimental psychology is related to this fact. Another problem is that even though there may be certain biologically based psychological foundations . . . this does not necessarily mean (1) that they are invariant across individuals or populations or (2) that culture does not affect their development as psychological structures and functions.

Whereas Greenfield and Much draw some methodological contrasts between cultural versus cross-cultural psychology, J. G. Miller (1997b) envisions the difference between cultural psychology and cross-cultural psychology in theoretical terms (although a similar theoretical point can be found in Greenfield and Much). She suggests, “The dominant stance within cultural psychology is to view culture and psychology as mutually constitutive phenomena which cannot be reduced to each other.” She adds that such a stance “contrasts with the tendency in cross-cultural psychology for culture to be conceptualized as an independent variable that impacts on the dependent variable of individual psychology.”
Markus et al. (1996) carry forward this point. With an intent to simultaneously study the cultural origins of mind and the mental side of culture, they argue that “culture and psychology, regardless of the level at which they are analyzed, are interdependent and mutually active.” Markus et al. suggest:

The communities, societies, and cultural contexts within which people participate provide the interpretive frameworks—including the images, concepts, and narratives, as well as the means, practices and patterns of behavior—by which people make sense (i.e., lend meaning, coherence and structure to their ongoing experiences) and organize their actions. Although experienced as such, those organizing frameworks (also called cultural schemas, models, designs for living, modes of being) are not fully private and personal; they are shared.

Markus et al. go on to say:

Importantly, the contention here is that these group-based meanings and practices are not separate from observed behavior. They are not applied as interpretive frameworks after “behavior” has occurred. Instead they are fully active in the constitution of this behavior; they are the means by which people behave and experience, and thus should be taken into account in an analysis of this behavior. The claim is that with respect to the psychological, the individual level often cannot be separated from the cultural level. Many psychological processes are completely interdependent with the meanings and practices of their relevant sociocultural contexts and this will result in systematic diversity in psychological functioning. It follows from this perspective that there may be multiple, diverse psychologies rather than a single psychology.

MULTIPLE, DIVERSE PSYCHOLOGIES

Perhaps, the central claim of cultural psychology (in contrast to other approaches to the study of consciousness and mental life) is that “there may be multiple, diverse psychologies rather than a single psychology.” and perhaps the central problematic of the field is to make sense of that provocative claim. Does such a claim entail the denial of universals? If not, what universals of mind are entailed by cultural psychology? How are those universals to be reconciled with the existence of diverse psychologies across human populations without trivializing that diversity or treating it as mere content?

Currently, there is no single answer that all cultural psychologists would endorse. One type of answer, with a pedigree stretching back to Vico (Berlin, 1976), suggests that “the nature of [human beings] is not, as has long been supposed, static and unalterable or even altered; that it does not so much as contain even a central kernel or essence, which remains identical through change; that the effort of [human beings] to understand the world in which they find themselves and to adapt it to their needs, physical and spiritual, continuously transforms their worlds and themselves” (p. xvi).

A second type of answer to those questions, to be developed in this chapter, starts from the premise that any human nature that we are in a position to understand and render intelligible must have “a central kernel or essence,” but it is rarely a strong constraint. According to this answer, the central kernel or essence of human nature consists of a heterogeneous collection of mutually contradictory structures and inclinations, which are differentially and selectively activated, brought “online,” and given character and substance in the course of the historical experience of different cultural communities. The motto “One mind, many mentalities; universalism without the uniformity” is the rallying cry for the interpretation of the claim that there may be multiple, diverse psychologies rather than a single psychology.

This motto advertises a discipline founded on the principle that the abstract potentialities and specific heterogeneous inclinations of the human mind are universal but only gain character, substance, definition, and motivational force (i.e., assume the shape of a functioning mentality) as they are translated and transformed into and through the concrete actualities of some particular practice, activity setting, or way of life (Cole, 1990; D’Andrade, 1995; Goodnow et al., 1995; Greenfield, 1997; Greenfield et al., 2003; Lave, 1990; Markus et al., 1996; Much, 1992; Nisbett & Cohen, 1995; Rogoff, 1990; Shweder, 1991; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). The slogan connects current researchers in cultural psychology with the intellectual ancestors of the field (Vico, Herder, and others; Berlin, 1976) who, Kant-and Hegel-like, believed “Form without content is empty, content without form meaningless.”

For at least 200 years, a distinctive tenet of cultural psychology has been the claim that the formal universals of mind and the content-rich particulars of any sustainable mentality or way of life are interdependent, interactive, and give each other life. Scholars, such as Herder, Vico, and Wundt, scouring the historical record for successful (cohesive, shared, stable) fusions of form and content in which the human imagination has, of necessity, gone beyond the relatively meaning-barren
constraints of logic and mere sense perception to construct an imaginative (and culture-specific) picture of the underlying nature of the world and it values, resulting in a mentality (the Homeric mentality, the Hindu mentality, the Christian fundamentalist mentality) supportive of a way of life.

They took as their data the great symbolic formations produced by human beings: myths, folk tales, language patterns, naming systems, ethnoscientific doctrines, and ethical, social, and religious philosophies. They also took as their data the great behavioral formations produced by human beings, including customary practices of various kinds: subsistence activities, games, rituals, food taboos, gender roles, the division of labor, and marriage rules. They interpreted those symbolic and behavioral formations as alternative manifestations, substantializations, or instantiations of the disparate abstract potentialities of the universal mind, which they believed was the business of cultural psychology to characterize and to explain.

THE MEANING OF MEANING AND A CONTEXT FOR CONTEXT IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

In contemporary cultural psychology, the translation and transformation of one mind into many mentalities is typically conceptualized as a process by which contexts and meanings become essential, active components inside as well as outside the psychological system of individuals. In cultural psychology, this process is sometimes described as the process by which culture and psyche make each other up.

This insistence in cultural psychology that contexts and meanings are to be theoretically represented as part of the psychological system and not simply as influences, factors, or conditions external to the psychological system distinguishes cultural psychology from other forms of psychology, which also think of themselves as contextual (or situated). The aim in cultural psychology is not first to separate the psychological system from its nonpsychological context and then to invoke some type of external setting effect or outside situational influence on psychological functioning. The aim and the challenge are rather to recast or soften the contrast between person and context (inside versus outside, subjective perspective versus external reality) so that the very idea of a context effect will take on new meaning because our theoretical language for psychological description will be contextual from the start. In part, cultural psychology involves the study of real things that do not exist independently of some collectively shared point of view. Later in this chapter, we address in some detail this issue, of dichotomies that need to be softened or recast (see also Overton, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume).

The distinction between cultural psychology and other contextual approaches in psychology is subtle, important, and easy to overlook because all approaches to psychology that emphasize context share much in common, especially their opposition to the idea that the science of psychology is primarily the study of fixed, universal, abstract processes or forms. Thus, cultural psychology shares with other contextual psychologies the assumption that the mind of human beings (knowing, wanting, feeling, valuing, etc.) can only be realized through some situated or local process of "minding," which is always bounded, conditional, or relative to something—shared meanings, goals, stimulus domain, available resources, local artifacts, cognitive assistants, and so on. Beyond that general point of similarity, cultural psychology should be understood as a rather special type of contextual approach.

In the conception of cultural psychology developed in this chapter, the relevant contexts for the realization of mind are the customs, traditions, practices, and shared meanings and perspectives of some self-monitoring and self-perpetuating group. The primary emphasis is on contexts thought to be relevant for the realization of mind in the sense that such contexts are the means for transforming a universal mind into a distinctively functioning mentality, a distinctive way that "people think and act in the light of particular goals, values and pictures of the world" (Berlin, 1976). In this approach, cultural psychology is not coextensive with contextual psychology (more on this in a moment). More important, the contrast between inside and outside, person and context, and subjective perspective and external reality is reconceptualized in cultural psychology as a process by which culture and psyche are constantly and continuously making each other up.

THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM

Just as the general field of psychology seems unsure whether its proper subject matter should be the study of
behavior or the study of consciousness or the study of the mental life (which is a broader subject than the study of consciousness because it includes states of mind that are not in awareness), so too cultural psychologists do not always seem to agree on their proper unit of analysis. Practitioners of cultural psychology study mentalities, folk models, practices, activity settings, situated cognitions, and ways of life. It is not clear whether these units of analysis mentioned in the literature are different ways of speaking about the same intellectual object or whether it is possible to combine them into a single unit of analysis.

For the sake of clarity in this review, we adopt a proposal for a common unit of analysis for cultural psychology put forward more than a generation ago (J. W. M. Whiting & Child, 1953) in an exemplary collaboration between an anthropologist and a psychologist. Whiting and Child suggest combining mentalities and practices (the symbolic and behavioral inheritances of a cultural community) into a single unit of analysis called the custom complex, which "consists of a customary practice and of the beliefs, values, sanctions, rules, motives and satisfactions associated with it" (p. 27). If we adopt this proposal, cultural psychology can be defined as the study of the custom complex.

Although J. W. M. Whiting and Child introduced the idea of a custom complex in 1953, its theoretical implications were not widely or fully appreciated at the time. Curiously, the idea was not taken up or carried forward by psychological anthropologists working in the classical traditions of the 1950s. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s, with the rebirth of a two-handed cultural psychology focused on the way culture and psyche make each other up, and with the return of interest in "activity settings" (Cole, 1992, 1995; Weisner, 1984, 1990, 2001, 2002) and a "practice approach" to developmental studies (Goodnow et al., 1995), that J. W. M. Whiting and Child's conception gained currency and appeal.

If a custom complex "consists of a customary practice and of beliefs, values, sanctions, rules, motives and satisfactions associated with it," then the idea bears some resemblance to the social psychologist's idea of a personal "life space" (Lewin, 1943), to the sociologist's idea of a societal "habitats" (Bourdieu, 1972, 1990), and to the historian's idea of an epochal "mentality."

Using the custom complex as a unit of analysis makes it possible to conceptualize cultural psychology as the study of the way culture and psyche are socially produced and reproduced, resulting in an intimate association between a mentality and a practice and a partial fusion of person/context, inside/external, or subjective perspective/external reality.

Examples of a custom complex are so commonplace they are easy to overlook. They include the mentalities associated with nursing on demand, co-sleeping in a family bed, the family meal, enforcing strict Christian discipline, performing the ritual of "what did you do in school today," or practicing ways to bolster self-esteem.

A Custom Complex Example: Who Sleeps by Whom in the Family

The mentality (what people know, think, feel, want, value, and hence choose to do) intimately associated with the practice of "who sleeps by whom" in the family provides a paradigmatic example of a custom complex. Who sleeps by whom in a family is a customary practice invested with socially acquired meanings and with implications for a person's standing (as moral, rational, or competent) in some consensus-sensitive and norm-enforcing cultural community.

Research on family life customs in different communities in the United States (Abbott, 1992; Okami & Weisner, in press; Okami, Weisner, & Olinstead, 2002; Weisner, Bausano, & Kornfeld, 1983) and around the world (Canfield & Plath, 1966; Levine, 1989, 1990a, 1990b; McKenna et al., 1993; Morelli, Roff, Oppenheimer, & Goldsmith, 1992; Shwedler, Balle-Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995; J. W. M. Whiting, 1964, 1981) confirms the existence on a worldwide scale of several divergent custom complexes in this domain, each consisting of a network of interwoven and mutually supportive practices, beliefs, values, sanctions, rules, motives, and satisfactions. Indeed, on a worldwide scale, the European American who sleeps by whom custom complex is not the one that communities most typically produce, reproduce, and enforce with the various formal and informal powers (e.g., legal interventions, gossip, and effects on reputation) at their disposal.

The middle-class European American custom complex includes the ritualized isolation of children during the night, the institution of bedtime, and the protection of the privacy of the sacred couple upheld by a cultural norm mandating the exclusive co-sleeping of the husband and wife. This European American custom complex is typically associated with something like the following propositional attitudes, where knowing,
thinking, feeling, wanting, and valuing define the set of potential attitudes, and thus can be stated in propositional form:

I value autonomy and independence; I want my children to become autonomous and independent adults; I know that I can promote autonomy and independence in infants and young children by having them sleep alone; I value sexual intimacy with my spouse; I know that a sleeping space is the most suitable site for sexual intimacy with my spouse; I know that it will not be possible to have sexual intimacy with my spouse if the privacy of the spousal sleeping space is violated; I know that children have erotic impulses and a sexual fantasy life that should not be aroused or titillated by adults for the sake of the mental health of the child; I don’t want to damage the mental health of my children or make them unhappy and neurotic about sex or touching; I feel anxious about touching and having prolonged skin-to-skin contact with a young child; therefore, infants and young children should be trained, encouraged, and if necessary, forced, to sleep alone.

This custom complex is sanctioned, glorified, rationalized, and enforced in innumerable ways in the European American culture area, although nearly every one of those propositional attitudes is thought to be wrong, bizarre, or beside the point by adults and children in many parts of Asia, Africa, and Central America, where children routinely and habitually co-sleep with one or more of their parents and/or siblings and prefer to do so even when more than ample sleeping space is available for separate sleeping arrangements (Abbott, 1992; Brazelton, 1990; Caudill & Plath, 1966; Shweder et al., 1995).

In the early 1960s, Caudill and Plath (1966) discovered that (a) urban Japanese parents felt morally obliged to provide their children with a parental sleeping partner, (b) husbands and wives were willing to separate from each other to do so, and (c) approximately 50% of 11- to 15-year-old urban Japanese boys and girls slept in the same room as their mother or father or both. In another example, Shweder et al. (1995) discovered from a record of single-night sleeping arrangements in 160 high-caste households in Orissa, India, that only 12% of the cases matched the European American custom complex in which husband and wife sleep together and separate from their children.

The cluster of propositional attitudes that lend authority to co-sleeping still need to be worked out for the different culture regions of the world (although see Morelli et al., 1992). The Japanese custom complex includes the propositional attitudes:

I value and want to promote interdependency and feelings of closeness and solidarity among members of the family; I know that co-sleeping will help children overcome feelings of distance and separation from members of the family who are older or of a different sex.

The Oriya Hindu custom complex includes the propositional attitudes:

I highly value children as members of the family; I know that children are fragile, vulnerable, and needy and therefore should not be left alone and unprotected during the night.

Chastity anxiety and the chaperoning of adolescent females also play a part in the Oriya custom complex (Shweder et al., 1995).

Examples of the way local experts (pediatricians, advice columnists, or social workers) rationalize, uphold, and lend authority to the European American custom complex can be found in the responses of “Dear Abby” and “Ann Landers” to the many letters they receive about the perceived problem of parent-child co-sleeping. The following, published May 26, 1994, in the Chicago Tribune, is a typical exchange between concerned adults in the European American cultural zone:

Dear Abby: My niece—I’ll call her Carol—is a single mother with a 4-year-old son. (I’ll call him Johnny.) Carol just turned 40. Since the day Johnny was born, he has slept with his mother in a single bed. They go to bed between 8 and 10 o’clock every night and always have snacks and drinks in bed. They watch TV and cuddle until Johnny falls asleep in his mother’s arms. Abby, this child has never fallen asleep alone. Carol lives with her parents, and there is no shortage of beds in their home. Recently, Carol and Johnny visited me in my country home, and I gave them the bedroom with twin beds. The following morning, I discovered that Carol had pushed the beds together so she and Johnny wouldn’t be separated. I think Carol’s emotional needs are taking precedence over what is best for her son. He has no father, and his grandparents have no say in his upbringing. I would appreciate your ass
ssessment of this situation. No city, please, and sign me, Concerned Aunt.

Dear Concerned: You have good reason to be concerned. You hit the nail on the head—Johnny doesn't need to sleep with his mother nearly as much as she needs to sleep with him. You would be doing Carol an enormous favor if you advised her to get counseling in the rearing of her son. With all her good intentions, she is "smothering" her son. Johnny's pediatrician will be able to recommend the best counselor for Carol and Johnny. It is desperately needed.

Surprisingly little is known about the long-term effects of nighttime isolation or separation versus co-sleeping in any part of the world, which is a major lacuna in the history of research in cultural psychology. Nevertheless, with the publication of an important longitudinal study by Okami et al. (2002; see also Okami & Weisner, in press) there is now some empirical grounds for being suspicious about any strong or generalized claims about the long-term effects on children of sleeping alone versus co-sleeping with one or more parents.

More on the Custom Complex: The Intimate Association between a Mentality and a Practice Supported by a Cultural Community

The concept of a custom complex presupposes an intimate association between a mentality and a practice that is supported, enforced, defended, and rationalized by members of some cultural community. When such an association is in place, it will be the case that other members of the cultural community will judge the mentality associated with the practice to be normal and reasonable, while any actual participant in the practice will experience the mentality associated with the practice to be under the skin, close to the heart, and self-relevant; the mentality will have become habitual, automatic, and can be activated without deliberation or conscious calculation—it will have become internalized. This intimate (some might say experience-near) connection or partial fusion of a mentality and a practice does not, however, prohibit us from drawing an analytic distinction between the mentality and the practice that instantiates it. It does not keep us from characterizing the custom complex as two things intimately connected or partially fused.

The study of a custom complex calls for the analysis of a two-sided thing—the intimate connection between a mentality (the symbolic inheritance of a cultural community) and one or more specific practices (the behavioral inheritance of a cultural community). This analysis begins with the systematic identification, through observation and interviews, of the routine or habitual family life and social practices engaged in by members of some self-monitoring and self-regulating group. Some of these practices may surprise, disgust, or enrage an outside observer, although to the jaded eyes of the group members their own practices are likely to seem ordinary, decent, and reasonable or at least "normal."

Each of the following practices, for example, is a commonplace way of being, at least for the members of the particular cultural communities that uphold them. In one cultural world, a 2-year-old child gets in bed with his or her mother, unbuttons his or her mother's blouse, suckles at her breast, and sleeps by her side throughout the night. In another cultural world, each child in the family sleeps in a private sleeping space separated from the sleeping space of all adults. In one cultural world, a woman brings food home from the market and cooks it, and then she and her husband consume the food together. In another cultural world, a man brings food home from the market, his wife cooks it at home, and he consumes the food alone and his wife eats separately and later. In one cultural world, children are fostered by their parents to more prosperous families in their society who subject these children to ordeals of hardship, physical punishment, and demanding tests of loyalty, requiring them to work as family servants until they endure the ordeals and pass the tests (Bledsoe, 1990). Then the children are adopted and supported by those families and patronized and provided for throughout life. In another cultural world, however, parents get upset (even incensed) if another adult touches their child, reprimands or scolds their child, makes strenuous demands of their child, or causes their child to suffer abuse in any way.

As noted earlier, the analysis of a custom complex ends when one is able to spell out as comprehensively as possible the things that the members of some group (tacitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously) know, think, feel, want, and value that explain and make intelligible the things that they do. Thus, the analysis begins with the identification of practices and it ends with the specification of a distinctive mentality.

This interest in the distinctive mentality associated with the practices of a cultural community distinguishes cultural psychology from other approaches to the study of practice domains in which it is assumed that human activities come in natural domains or universal kinds (e.g., religion, economics, family life, schooling, or politics) and
that members of different cultural communities think and behave more or less alike because of the strong constraints of each species of activity, regardless of community. The idea of a custom complex invites a very different approach in which it is assumed that members of various cultural communities have distinctive mentalities associated with each of their practice domains (e.g., a Taiwanese mentality of family life versus a New England mentality of family life), leading members of those cultural communities to engage in divergent patterns of behavior in ostensibly similar domains.

The idea of a custom complex also invites cultural psychologists to address the question of whether a particular cultural community has a characteristic mentality (e.g., the Protestant mentality), which leaves its generalized mark on many domains in that community, thereby making, for example, Protestant economics, Protestant religion, and Protestant family life more like each other than like a parallel natural domain in another cultural community.

We emphasize, however, that cultural psychology does not presume the existence of global consistency or thematic integration across all practice domains in a culture. Even Ruth Benedict (1934) was quite aware that many cultures are not patterned after some simple mold (Dionysian, Apollonian) or fundamentally integrated by a single theme (e.g., the work ethic). She knew, as we know, that the degree to which a small set of core beliefs, goals, or motives can account for the meaning and behavior of a people across the many domains of their life (family, work, and politics) is entirely an open empirical issue.

There is no way to know in advance of years of research in some particular cultural community whether their many practice domains all draw on the same mentality. Nevertheless, even if a particular cultural community is not thematically integrated (one small set of core meanings revealed in many practice domains), the custom complex is still a natural theoretical frame of analysis for cultural psychology. The idea defines a parameter space for conceptualizing and modeling the ways that culture and psyche make each other up, resulting, on a worldwide scale, in multiple instances of a relatively stable or equilibrated condition in which a mentality and a practice are mutually sustaining and reciprocally confirmatory. Not all custom complexes are integrated in the same way or cohere to the same degree. Nevertheless, the idea makes it possible for us to ask about the ways and degrees to which a relatively stable equilibrium (the intimate association of a local mentality and a cultural practice) has actually been achieved.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF PRACTICES

To conduct a relatively complete and systematic empirical study of a community's cultural psychology, it is necessary to identify the members' practices and categorize them into domains. Practices can be categorized in many ways, because any scheme of classification will depend largely on the investigator's theory of human needs (physical, social, psychological, and spiritual) and the research issues at hand.

One of the several ways practices can be classified into domains is from an ontogenetic perspective, with special reference to the development of mastery or expertise in some domain of psychological functioning (knowing, thinking, feeling, wanting, or valuing). Thus, practices might be identified and classified by reference to the particular substantive type of competence they promote (e.g., practices promoting social sensitivity, practices promoting moral development, practices promoting cognitive development). For example, a recent study (Munroe, in press) of 3- to 9-year-olds in four cultures (the Logoli of Kenya, Newars of Nepal, Black Caribs of Belize, and American Samoans) produced the counter-intuitive and provocative finding that children are more willing to engage in opposite gender sex role play and seem less threatened by sex role confusions in societies that have institutionalized adult patriarchal or patricentric practices such as male dominance, gender segregation, and a strict sexual division of labor. Although one can only speculate based on the data presented in Munroe's study, one might entertain the hypothesis that where gender is culturally sanctioned as a basis for social organization the interest and capacity to imaginatively take the perspective of the other across the gender division is more highly developed.

Or a developmentalist might classify practices not so much according to the substantive competence (e.g., taking the perspective of others) acquired but rather according to types of processes of acquisition. Werker (1989; also G. Gottlieb, 1991), has generated a short list of hypothetical ways that experience (read exposure to or active participation in a cultural practice) can affect the development of any mental skill or ability. She imagines five kinds of processes:

1. Maturation (the practice made no difference; the ability would have developed without it).
2. Facilitation (because of the practice, the ability was attained more quickly than otherwise would have been the case).

3. Induction (without the practice, there would have been no ability at all in this domain).

4. Attunement (because of the practice, a higher level of ability was attained than otherwise would have been the case).

5. Maintenance/loss (the ability was preexisting but would have been lost or deactivated if it had not been kept online through participation in the practice).

At this early stage in the evolution of a cultural psychology of individual development, we can only look forward with excitement to the time when we will have in hand the research designs, methodologies, and systematically collected bodies of evidence that will allow us to classify practices in this way. We look forward to the time when we will be able to distinguish between each of those five interpretations of the effects of participation in a cultural practice on the growth of a mental state or ability.

Cultural psychology is, however, not committed to a blank-slate learning theory (the blank-slate stance is a straw person, and not even John Locke posited an entirely empty organism prior to learning from childhood experience) nor does it presuppose an induction theory of mental development. Quite the contrary, much of the current research in cultural psychology is quite compatible with (and may even presuppose) either an attunement or a maintenance/loss account of the differential emergence, activation, or selective maintenance of particular mental states. Our conception of cultural learning is discussed later, especially in relationship to innate ideas.

In this chapter, we can seldom choose between different interpretations (maturation, attunement, maintenance/loss, etc.) of how participation in a cultural practice affects the activation of a mental state or the emergence of a mental skill. What we can do, however, as an intermediary step in building a full-blown cultural psychology of individual development, is point to some of the research and scholarship in cultural psychology that tries to describe and explain the differential ontogenetic emergence, activation, and selective maintenance of what the "I's" in different groups know, think, feel, want, value, and hence choose to do, including research about the "Self." Later in this chapter, we examine one important line of cultural psychological research on the development of an interdependent socioecentric, collective versus independentautonomous, individulistic self, but the cultural psychology project has general implications for claims about mental development that are quite independent of any particular findings in any particular domain.

For example, comparative research by Ross et al. (2003) has suggested that cognitive developmental theories presupposing a universal anthropocentric stage in the development of children's folk biological knowledge the idea that young children everywhere initially project a naive human psychology onto nonhuman species are more accurately viewed as local descriptions of the course of mental development for urban majority children who grow up with an impoverished experience of nonhuman nature. Native American Menominee children and rural children from mainstream populations in the United States, whose involvement with plants and nonhuman animals is positively structured and mediated by cultural beliefs and practices of various sorts, do not display the predicted universal developmental pattern and exhibit competences in ecological reasoning that are absent from the mentality of the urban, mainstream kids in the United States.

There are many other ways to classify cultural practices into domains. From the point of view of personal and social identity, cultural practices might be identified and classified by the existential problems they address. In any society, there are many existential questions, which must be answered for the sake of both individual mental health and social coordination:

- **Self practices** answer: "What's me or mine, and what's not me or mine?"

- **Gender practices** answer: "What's male, and what's female?"

- **Disciplinary practices** answer: "How are norms and rules to be enforced?"

- **Distributional practices** answer: "How should burdens and benefits be distributed?" (Shweder, 1982)

A closely related approach has been proposed by Fiske (1991, 1992), who argues that social life is comprised of four social relationships: communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. Fiske's scheme could readily be adapted and used in the classification of practices (practices promoting a sense of commonality, the importance and legitimacy of hierarchy, etc.). Some researchers may prefer to identify and classify practices by the institutions in which they are embedded (e.g., family-life practices, school-life practices). Other researchers, with different intellectual
aims and inclinations, may prefer to classify practices according to the biological needs or physical survival functions they serve (e.g., eating practices, health practices, or sexual practices).

Still others may want to proceed emically (Pike, 1967), which involves letting the classification of practice domains go hand in hand with the specification of the mentality of a cultural community, in the anticipation of some counterintuitive and astonishing results. In some cultural communities, for example, among devout Brahmins in India, there is a highly elaborated practice domain that might be labeled oblations, sacrifices, and sacramental offerings. It encompasses the daily preparation and consumption of food and includes in the same general practice domain other activities (e.g., prayer and animal sacrifice) that would never naturally go together in the mentality of a Western researcher. Among Hindu Brahmins in India, food is not a personal preference system. Given the local culturally elaborated idea that eating is a sacramental offering to a divinity (the self is conceptualized as a piece of divinity) residing in a temple (the human body), what you eat, how and by whom it has been prepared, and the conditions under which you eat is a mark of your moral standing and social status in the world.

THE ANALYSIS OF MENTALITIES

Mentalities are the other side of the custom complex. They can be investigated in the following ways: (a) by analyzing the idea of a mentality into its component parts: knowing, thinking, feeling, wanting, and valuing; (b) by modeling what some ideal or prototypical "I" (subject, agent, individual, or self) might be engaged in this or that practice might know, think, feel, want, and value; (c) by empirically determining the degree of specificity or generality of those components of a mentality for actual agents across practice domains in a cultural community (and perhaps across cultural communities for a particular practice domain); and (d) by pointing to broad patterns of generality for mentalities when and where they exist.

For example, there is good empirical reason to believe that the mentality dubbed interdependence, sociocentrism, or collectivism supports and maintains a whole array of practices both in and across domains for some groups in the United States (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b; Triandis, 1989, 1990).

Thus, although cultural psychology is in one major sense, the study of the way culture and psyche make each other up; in another closely related sense, it is also the study of the origin, structure, function, operation, and social reproduction of that intimate association between a mentality and a practice known as the custom complex.

THE TWO SIDES OF CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

Cultural psychology is the study of the way culture and psyche make each other up, resulting in the formation of the custom complex, which is a unit of analysis for characterizing the way multiple, diverse psychologies emerge out of the abstract potentialities of a universal mind. Psychological pluralism emerges, at least in part, because peoples think and act in the light of particular goals, values, and pictures of the world. Those factors are rarely the same across cultural communities.

The cultural side of cultural psychology is the study of the mentality-laden practices (including the symbolic forms, communicative exchanges, rituals, mores, folkways, and institutions) developed, promoted, promulgated, enacted, and enforced (and hence judged to be customary, normal, legal, moral, or reasonable) by the "I's" (the subjects, agents, individuals, or selves) of particular groups.

The psychological side of cultural psychology is the study of practice-related mental states, the things that the "I's" (subjects, agents, individuals, selves) of particular groups know, think, feel, want, value, and hence choose or decide to do to carry forward the normal practices of their society.

Based on those two sides of cultural psychology, which are fused in the idea of a custom complex, the aim of the discipline is to investigate precisely those cases where the following three conditions hold:

1. A "practice" displays significant variation across groups and differential patterning of within-group variations (e.g., there is a far greater probability of children and adults co-sleeping in a family bed in South Asia and Africa than in Europe and the United States and the correlation between social status and co-sleeping is not the same in South Asia and in the United States).
2. The components of a mentality (knowing, thinking, feeling, wanting, and valuing), such as feelings of closeness, pleasure, and serenity versus feelings of anxiety or agitation associated with skin-to-skin contact between parent and child, display significant variation across groups and differential patterning of within-group variation (e.g., European American males, in comparison to South Asian males, are more likely to feel anxiety associated with skin-to-skin contact between parent and child and feelings of closeness, pleasure, and serenity produced by skin-to-skin contact between parent and child may be correlated with gender in the United States, but not in South Asia).

3. The distribution of the practice appears to be related to the distribution of the mentality, and vice versa.

Thus, through the idea of a custom complex, cultural psychology joins the study of individual mental states to the study of cultural practices. On the one hand, investigators explore those features of what individuals know, think, feel, want, value, and hence choose to do that are primed by, traceable to, or derivable from participation in the symbolic forms, communicative exchanges, rituals, mores, folkways, and institutions of some consensus-sensitive or norm-enforcing group.

On the other hand, investigators look at the way in which the mentality-laden practices (the custom complexes) of particular groups gain their credibility, reasonableness, and motivational force from the very psychological states that they have helped activate and to which they have given life. Cultural psychology is therefore the study of reciprocal connections between culture and psyche and of the various patterns or forms of coherency (custom complexes) that have arisen out of their interactions.

**CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY'S THEORY OF MIND**

On a worldwide scale, there is well-documented diversity in the developmentally relevant cultural practices that promote, sustain, and confirm what the "I's" of particular groups know, think, feel, want, value, and hence choose to do. Consequently, cultural psychology is concerned not only with the inherent, mandatory, or fundamental aspects of the human mind but also, indeed especially, with those parts of what people know, think, feel, want, value, and hence decide to do that are conditional, optional, or discretionary and are primed and activated through participation in the symbolic and behavioral inheritance of particular groups. In effect, cultural psychology is a discipline committed to the study of patterns of psychological difference across groups or subgroups and to the investigation of the emergence (and dissolution) of stable, relatively coherent, and intimate interconnections between cultural practices and individual mental states.

Any study of difference, however, presumes many commonalities, likenesses, or universals by which attributions of difference become intelligible. A notable feature of our conception of cultural psychology is that it presupposes certain universal truths about what is (and what is not) inherent in human psychological functioning. At a minimum, we are committed to a theory of mind in which everywhere in the world human beings are the kind of beings who have a mental life (who know, think, and use language and other symbolic forms) and who feel, want, and value certain things, which is one way to explain what they do (Donagan, 1987).

Even more deeply, we are committed to the view that psyche consists of certain mental powers. Most notable of these are (a) the representational power to form beliefs about other persons, society, nature, the divine, and about means-ends connections of all sorts; and (b) the intentional power to affect an imagined future state of affairs by means of acts of the will, which is the human capacity to have a causal influence on the world through acts of decision making and choice.

If the power of representation is an essential feature of the human psyche, then the human psyche can be studied, at least in part, as a knowledge structure. If the power of intentionality is an essential feature of the human psyche, then the human psyche can be studied, at least in part, as inherently ends-sensitive, which is minimally what it means to be agentic or to have a free will.

This view of the inherent powers of the psyche accords reasonably well with William James's (1950) description of the marks of the "mental." According to James:

The pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon. We all use this test to distinguish between an intelligent and a mechanical performance. We impute no mentality to sticks and stones because they never seem to move for the sake of anything, but always when pushed and then indifferently and with no sign of choice. So we unhesitatingly call them senseless...
actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of means, can be indelible expressions of Mind. (p. 11)

As noted earlier the anthropological linguists Anna Wierzbicka (1986, 1991) and Cliff Goddard (1997, 2001) have shown that the notion of a mental subject or agent ("I") and mental state concepts such as to know, think, feel, want, and value (as good or bad) are lexicalized in all languages of the world and universally used in folk psychology to explain what people do. And it has been argued by Collingwood (1961, pp. 303, 306; see also Shweder et al., 1997), among many others, that at least one basic sense of the folk psychology concept of a "cause" is the idea of "a free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent" that is best understood through the ends the agent is trying to achieve and the means the agent believes are available for achieving them. With respect to its picture of the component parts of a mentality, folk psychology and cultural psychology presuppose pretty much the same picture of the universal and inherent features of the human psyche. Those marks of the mental include representation, intentionality, knowing, thinking, feeling, wanting, valuing, and hence deciding to do something.

Although cultural psychology is primarily concerned with the emergence and development of psychic pluralism, it makes use of a restricted set of mental state concepts as a universal framework for understanding the organization of psychological differences between the "1's" of different groups. The nature and organization of such differences and the manner of their development are discussed in the following section.

CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY'S SPECIAL USE OF MENTAL STATE CONCEPTS

In cultural psychology, mental state concepts are used to refer to the causal powers inherent in the mental nature of human beings. Such concepts are not necessarily meant to be descriptions of bits of human consciousness or of deliberative awareness.

One can use a mental state concept to explain what people do without necessarily assuming that the mental events in question are events in consciousness. What a person knows, thinks, wants, values is not always in front of that individual as a piece of awareness, even as it plays a causal role in how the person acts. How that causal process operates and produces its effects is a mystery that is at the heart of the unresolved (and perhaps irreconcilable) mind-body or mind-brain problem. Not all types of explanation of human behavior assume that mind matters, in the sense of having causal effects on the body. Cultural psychology makes the assumption that mental states are real, not epiphenomenal.

This suggests one additional power inherent in the human psyche—the ability to translate or transform a self-conscious deliberative process into a routine, automatic, unconscious, or habitual process. This power to turn a slow calculative process into a rapid response process prepares the individual to respond skillfully, smoothly, and not self-consciously (indeed almost mindlessly) in particular ways in particular circumstances. When this translation or transformation is fully accomplished, the associated mentality comes to be intimate and seems to be implicit in the practice.

As J. W. M. Whiting and Child (1953) pointed out long ago, with respect to the beliefs implicit in a practice: "The performer of a practice does not necessarily consciously rehearse the belief to himself at each performance. [For example, a typical middle-class European American parent does not necessarily consciously think to herself or himself] 'I know that I can promote autonomy and independence in infants and young children by having them sleep alone' every time she or he goes to bed at night.]" If asked, however, she or he will generally be able to report immediately at least some of the associated beliefs; in this case one may surmise that rehearsal of the belief was not part of the stimulus pattern for the present performance of the custom but rather a significant part of the stimulus pattern earlier in the development of the custom" (p. 28).

This comment by J. W. M. Whiting and Child is important for two reasons. First, it highlights the developmental process of becoming unconscious, whereas most developmental theorists, from Vygotsky to Piaget to Kohlberg, privilege the developmental process of becoming conscious or reflective. Whiting's and Child's implication that much of social behavior is habitual and automatic and that social life would not be possible if this were not so accords well with the views of Bourdieu (1972, 1990, 1991), Packer (1987), and others who are concerned with the difference between participating in the world and consciously deliberating about it.

Bourdieu argues that as practices are repeated again and again, they come to be seen as part of a natural order, and their original explicit reasons for occurrence may be difficult to resurrect. Packer makes the point that development typically involves becoming more fluent at some activity and that this is not necessarily the
same as becoming more reflective about that activity (as any serious athlete surely knows; see also Kell, Chapter 14, this Handbook, Volume II).

The idea of the custom complex and the return of research interest to the study of routine or habitual practice is an invitation to rethink some basic and classical ideas about the nature of development (the intellectual history of the idea of "habit"—see Charles J. C. Campe, 1986). More needs to be said about the misguided idea that one can define progressive development as some standard formal criterion such as the shift from intuition to reflection or from context-boundness to context-independence (Kessen, 1990).

One can add to the classical image of progressive directional change an indefinitely large series of other dichotomies. Somewhere or other in the vast literature on cognitive development, someone or other has argued that the fully developed mind is complex (versus simple), complete (versus incomplete), explicit (versus tacit), impersonal (versus personal), taxonomic (versus associative), elaborated (versus restricted), concept-driven (versus percept-driven), detached (versus affect-laden), consistent (versus inconsistent), and so on. As should be apparent from our discussion of the custom complex and the developmental advantages of tacit understandings, habits, and unreflective but fluent skills, cultural psychology is deeply suspicious of any attempt to define progressive development by universal (decontextualized) formal criteria. In some cases, cognitive development is the process of becoming less reflective not more reflective. Again, at times, the accumulation of tacit understanding is what intellectual growth is all about. It all depends.

The second reason for the importance of J. W. M. Whiting's and Child's (1953) comment is that it underscores the point that any adequate investigation into the cultural psychology of a person or a people—any description of a custom complex—must characterize the level of consciousness of the mentality that is associated with a particular cultural practice. Are the relevant beliefs, values, motives, and satisfactions active without deliberation, active because of deliberation, reportable reflections, unavailable to reflection, and so on? When it comes to participation in the custom complexes of any particular cultural community, to what extent is the course of development from the deliberate to the automatic, from the self-conscious to the fluent, or from the explicated to the tacitly understood? At the very least, the cultural psychology of development into the customary practices of any cultural community is likely to be the story of the progressive shift from deliberation and self-consciousness to mindless or intuitive fluency. It is a developmental story that has rarely been acknowledged in child development studies, except perhaps by those interested in the acquisition of physical skills such as walking downstairs, tying a shoe, or hitting a golf ball.

**SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIVERGENT INTERPERSONAL WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD**

From the perspective of cultural psychology, the local world of the child—especially in those dimensions likely to affect behavioral and psychological development—is largely mediated through culture-specific mentalities and practices of child rearing. In documenting variations across populations, cultural psychology first considers how responsible caregivers and educators, with special attention to the local ideas and meanings that support their behavior, routinely organize the child's experience. If people think and act in the light of particular goals, values, and pictures of the world, what are the goals, values, and pictures of the world (the mentality) of members of different cultural communities? Are there any generalizations that can be made about how and why differences arise in children's worlds and how they are structured?

As portrayed in the anthropological literature, variations in childhood worlds across human populations can be roughly divided into three categories corresponding to the material, social, and cultural conditions for child development (R. A. LeVine, 1989). First, material conditions include diet, housing, infant handling devices, and forms of protection against disease and other health risks. Second, social conditions include the family, peer groups, and other aspects of the interpersonal environment. Third, cultural conditions refer to the local ideational models, combining beliefs and moral norms that give meaning to all features of the child's world as well as to the child's development.

The focus in this section is on interpersonal aspects of the child's world, as mediated by differing cultures throughout the world. A considerable body of evidence on this subject has accumulated over the past 35 years (since a review of the literature appearing in the third edition of the present work; see R. A. LeVine, 1970, and even more since Margaret Mead's review in the Handbook's first edition in 1931) permitting some generalizations about the range of variation in children's worlds and their
meanings. The interpersonal worlds of children from birth to adolescence in different cultural communities vary widely along dimensions that can be described in quantitative and qualitative terms and that indicate divergent pathways for behavioral and psychological development—particularly when analyzed from the perspectives of interactional theories of development.

First, we begin by describing how differing organizational settings, caregiving relationships, parental practices, and age-graded participation in activities provide divergent patterns of socially and symbolically mediated experience for children of different cultures. Second, we turn to the cultural mentalities that not only rationalize and legitimize these social patterns but also motivate parental behavior. Third, we consider to what extent culturally differentiated social experience during childhood affects the psychological development of individuals— their attachments, skills, competence, preferences, relationships, and emotional experience as adults. Finally, we attempt to generalize about universals and variations in social development and their implications for developmental theory and research.

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCE

In this section we discuss the character and composition of domestic groups and variations in their function, size, density, boundedness.

Organizational Settings

For the first few years of life and often much longer, children in most societies are raised in domestic groups (the normal residential homes of the adults who care for them). The functions of these groups, and their size, composition, social density, and boundedness—all variable across cultures—influence the quantity and quality of social experience possible for a child in a given society. Many of these features, and the sociospatial arrangement of the family as a domestic group as a whole, are often not matters of personal choice but are standardized in local practice according to the dominant mode of economic production and prevailing ideas of morality.

The Function of Domestic Groups

In societies with domestic agricultural or craft production, where every family engages in productive work at home, children are raised in local settings designed for economic activities as well as for family residence. In urban-industrial societies like the United States, in which only 2% of adults engage in food production, children are more likely to be raised in home settings specifically designed for child care and segregated from adult economic activity.

This difference between cultural worlds in which work and family have been merged versus cultural worlds in which work and family have been separated (in some cases, as in the upper middle-class European American cultural area, with the family functioning more or less like a Montessori School) makes a great deal of difference for children. Where home is the setting for food or craft production, the attention of mothers is more often divided between child care and other demanding tasks. The family is then more likely to operate as a command hierarchy, with children at the bottom, and children are more likely to be spectators of a wide range of adult activities and to participate in them from an early age (Rogoff, Mistry, Göncü, & Mosier, 1993).

A family that functions as an economic production unit, like that of many Third World people today and preindustrial Europe and North America, constitutes a distinctive world of childhood in which child labor is expected and children’s play and education must be accommodated to the workplaces and routines of the home.

The actual amount of children’s labor contributions in such families varies from one agricultural people to another (Nag, White, & Peet, 1978). Among those with low-level technology, like the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, children may have to work a great deal at tasks they can do such as fetching water, herding animals, caring for babies, and assisting in cultivation. This permits the adults to concentrate on the heavier or more skilled tasks of hoeing, planting, weeding, harvesting, and food processing. Among peoples with a higher level of agricultural technology including irrigation, draft animals, and plows (e.g., rural villagers of India), the need for domestic labor is less and children may be indulged and have more free time. The actual utility of child labor in a particular setting, however, depends on the specific crops cultivated, their seasonal cycles, the availability of resources, such as water, and whether children can be hired outside the family. When new technology is introduced, the situation changes, and children may be freed from labor, unless they are drafted into craft production at home or sent elsewhere as hired hands.

In foraging (i.e., hunting-gathering) and fishing communities and among pastoral nomads, children also participate in productive activities at early ages (by the
among the Gusii of southwestern Kenya, a married woman and her younger children live in a house by themselves, but it is a unit embedded in a homestead owned by her husband or father-in-law, along with the (nearby) houses of her parents-in-law, brothers-in-law, and co-wives. If her husband is a polygamist, he may live in the houses of his other wives all or part of the time or even in a hut of his own separate from all of them, though near enough for children to bring him hot food from their houses.

Furthermore, as the children get older, they leave the mother’s house to sleep in the house of an older brother (for boys) or a grandmother (for girls), all within the homestead. The Gusii mother-child household is the elementary unit of family residence, but the homestead is the basic unit of domestic social life from the viewpoint of adults, and its male members form the nucleus of a local patrilineage (R. A. LeVine et al., 1994; R. A. LeVine & LeVine, 1966). This complex composition of domestic groups is common to many nonindustrial societies and often means that the child grows up in a more complex residential environment than that of the average American child.

The Social Density of Domestic Groups

The interactive settings in which children spend their early lives—including those of eating, sleeping, work, and play—vary widely in social density across cultures regardless of the size and compositional complexity of domestic groups. Gusii children may grow up in a homestead with as many as 58 inhabitants but spend all their hours in and around their mother’s house, interacting only with mother and older siblings during the preschool years.

In contrast, Hausa children, in a much smaller compound, may experience greater social density because the sharing of cooking facilities and yard space among the Hausa women in a walled compound creates more crowded settings for daily interaction involving children. The social density a child experiences, especially during the less mobile early years of life, depends not only on the wealth or resources of the family but also on the rules that govern family interaction. It seems hard for Americans and Europeans to believe that people in other cultures may enjoy, indeed prefer, crowded settings in which to eat, sleep, work, play, and even breastfeed babies (Tronick, Morelli, & Winn, 1987). But such preferences are widespread among the world’s peoples, even when they have enough domestic space in which to carry on these activities in isolation.
The Boundedness of Domestic Groups

Interactive patterns in the child’s world are constrained by the social boundaries recognized by adults. Boundaries can be physical in form, like the mud walls of a Yoruba or Hausa compound or the cultivated fields that divide the mother-child households of a Gusii homestead from each other. Boundaries can also be invisible or conceptual barriers, as in the local traditions of inter-household visiting, greeting, and hospitality that limit the interaction of children and adults in many Western and Japanese urban neighborhoods.

In urban India, by contrast, there are middle-class apartment dwellings occupied by kin-related families whose children wander in and out of each other’s homes without such restriction. From the children’s perspective, the permeability of the household and other domestic units in the immediate environment provides the basis of a cognitive map of their social world.

Care-Giving Relationships

Mothers are the primary caregivers of their children for at least the first 2 years of life in most human societies, but there are significant exceptions, and there is even greater variation in the array of supplementary caregivers who assist mothers and form relationships with young children. The ethnographic record as a whole does not suggest that there is a single system for human child care but rather a range of parental patterns flexible enough to respond to and enable varying economic, demographic, and technological conditions with diverse care-giving arrangements that affect the interpersonal experience of the growing child.

When women have a heavy workload due to a primary role in food production, then the resultant scarcity of female labor may create a demand for supplementary caregiving arrangements. When children are scarce relative to adult women (due to high rates of infertility, infant and child mortality, or contraception), adult women who are infertile or postmenopausal may be eager to take care of young children born to others. When wet nurses or synthetic milk formulas become available, maternal breast-feeding may decline. Thus, variations in caregiving practices and relationships are generated by the differing conditions to which human populations adapt.

There are some human populations in which a majority of children under 2 years of age live with and are cared for by someone other than their mothers. These fostering and adoption practices have been documented in Micronesia (Carroll, 1970) and West Africa (Bledsoe, 1989). In these cases, young children are distributed among kin, often to mothers and sisters of the women who gave birth to them, after a period of breast-feeding by the mother. There is usually no effort to disguise the original relationship, and children often go back to their mothers after a period of years. Although some mothers do this because they feel obliged to meet the demands of their own mothers or sisters, they usually also feel that the child will benefit from additional sponsorship, as Goody (1982) has described for the fostering of older children among the Gonja of Ghana. All these practices are infused with the assumptions of a kinship ideology in which children are seen as belonging to, and as potential beneficiaries of, a descent group wider than the biological parents. Mothers who do not care for their own children are not viewed as irresponsible or neglectful in these cultural communities.

In a much larger range of societies, children are raised by their mothers, though often with help from others such as sibling caregivers, grandmothers, and other related adult women, and fathers or other men.

Sibling care of infants is widespread not only in sub-Saharan Africa (where it is ubiquitous) but also in Oceania, Okinawa, and parts of Southeast Asia (Weisner, 1982, 1987a, 1989a, 1989b; Weisner & Gallimore, 1977). It is more frequent where mothers have extensive responsibility for agriculture.

The practice of sibling caretaking raises the question of whether leaving infants in the care of 5- to 10-year-old children, which would be considered criminal neglect in the United States, harms babies when it has achieved the status of a custom complex and is the routine practice of an entire population.

From the available evidence, the answer to this question is: No, babies are not harmed by this practice. For several reasons, first, 5-year-old children can be, and are, trained to be responsibly protective, if not necessarily sensitive, caregivers, particularly for babies carried on the back. Second, child care is largely conducted in the open air during the day, and neighbors are within earshot in case anything goes wrong. Third, the child nurse is not expected to substitute for the mother in a general sense, but simply to complement her care by protecting and feeding the baby for a few hours at a time. The mother breast-feeds during the day and sleeps with the baby at night, and infants raised under these conditions become attached to their mothers.
Finally, and in light of the foregoing, it seems that the American or European American concern about psychological harm is probably exaggerated. Babies can accommodate comfortably to sibling care, and back-carrying as well as other widespread forms of tactile stimulation promote both physical growth and psychosocial attachment during the 1st year (R. A. LeVine et al., 1994, pp. 257–258).

Furthermore, sibling care can initiate a strong lifelong relationship between an older sister and younger brother, which some cultures selectively promote. Among the Hausa, the marriage of a sister’s son to the daughter of the brother she cared for as an infant is a preferred form of cross-cousin marriage. Even in the short run, the relationship of the toddler to his sibling caregiver often introduces the child to a larger group of children who become salient nonparental figures in his life.

Grandmothers and other adult women often play an important supplementary role in infant care, especially where children are raised in large domestic groups. From West Africa to India and China, grandmothers are not only caregivers in the early years but also, as the child grows older, complements to the mother’s disciplinary role with their unconditional nurturance and emotional support. Children can, and often do, form intense and long-lasting relationships with other resident women in extended family situations.

Fathers and other men are more rarely observed as caregivers for young children, but there is variation across human populations. Hewlett (1992) has provided substantial data from diverse peoples. He distinguishes between the father’s investment in the child, which may be indirect and consist of providing resources through the mother, and involvement with the child, which refers to interaction.

Although paternal interaction with young children is rare relative to that of the mother and other females, and it is unusual cross-culturally for males to be constant and responsible caregivers (as opposed to occasional playmates) for infants or toddlers, the range is quite considerable. Among the Dinka of the Sudan, for example, the exclusion of men from attending the delivery of a child is extended through the early years of a child’s life, and the father only interacts with his older children (Deng, 1972). Aka pygmy fathers in Cameroon, however, participate substantially in the care of young children (Hewlett, 1991), and among high-caste Hindu farmers of the Katmandu Valley in Nepal, various men in the extended family take care of infants and toddlers for periods of time during the day (S. LeVine, n.d.). As Harkness and Super (1992) point out, fathers can be in the presence of young children without interacting with them, and it is only when cultural practices and mentalities favor it, that fathers and other men will assume responsibility for the care of children or engage them in interaction. Infants become attached to their father and other men who interact with them, as they do to their mother, siblings, grandmothers, and other adult women (Ainsworth, 1967).

Parental Practices

An important and culturally variable part of the child’s social environment is constituted by the customary activities that parents and others arrange for them. Observational investigators of human and other primate offspring have created a number of dichotomous categories to describe these activities: Child-centered communications versus those that do not include the child, distal (often verbal) versus proximal (usually physical) stimulations, reciprocal or contingent vocalization versus unilateral speech to a child, positive versus negative emotional arousal, soothing versus stimulation, and sensitive versus insensitive response to infant signals.

These dichotomies are behaviorally specified to be unequivocally observable in differing contexts of primate behavior, but they nevertheless seem to reflect European American middle-class preferences for child-centered, distal, verbal, reciprocal, emotionally positive, stimulating, and sensitive patterns of parent-child interaction. Studies using these categories cross-culturally usually show that parents in other cultures exhibit some or all of these behaviors less frequently than middle-class European Americans (R. A. LeVine et al., 1994; Richman et al., 1988; Richman, Miller, & LeVine, 1992).

However valid these findings of difference in frequencies may be, they are only part of the story. Taking European American custom complexes as the reference point for comparison almost inevitably means overlooking activities and dimensions that are salient only in the other cultures. Without a complementary account of the mentality and point of view of the other culture, this is grossly uninformative, like an African account that might describe the American family as lacking cattle and agriculture.

The findings may indicate that parents in the other culture are not committed to the same custom complexes...
in their observable practices and do not share the European American mentality, but the findings do not describe what complex they are committed to and what goals, values, and pictures of the world they are in fact and in practice following. To make sense of observable differences in parents’ practices, it is necessary to describe the parents’ cultural models of social relations. It is necessary to describe the mentalities that guide and give meaning to their practices and to a child’s social participation. Some illustrations are provided in the next section.

Age-Graded Activities

In all societies, the social interaction of children is altered by their age-related participation in activities at home or school. The institution of schooling creates an extreme form of age-grading. In most schools children, from the ages of 5- to 8-years-old onward, tend to be rigidly segregated by age from those older and younger for many of their daytime activities.

The peer groups that result are neither natural nor universal. In societies without schools, children’s relationships with each other are formed among siblings or other multiage groups of juveniles (Konner, 1975). In these multiage groups, participants are much more sharply differentiated by authority and knowledge than in school-based peer groups. In such groups, relationships among older and younger children may facilitate the learning of skills by the younger, who observe mature practice performed by someone old enough to be more skilled but close enough in age to be easily imitated (Dunn, 1983).

Sibling relations may also promote interpersonal responsibility, cooperation, and sensitivity to the vulnerability of others on the part of the elder children (Schieffelin, 1990; Weisner, 1982, 1987, 1989b; B. B. Whiting & Edwards, 1988). Schools, alternatively, may foster interpersonal comparison and competition among peers and, by obstructing the child’s observational access to mature practice, make learning more problematic and hence more self-conscious (Lave, 1990; R. A. LeVine, 1978; Scribner & Cole, 1973). Cultural variability in age-graded social activities is widened further by specific combinations of siblingship, school and work in the local environments of children, and culture-specific norms that elaborate or diminish age ranking.

CULTURAL MENTALITIES CONCERNING CHILDHOOD SOCIAL RELATIONS

Parents do not always try to control the interpersonal environments of their children in detail, particularly after the first 2 or 3 years, and when they try to, they are often far from successful. Nevertheless, parents care about and can usually influence the settings in which their children interact with others, their caregivers and companions, and the kinds of interactions that take place (B. B. Whiting & Edwards, 1988; B. B. Whiting & Whiting, 1975). Thus, it matters what parents think and feel about such things, and socially inherited beliefs, values, and pictures of the world frame what they think and feel. Parents are culture bearers, and their models of childhood social relations are as variable as their culture’s conceptions of the good life and how to live it (Harkness & Super, 1996; R. A. LeVine et al., 1994; R. A. LeVine, Miller, & West, 1988).

Parental Models and Strategies

Parental behavior is symbolic action in Geertz’s (1973b) sense of the term and reflects a local mentality about what parenthood and child development are and ought to be, as formulated in the symbols of a particular culture. The local cultural mentality gives meaning to the actions of parents and children and motivates parents to promote certain behaviors and dampen others. A cultural mentality of child care has three components: (1) moral direction, (2) a pragmatic design, and (3) customary scripts for interaction (R. A. LeVine et al., 1994).

Moral Direction

Cultural mentalities of child care are goal driven; they are formulated by cultural concepts of virtue toward which a child’s behavioral development should move. The vernacular words (e.g., independence, autonomy, and self-reliance for the European American middle class) and the images associated with them that represent virtuous goals of development help provide parents’ rationales for their observable child-care practices.

Research on comparative ethics and development, however, has revealed that the humanly recognizable virtues or moral ends of life can be culturally organized in ways that do not privilege an “ethics of autonomy” (Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1996, 2000; Shweder, 1980).
Shweder et al., 1990, 1997) and that in some societies an “ethics of community” and/or an “ethics of divinity” leads to an emphasis on alternative virtues and goals of development such as duty, respect, hierarchical interdependence, purity, and sanctity.

Furthermore, each type of ethics highlights a particular view of the self. Shweder et al. (1997) argue that (a) the ethics of autonomy is associated with a conception of the self as an individual preference structure, where the point of moral evaluation is to increase choice and personal liberty; (b) the ethics of community is associated with a conception of the self as an office holder in which a person’s role or station in life is intrinsic to their identity; and (c) the ethics of divinity is associated with a conception of the self as a spiritual entity connected to some sacred order of things and as the bearer of a legacy that is elevated and pure. The meaning of child-care practices in any particular community, from disciplinary practices to sleeping arrangements to the practice of circumcision, is often most understandable with reference to the particular moral ends that justify and rationalize those practices in the minds of parents in that local cultural world (on initiation and circumcision see, e.g., Kratz, 1994, pp. 341–347).

**Pragmatic Design**

Cultural mentalities of child care embody strategies not only for facilitating the child’s behavioral development in a morally virtuous direction but also for achieving other ends (e.g., survival, health, and economic returns) and for overcoming obstacles to the attainment of all these ends. This utilitarian aspect of child-care mentalities provides a practical value and convinces parents that they are doing what is necessary and right.

**Customary Scripts for Interaction**

The moral and pragmatic aspects of a child-care mentality may or may not be explicitly formulated in general terms, but they are always represented in the social customs that guide the interaction of parents and other caregivers with young and older children. At this level of specificity in social interaction, for example, the script for responding to a baby’s cry among the Gusii of Kenya is an immediate soothing response. This response is seen as promoting the calmness and compliance of a young child (the moral direction) as well as the child’s health and survival in the early months (part of the pragmatic design). However, it is so customary that allowing a baby to cry more than a few seconds is experienced by Gusii adults as an intolerable breach of caregiving norms.

**THE EFFECTS OF EARLY INTERPERSONAL EXPERIENCE**

What effects do cultural variations in interpersonal environments and symbolically mediated experience have on the behavioral and psychosocial development of the child? A cultural community or population-level approach provides a clearer picture of the effects of early experience than a focus on the psychology of individual differences (R. A. LeVine, 1990a). For example, children who grow up in China obviously learn to speak Chinese, just as those who grow up in Turkey learn Turkish. Less obvious, but well established by sociolinguistic investigators of child language, is that as young children acquire a first language they also master the communicative practices regulating interpersonal behavior in their communities (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986a, 1986b).

The symbolic mediation of experience and communicative practices are discussed in a following section. The main point of emphasis here is a very simple one: For young children the development of communicative competence reflects their early experience in a particular language environment and constitutes an important part of their early enculturation.

By age 3, children have culture-specific capacities for and expectations of emotionally salient interpersonal behavior, embedded in speech routines and other customs of face-to-face interaction, in the context of specific relationships (Schieffelin, 1990). Their behavioral development has taken a culturally distinctive character and direction, diverging from that of other cultures.

Relatively little research has been done on the behavioral consequences of cultural variations in early social experience, but there is some evidence of measurable effects. Social behaviors shown to differ across culturally varying samples of children include infant-mother attachment (Grossmann & Grossmann, 1981, 1991; Grossmann, Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985), attention-seeking (R. A. LeVine et al., 1994; B. B. Whiting & Whiting, 1975), dependence (Caudill & Schooler, 1973), cooperation (Thomas, 1978), and gender orientation (B. B. Whiting & Edwards, 1988). In each of these cases, the evidence of
behavioral difference has been interpreted by the investigators to reflect the impact of the children’s prior experience in divergent cultural environments, although it is probably not possible at this time to choose between different interpretations of this impact (e.g., facilitation, attunement, or maintenance/loss, as discussed earlier; Werker, 1989).

An example from infancy research is the Grossmanns’ (1981, 1991; Grossmann et al., 1985) study of infant-mother attachment in Bielefeld, North Germany. This German replication of Mary Ainsworth’s Baltimore study (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) found that the majority of a nonclinical sample of 12-month-olds was classifiable on the basis of the videotaped Strange Situation as “insecurely” attached to their mothers. Forty-nine percent of the sample was classified in the “A” category or “anxious-avoidant,” almost twice as large a proportion as in American samples. The Grossmanns related this departure from American norms to the German mothers’ custom complex—their mentality and practices. German mothers, in this region of Germany, prefer a greater physical and interpersonal distance from their infants than Americans, leaving them alone more often and sometimes pushing them away. They would consider American infants rated as “optimal” by attachment researchers to be spoiled.

According to the Grossmanns’ interpretation, the culture-specific preferences of the German mothers was based on a broader cultural mentality, even ideology, emphasizing an ideal of pure independence that is even more exaggerated than the European American ethics of autonomy. For these mothers, this cultural ideology was translated into maternal practices that affected not only their infants’ routine expectations for social interaction and comforting but also their response to separation and reunion in the Strange Situation. Their interpretation of their findings implies, though the Grossmanns do not say so, that the profile of attachment ratings of American infants in the Strange Situation can be seen as reflecting the culturally influenced parental practices of European Americans rather than a universal norm for all human populations (LeVine & Norman, 2001).

If this is so, then claims of species-typical universality for attachment as observed in the Strange Situation should be considered premature. Infant reactions to reunion with their mother after a brief separation at 19 months of age can be reinterpreted as indicators of early enculturation to a cultural standard of interpersonal distance mediated through parental practices of infant care.

The German evidence provides the starting point for a cultural critique of the Bowlby-Ainsworth model of attachment, especially its claims to have discovered the evolutionary origins of human social relationships and the biological basis for judgments of optimality, normality, and pathology in early development. As more detailed and culturally informed evidence on behavioral development in diverse cultures accumulates, a cultural critique of developmental models may serve a useful purpose, particularly if the models themselves continue to ignore cultural variation in early social experience.

At this point, it may not be possible to launch robust generalizations about the psychological effects of early interpersonal experience based on population-level comparisons across cultures. However, as the concepts and techniques for observing and recording infant care and early communicative exchanges involving children have improved, and as comparative evidence has grown, so have the grounds for believing human behavioral development to be culturally divergent from the early years of childhood onward.

**THE SYMBOLIC MEDIATION OF EXPERIENCE: LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATIVE CUSTOMS IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY**

It is a major assumption of cultural psychology that one mind is transformed into many mentalities through the symbolic mediation of experience and that the human conceptual capacities that support culture also support language use, which is the primary means by which the symbolic and behavioral inheritances of a cultural tradition are passed on to the next generation. It is primarily by means of language that human beings negotiate divergent points of view and construct shared cultural realities. In this section, we selectively discuss the role of certain pragmatic forms of linguistic analysis in research on the cultural psychology of development.

As children learn language, they gain entry to existing meaning systems and access to the tools for recreating and transforming those systems. In a wide-ranging review of the literature, Nelson (1996) concludes “language and the surrounding culture take over the human mind” (p. 325), profoundly changing the nature of cognition and communication during the time from 2 to 6 years of age. Language is fundamental not only to meaning construction but to identity. Through its association
with particular contexts, language comes to symbolize and belong to particular groups. Quite simply, there can be no cultural psychology without language.

This premise is traceable to many intellectual forebears of contemporary cultural psychology. These include the eighteenth-century European philosophers who laid the groundwork for cultural psychology (Jahoda, 1992), Wilhelm Wundt and other nineteenth-century proponents of a “second” psychology (Cahan & White, 1992), and Edward Sapir (Mandelbaum, 1951) the anthropological linguist whose works on language in social life and on culture and personality anticipated many topics of current interest to cultural psychologists.

We begin this section of the chapter by discussing the conception of language that is most compatible with the aims of cultural psychology and by identifying resources from allied fields of study that hold promise for deepening our understanding of language in cultural life. We turn next to socialization, one of the fundamental problems of cultural psychology, and review studies that have yielded important insights into the actual process of socialization by examining the forms and functions of everyday discourse. We then single out oral narrative as a paradigm case of everyday discourse, organizing the discussion around issues of diversity. Throughout this section, the primary focus is on research with young children. In keeping with the comparative commitment of cultural psychology, examples of variation within and across cultures are included wherever possible.

**LANGUAGE AS PRACTICE**

The centrality of language to cultural psychology stems not only from historical precedent but also from the duality of language. Unlike other domains, language is both a tool and an object of inquiry. On the one hand, the use of language as an instrument of inquiry is pervasive; every study of human development depends on verbal communication in one way or another. Children are questioned about the reasons for their moral judgments. Parents are interviewed about their child-rearing beliefs. Verbal behaviors are incorporated into observational coding schemes. Experimental tasks have to be explained to participants. On the other hand, language serves as the object of inquiry in many studies that seek to understand the nature and development of the linguistic system itself, including its various subsystems (e.g., syntax, morphology).

This distinction between language as tool and object of inquiry serves the interests of cultural psychology by promoting critical examination of the ways in which researchers use language in conducting their research and by acknowledging the continued importance of understanding the referential function of language. At the same time, this distinction is limiting because it does not readily encompass a third, rapidly growing set of studies of particular interest to cultural psychology.

These studies focus on talk but they are not concerned with language development itself. Instead, they examine how talk contributes to constituting children’s experience in other developmental domains (Garvey, 1992) such as social development (e.g., Dunn, 1993), self-construction (e.g., Bruner, 1990a, 1990b), and peer culture (e.g., Corsaro, 1992, 1997). These studies take talk seriously as a “substantive, structured, and structuring activity with intrinsic developmental significance” (Packer, 1987, p. 253). An important implication of this perspective is that a particular social phenomenon may be constituted in qualitatively different ways within and across cultures and that these differences are created partly through talk.

Recent research on play deserves to be singled out because it illustrates this point especially well and because it represents some of the most richly contextualized research in developmental cultural psychology. Children use verbal and nonverbal means to frame their play as nonliteral, to enact pretend roles, and to negotiate pretend transformations with their play partners (e.g., Garvey & Kramer, 1989; Sawyer, 1997). However, local customs and belief systems vary dramatically along many dimensions, including who children play with and how they communicate with one another (e.g., C. D. Clark, 2003; Göncü, 1999; Göncü, Patt, & Koubi, 2002; Haight, Wang, Fung, Williams, & Mintz, 1999; Laney, 1996; Schwartzman, 1978). For example, when a child has long conversations with an invisible other, middle-class American parents are likely to assume that she is talking to an imaginary companion; Hindu parents that she is talking to a real spiritual being (M. Taylor & Carlson, 2000). In contrast to middle-class European American children, whose mothers induct them into pretense by prompting, elaborating, and modeling (Haight & Miller, 1993), Yucatec Mayan parents do not play with young children (Gaskins, 1999). When Mayan children engage in social pretense, they do so exclusively with other children. Similarly, Indonesian and Mexican children are socialized into play by older siblings.
(Farver, 1999). Although children in all these groups engage in pretend play, they do so according to local social and communicative conventions. As a result, play assumes different forms, takes on different significances, and likely makes different contributions to their overall development.

Implicit in these studies is a conception of language that privileges the situated use of language and recognizes that speaking is inherently polysemous when extracted from context (Bauman & Sherzer, 1989; Duranti & Goodwin, 1992; Hanks, 1996). This conception contrasts with the narrowly referential conception of language that holds sway in most research on human development and cross-cultural psychology. The view of language that is most compatible with the aims of cultural psychology does not reduce language to a representational system or repository of knowledge. Rather, it goes beyond grammatical and lexical meaning to include processes of indexical meaning that anchor utterances to their linguistic and nonlinguistic contexts and to unspoken background assumptions.

Hanks (1996) describes speech as "a form of engagement in the world... To speak is to occupy the world, not only to represent it, and this occupancy entails various modes of expression, of which propositional meaning is only one" (p. 236). To speak is to create social realities—to play, tease, instruct, dominate, transform oneself, and so on. Just as language cannot be sealed off from social life, words cannot be sealed off from silence or from gaze, posture, gesture, facial expression, and other practices of the body. From this perspective, speaking consists of practices that are organized beyond the sentence level into dialogues, genres, and multichanneled performances. These larger communicative events, while serving as units of analysis, are themselves multiply embedded in larger sociocultural contexts and networks of cultural practices. In contrast to approaches that take the disembodied word, sentence, or text as the unit of analysis, this approach permits a deeper cultural analysis, for it recognizes that cultural principles are expressed not just in the content of talk but in the way that discourse is organized internally and in relation to larger events and sequences of talk.

Among the many intellectual currents that have fed into practiced-centered views of language is sociohistorical theory, with its focus on semiotically mediated activity (Cole, 1996; Wertsch, 1985) and linguistic anthropology, especially the fields of ethnography of communication (e.g., Bauman & Sherzer, 1989; Hymes, 1974) and language socialization (which is discussed more fully later). These fields have been centrally concerned with cross-cultural comparisons and hence are especially germane to the comparative mission of cultural psychology. Relying on the assumption that everyday talk is a pervasive, orderly, and culturally organized feature of social life in every culture, they seek to understand the diversity of language use in the conduct and constitution of social life.

These fields provide a rich set of conceptual, methodological, and empirical resources that cultural psychologists should exploit more fully. These include procedures for grounding interpretations of communicative practices in the public cues that participants systematically deploy in interaction and critiques of our own social scientific methods as communicative practices whose meaning may not be shared by the people we study. For example, C. Briggs' (1986) analysis of interviewing as a social and cultural practice is still timely and demonstrates the critical importance of customizing interviewing to local metacommunicative practices (see also P. J. Miller et al., 2003, for an application of this approach).

Another important insight from these fields pertains to the issue of context. The focus on naturally occurring discursive practices has led to a much more dynamic conception of context and practice than is usually assumed in developmental studies. Contexts are treated not as static givens, dictated by the social and physical environment, but as ongoing accomplishments negotiated by participants. This shift from static to dynamic is signaled by the term contextualization, which focuses attention on the interpretive processes participants themselves use to determine which aspects of the ongoing activity are relevant (e.g., Bauman & Briggs, 1990; Duranti & Goodwin, 1992). This conceptual innovation offers a holistic conception of individual and context as an interlocking system in which the language practice changes along with the person (see Goodnow et al., 1995, for further discussion of this point).

**SOCIALIZATION THROUGH LANGUAGE**

The growing literature on language socialization deserves further consideration because it arises from an intellectual project that is basic to cultural psychology. Cultural psychology recognizes that child development is inextricably bound to the process of socialization—of orienting oneself in systems of meaning—and seeks to understand the nature of this process as it is actually en-
acted by living, experiencing human beings. Cultural psychology is uniquely positioned, by virtue of its interdisciplinarity character and commitment to meaning, to claim socialization fully as its own—something that none of the social sciences has succeeded in doing. Because of the way in which human action has been partitioned for study, socialization has remained marginal to the intellectual agenda of any discipline. As a result, it has been difficult to devise an integrated conception of socialization that slights neither culture nor children.

The field of language socialization provides an important model of how to proceed with this task. Inspired by Edward Sapir’s famous words, “Language is a great force of socialization, probably the greatest that exists” (Mandelbaum, 1951, p. 15), this field rests on the premise that children are not only socialized through language but are socialized to use language (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984). Another touchstone is the Vygotskian idea that sociocultural meanings are created by using language for particular purposes in socially defined activities (Vygotsky, 1934/1987; Wertsch, 1985). If language not only reflects meaning but also constitutes meaning, then an adequate theory of socialization must incorporate talk in a principled way.

Such a theory confers three advantages. First, the actual processes of socialization are rendered accessible through analysis of the forms and functions of everyday discourse. Second, in keeping with a basic insight of modern developmental psychology, the child is accorded an active role through a focus on child and caregivers’ mutual, negotiated participation in discourse practices (Brandtstädter, Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume; Rogoff, 1990). Third, the fact that language practices systematically index social statuses and ideologies helps to explain the varied affective stances—eager acceptance, resistance, playfulness—that children assume as they attempt to invest cultural resources with meaning (Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1999). Both the nonneutral, ideologically charged nature of the socializing environment and the necessarily evaluative responses of the child-in-context are taken into account (Goodnow, 1990a).

Beginning in the 1970s, led by the pioneering work of Ochs and Schieffelin (1984), researchers began to translate these ideas into a particular kind of empirical work designed to link macro- and microlevels of analysis. In an attempt to discover how communities structure children’s entry into meaning, they combined ethnographic fieldwork with the meticulous documentation of interactions between members and novices as they unfold in everyday life. Although the process of language socialization was assumed to be lifelong, most research focused on the early years. In contrast to many domains of human development, some of the best documented cases were non-Western cultures (e.g., Ochs, 1988; Schieffelin, 1990; Watson-Gegeo & Gegeo, 1990, 1999) and working-class and minority groups in the United States (e.g., Heath, 1983; P. J. Miller, 1982).

Research on language socialization has been the subject of numerous reviews (e.g., P. J. Miller & Hoogstra, 1992; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986a) and collections (e.g., Bayley & Schecter, 2003; Corsaro & Miller, 1992; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986b). An important conclusion emerging from this body of work is that there is enormous diversity in the cultural organization of caregiving and language learning and that the pattern of sustained dyadic conversation and mutual negotiation of meaning so familiar to many middle-class European Americans is just one variant among many. As noted earlier, groups differ in the physical and social ecology of child care, in language ideologies and folk theories about the nature of children and development, in the practices used to encourage mature speech, and in the principles that organize interaction.

For example, Kaluli mothers of Papua, New Guinea, believe that infants do not understand and thus cannot be conversational partners (Schieffelin, 1990). They do not talk to infants; instead they face babies outwards so that they can be part of the social flow. When older siblings greet the baby, the mother speaks for the baby, using language that is appropriate to the older child. Mothers do not interpret or paraphrase infants’ vocalizations, a practice that reflects a dispreferance for talking about another person’s thoughts or feelings. In the working-class African American community described by Heath (1983), multiparty talk is the norm and children are almost never alone. Talk around the child, rather than talk directly to the child, is the primary linguistic resource for novice learners. In a Mayan community in southern Mexico, both dyadic and “eavesdropper” models of language learning are practiced, and nonverbal interaction plays an important role in organizing infants’ participation (de León, 2000).

Coexisting with these and other differences are important similarities. For example, many groups socialize children into elaborate forms of teasing and oppositional language (e.g., Briggs, 1998; Corsaro, Molinari, & Rosier, 2002; de León, 2000; Eisenberg, 1986). Even more widespread is the use of explicit instruction to socialize young children into valued ways of acting, feeling.
and speaking (P. J. Miller & Hoostrag, 1992). This is one of the reasons we could suggest (in our initial discussion of the custom complex) that the course of progressive development is sometimes from the reflective to the unreflective, from the explicit to the tacit. For example, Watson-Gegge and Gegeo (1990), found that Kwara’ae (Solomon Islands) parents used a symbolically powerful and emotionally intense discourse, called “shaping the mind,” to pass on traditional knowledge and encourage children to practice reasoning and argumentation.

Research on language socialization also has revealed that many of the most powerful socializing messages are implicit and unintended. They are conveyed through tacit routine organizations of time and space, with their associated routines and distributions of social actors, and through contrastive distributions of language forms and functions that index meaning. The implication is that research that depends exclusively on asking caregivers about their socializing goals is likely to miss some of the deepest and most subtle dimensions of socialization—those pervasive and fundamental cultural orderings that feel most deeply natural to participants and are least likely to be reflected on. For example, Western Samoan children begin to learn about the social stratification that pervades their society not only by participating in interactions in which higher status caregivers direct lower status caregivers to care for them but also by observing how caregivers of different rank distribute themselves in domestic spaces (Ochs, 1988).

In addition to establishing that there are diverse pathways to communicative competence, studies of language socialization also demonstrate that children come to embody diverse ways of being in the world. Particularly relevant to cultural psychology are studies that focus on the socialization of affect. Like earlier work (e.g., P. J. Miller & Sperry, 1987; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986a, 1986b), recent studies show that children are able to express affect through custom communicative means from an early age and that they deploy a wide variety of communicative resources, not just emotion state terms (e.g., Clancy, 1999). Some studies focus on caregivers’ styles of affective socialization (e.g., Cervantes, 2002). Others show how culturally salient affective experience—for example, shame for Taiwanese children (Fung, 1999), interpersonal danger for Inuit children (J. Briggs, 1998)—is constituted through children’s habitual participation in recurring patterns of discourse.

Welcome as such evidence is for developmental cultural psychology, the project of mapping a landscape of cultural distinctiveness carries with it certain risks. One of the unintended consequences of the first phase of research on language socialization was to essentialize differences across cultures, minimizing variation within culture and across time (Ochs, 1999). Fortunately, an emerging trend in recent research on language socialization is a focus on bilingual and multilingual communities and other situations in which languages and cultures come into contact (Bayley & Schecter, 2003; Garrett & Baquedano-López, 2002). Kulick’s (1992) study of language shift and language socialization in Gapun, Papua, New Guinea is a landmark in this respect. Adults in this small-scale society traditionally spoke the vernacular language as well as one or more other languages. However, under the influence of modernization, Gapuners began to valorize the local Creole language. Kulick found that adults unwittingly interacted with children in ways that systematically denied them access to the vernacular language, resulting in its rapid decline. This study not only linked two trajectories of change (historical change and childhood socialization) but also showed that language ideologies linking gender, affect, and language played a critical role in imperiling the vernacular language.

As scholars turn their attention to language socialization in heterogeneous situations, such as changing language policy in nation states, transnational migration, postcolonial settings, and linguistically diverse institutions (e.g., Fader, 2001; González, 2001; He, 2001; Sandel, 2003), they have begun to problematize important ideas. Garrett and Baquedano-López (2002) point out that such studies reveal that the boundaries of language communities are fuzzy, permeable, and shifting; community can no longer be defined as “geography, language(s) spoken, or broad presupposed social categories such as race or ethnicity, but in terms of mutual social and interactive engagement” (p. 347). Such studies underscore the need to know more about how children navigate and interweave multiple languages, meaning systems, and genres, a process that is also gaining attention in studies of narrative.

**Narrative: Getting Those Stories Straight**

Narrative is a cultural universal, and one of the most powerful interpretive tools that human beings possess for organizing experience in time and for interpreting and valuing human action. The literature on narrative is vast, and the list of topics relevant to cultural psychology is long. These include the relationship between nar-
rative and memory (e.g., Neisser & Fixush, 1994), the role of narrative in the construction of selves and identities (e.g., Bruner, 1990a, 1990b; Gergen, 1991; Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998; Wortham, 2001), narrative as a therapeutic technique in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis (e.g., Polkinghorne, 1988; Spence, 1982), and narrative in family life (Pratt 

Varieties of Oral Narrative

Keith Basso (1996) begins his classic paper on Western Apache oral narratives with an interpretive puzzle. What did Western Apache elders mean when they made the following statements:

Our children are losing the land. It doesn’t go to work on them anymore. They don’t know the stories about what happened at these places. That’s why some get into trouble. (p. 38)

... I recall stories of how it once was at that mountain. The stories told me were like arrows. Elsewhere, hearing that mountain’s name, I see it. Its name is like a picture. Stories go to work on you like arrows. Stories make you live right. Stories make you replace yourself. (p. 38)

Basso’s (1996) attempts to understand the significance of these statements yielded one of the most comprehensive accounts available of a group’s shared understanding of how oral narrative functions in their lives. Working in collaboration with informants whom he had known for many years, Basso discovered that Western Apache storytelling exploited two symbolic resources—land and narrative—for maintaining the moral order.

Western Apache use stories about the early history of the group to establish enduring ties between individuals and features of the natural landscape. Because of these bonds, people who have behaved improperly are moved to reflect on and correct their misconduct. At times, a member of the community might find it necessary to “aim” a story at an offender. If taken to heart, the story and the place with which it is associated will “stalk” the offender and promote beneficial change.

Basso’s study illustrates three issues of plurality that apply to the study of oral narrative as a socializing medium. First, the most obvious is the issue of narrative diversity across sociocultural groups. Basso describes a distinctive cultural case that is sufficiently detailed to allow precise comparison and contrast with other cultural cases. Second, although the study focuses primarily on one type of oral narrative—historical tales—it situates them in the full range of native narrative categories, including myths, sagas, and gossip. The plurality of oral narrative types in the culture is thus established. Third, access to and ownership of narrative genres is socially distributed, introducing another source of intracultural variation.

Storytelling Begins Early

A question left unanswered by Basso’s account is how Western Apache narrative practices intersect with children. For example, when do Western Apache begin to aim historical tales at errant children? An exciting trend in recent developmental research is the strong interest in young children’s narratives. There is a growing body of evidence that children from many cultural backgrounds within and beyond the United States begin to tell stories in conversation during the second or third year of life (e.g., Eisenberg, 1985; Engel, 1995; McCabe & Peterson, 1991; Meng, 1992; Ochs & Capps, 2001). At this early age, children step into the narrative practices of family and community, thereby laying claim to an important cultural resource for creating their own socialization (Bruner, 1990a, 1990b). Even linguistically isolated deaf children, whose parents choose not to expose them to a conventional sign system, were able to create gestured narratives (Van Deusen-Phillips, Goldin-Meadow, & Miller, 2001). These stories carried echoes of culture-specific meaning, suggesting that conversational narrative is a remarkably robust medium of socialization.

Personal storytelling not only emerges early in life but also occurs habitually in a wide variety of communities, occurring especially frequently in working-class communities. For example, stories involving 2½-year-olds occurred at average rates of 3 to 4 per hour in both middle-class Taiwanese and middle-class European American families (P. J. Miller, Wiley, Fung, & Liang, 1997; Wiley, Rose, Burger, & Miller, 1998). Narratives accounted for one-quarter of 2-year-olds naturally
occurring talk in working-class African American families in the Black Belt of Alabama (Sperry & Sperry, 1995, 1996). In working-class European American families in Chicago, 3-year-olds participated in co-narrations at the remarkable rate of 6 times per hour (Burger & Miller, 1999). When personal storytelling occurs so abundantly, it gets woven, densely but almost invisibly, into the fabric of young children’s social experience.

Moreover, regardless of where they occur, these small, mundane stories are saturated with value and replete with culturally patterned messages. Stories vary within and across cultures along a host of parameters that encompass how the genre is defined and practiced (P. J. Miller & Moore, 1989). For example, in her classic ethnography of neighboring working-class communities in the Piedmont Carolinas, Heath (1983) found that the European American residents of Roadville adhered to a criterion of literal truth when narrating their personal experiences. This contrasted with the African American community of Trackton, who strongly favored fictional embellishment. Trackton and Roadville also enacted opposing norms toward and away from self-aggrandizement. Trackton children not only created bold and triumphant self-protagonists but also asserted their rights to tell stories by adroitly working their way into adult talk, commanding the floor, and receiving approbation for their verbal artistry.

In their study of an African American community in rural Alabama, Sperry and Sperry (1995, 1996) found that 2-year-olds produced more fantasy stories than factual stories of past experience. “Both caregivers and children enjoyed telling stories of escaping from ‘Nicoudini,’ the ‘Boogabear,’ ‘Werewolf’, or the spectral deer who entered their home one misty evening. Families told such stories easily and frequently, and children gathered around to be thrilled by the imagined terror and to practice creating it themselves” (p. 462; Sperry & Sperry, 1996). Boys’ efforts to tell fantasy stories received much more support than girls’, a finding that may help to explain how men in this community get to be so good at “tall-bragging.”

P. J. Miller, Fung, and their colleagues compared middle-class Taiwanese families in Taipei and middle-class European American families in Chicago and found that in both cases narrators interpreted young children’s past experiences in interpersonal terms, situating the child in relationship to other people (P. J. Miller et al., 1997; P. J. Miller, Fung, & Mintz, 1996). At the same time, personal storytelling differed dramatically: Taiwanese families were much more likely than their European American counterparts to tell stories in which they cast the child protagonist as a transgressor. In keeping with local beliefs that parents should take every opportunity to correct young children, many of these stories occurred immediately after the focal child had committed a misdeed in the here and now. Families repeatedly invoked moral and social rules, structured their stories to establish the child’s misdeed as the point of the story, and concluded their stories with didactic codas. By contrast, the European American families enacted a self-favorability bias, erasing or downplaying children’s misdeeds. These differences were also evident in parents’ beliefs about storytelling (P. J. Miller, Sandel, Liang, & Fung, 2001) and in pretend play (Haight et al., 1999).

Wang, Leichtman, and colleagues compared stories elicited from Chinese and European American children and reported similar findings. Chinese mothers from Beijing showed a greater concern with moral rules and behavioral standards when co-narrating stories with their 3-year-olds (Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 1998; Wang, Leichtman, & Davies, 2000), and 6-year-olds told stories exhibiting a parallel concern with moral correctness (Wang & Leichtman, 2000).

Thus, although personal storytelling is a rich purveyor of values for European American children, the version of personal storytelling practiced by the Taipei and Beijing children leans more strongly in a didactic direction, reflecting and reinforcing larger systems of meaning that privilege moral education. Fung, Miller, and Lin (2004) link this didactic bias to Confucian discourses that valorize teaching, listening, and self-improvement, discourses that continue to circulate in the complex mix of local and global influences that are reshaping childrearing and education in contemporary Taiwan. Li (2002) found that Chinese college students viewed learning as a moral process, imbued with purpose, undertaken according to the virtues of diligence, persistence, and humility, and encompassed by the larger project of self-perfection, but American college students saw learning as a neutral, mental process of knowledge acquisition. The stories told by the Beijing children and their mothers share a similar moral cast.

In sum, studies of children’s early storytelling in families and communities demonstrate that this narrative genre is culturally differentiated from the beginning. Wherever personal storytelling is practiced, with young children, it takes on local color, absorbing values, affective stances, and moral orientations. As children
participate routinely in personal storytelling, they begin to carve out different versions of personal experience. Personal storytelling thus highlights—and is implicated in—an early developmental moment in the co-creation of person and culture. Particular frameworks of evaluation and interpretation, linked to larger currents of cultural meaning, operate again and again in oral stories, while narrators and listeners create and respond to here-and-now social contingencies. Each co-narrated story, each story aimed at or told around the child provides another opportunity for the child to hear which experiences are reportable and how these experiences should be assessed. In this way, interpretive frameworks are not only reproduced but also repeatedly instantiated in personally relevant terms. To return to the comparisons between European Americans, on the one hand, and Taiwanese or Chinese, on the other, we catch a glimpse of how culturally distinct selves might originate. A need for positive self-regard may be rooted, in part, in storytelling that is systematically biased toward self-favorability, whereas an inclination to self-improvement may be rooted, in part, in the narration of misdeeds and the explicit invocation of moral standards (see the following section: “The Development of Self”).

Although comparative studies, informed by local practices and understandings, are necessary for identifying these kinds of divergent developmental pathways, again we emphasize that it is important not to dichotomize such differences, erasing similarities across groups and variations within groups. Evidence is accumulating, for example, that personal storytelling is especially rich in gendered meanings (Nicopoulou, 1997; Ochs & Taylor, 1995). Again, this differentiation is apparent early in development. Fivush and her colleagues found that middle-class European American children’s oral narratives are gendered in numerous ways during the preschool years and beyond. For example, when asked to elicit stories from their young children about specific emotions experienced in the past, mothers co-constructed more elaborate stories about sadness with their daughters than with their sons (Fivush, 1993). Similar findings emerged when fathers served as co-narrators. Even when parents were asked to talk with their children about novel past events (without being asked to elicit talk of specific emotions), mothers and fathers narrated more emotion events with their 3-year-old daughters, compared with their sons, and this contrast was especially marked for sad events (Kuebli & Fivush, 1992). From these and other studies, Fivush and Buckner (2000) conclude that by the end of the preschool years, girls talk much more about sadness than do boys, and that such talk occurs both with parents and friends, possibly contributing to girls’ vulnerability to depression.

Variability and Heterogeneity

In addition to these ways in which early narrative varies in and across cultures, a practice approach to narrative reveals even more sources and dimensions of variability. Ochs and Capps (2001) developed a dimensional approach to conversational stories of personal experience, arguing that personal narrative oscillates between the narrators’ desire for coherence and their desire for authenticity, but that research has tended to privilege the former. The “default” story involves one active teller, crafting a linearly sequenced, coherent account of a highly tellable event. Such stories are framed by a constant moral stance and are easily detached from surrounding discourse. Researchers should not assume that this default version of storytelling is the only adult model or endpoint of development. Ochs and Capps propose that development proceeds along two lines. Children become able to report norm violations and to produce temporally ordered, coherent narratives; at the same time they learn to use stories in a nonlinear manner to puzzle over events and weigh alternatives.

Ochs and Capps (2001) draw attention to a variety of overlooked or understudied aspects of storytelling that could enrich cultural psychologists’ understanding of narrative as a socializing medium. How do children use narratives for problem solving: expressing, negotiating, or failing to negotiate divergent points of view; grappling with moral dilemmas; pondering hypothetical scenarios; envisioning the future? How are children’s stories embedded in surrounding discourse and activity? What participant roles are available to children?

Much of the developmental research on preschoolers’ stories has focused on children as co-narrators, producing stories about their experiences in collaboration with parents or other family members. Less is known about children as listeners, recipients, overhearers, and eavesdroppers. By way of illustrating the importance of these other participant roles, consider two examples. In the working-class community of South Baltimore, adults and older children told a great many stories of personal experience to one another (P. J. Miller, 1994). Young children were present as bystanders to these stories, free to tune in or out. Many of these stories fell toward the
default end of the continuum highlighted by Ochs and Capps (2001) and were highly performed, riveting accounts, ranging from the hilarious (e.g., the bathtub fell through the floor with Aunt Sharon in it) to the harrowing (e.g., violent encounters in school or on the street). This activity not only modeled narrative virtuosity but also provided curious youngsters with a constantly updated source of information about the lives of significant others, including their mothers’ experiences of school, workplace, and male-female relations.

Whereas this study illustrates what a rich and varied socializing medium stories around the child can be, C. E. Taylor (1995) offers a rare, penetrating analysis of how keenly children listen to stories told around them. In one case study of a middle-class family, the 5-year-old sister and 8-year-old brother were initially silent when their parents engaged in narrative conflict at the dinner table. Eventually, the sister protested that the parents were fighting, a concern that they dismissed and rationalized as the conversation continued to unfold. This study not only shows how carefully children monitor adult discourse but also serves as a powerful reminder of two other important points: family narrative is sometimes unfriendly and threatening, exacerbating rather than solving problems, and children are socialized as much by the relationship that participants enact—in this case, parental conflict—as they are by the content of stories.

In her analysis, C. E. Taylor (1995), like several of the scholars mentioned in this section of the chapter, borrowed ideas from Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian literary scholar and philosopher of language. His vision of language as culturally shaped and socially situated is compatible with the conception of language described earlier (Bakhtin, 1981; Wertsch, 1991). Bakhtin (1986) stressed that speech is organized into genres associated with particular speech situations. He argued that speech is never free of generic constraints but that speakers can achieve individuality of expression by creatively appropriating, combining, and reaccenting existing genres. As researchers apply Bakhtinian constructs to the analysis of children’s discourse, it is becoming clear that narrative sense-making involves juxtaposing and interweaving multiple, even conflicting voices and ideological perspectives and that every community affords such heterogeneity (e.g., Cazden, 1993; Dyson, 1993; Hicks, 1994; Tobin, 2000; Wertsch, 1991; Wortham, 2001).

This perspective not only underscores the importance of studying children’s narrative repertoires (e.g., Preece, 1987; Sperry & Sperry, 1995) but also draws attention to the many ways in which stories are embedded, are blended with, or otherwise keep company with other stories, other genres, and other activities. For example, ethnographic studies have shown that oppositional talk is an important means by which working-class African American children of various ages construct identities, form friendships, and sustain peer culture and that narratives are often incorporated into oppositional talk as a way of instigating disputes and projecting conflicting points of view (e.g., Goodwin, 1990; Shumian, 1986). The preschooler studied by Corsaro et al. (2002) was already adept at this kind of talk and collaborated with her Head Start peers in producing pretend scenarios that drew on both oppositional and narrative elements. Fung and Chen’s (2001) study of the socialization of shame in Taiwanese families revealed that naturally occurring events of shame included multiple episodes and traversed multiple temporal and spatial worlds. Young children were led to relive and reflect on present and past transgressions and to prepare for a better self in the future. Both of these studies suggest that stories do not necessarily come neatly packaged and clearly bounded in children’s everyday experience. Rather, stories are embedded in and overlap with other genres in heterogeneous and shifting configurations that illuminate again and again particular threads of meaning for young participants.

The Dynamics of Narrative Practices

Thus, when narratives are treated as situated practices, rather than disembodied texts, it becomes apparent that storytelling is a dynamic process, emerging from particular circumstances, shaped by the interests of narrating participants, recurring in different combinations, and affording children a range of participant roles. Children engage repeatedly in networks of narrative practices, characterized by systematic variability and cross-cutting redundancies. As argued earlier, this is one of the means by which persons and cultures are cocreated. However, narrative is also a means by which individuals affect change and transform identities (Holland et al., 1998; Wortham, 2001).

The dynamic nature of narrative practices is especially apparent when narrators tell the same story repeatedly. Such stories can play a critical role in the lifelong process of socialization. Adults may be haunted, baffled, or sustained for decades by stories from their own or others’ lives (e.g., Coles, 1989; Fung.
2003; Gone, 1999; Hudley, Haight, & Miller, 2003; Steedman, 1986). As the person tells the story repeatedly to self and other, it accrues layer on layer of meaning and may be used to reinforce favored interpretations or to construct new interpretations. Repeated tellings and reinterpretations of personal experience are institutionalized in psychotherapy, Alcoholics Anonymous, and religious conversion (Holland et al., 1998; Stromberg, 1993). Children as young as 2 years of age develop intense attachments to particular stories, revisiting them again and again for weeks, months, and even years (e.g., Alexander, Miller, & Hengst, 2001; P. J. Miller, Hoogstra, Mintz, Fung, & Williams, 1993; Nelson, 1989; Wolf & Heath, 1992). The middle-class European American children in these studies treated their special stories as resources for discussion and pretense and used them to ponder problems and manage emotions, activities that were supported by parents. These studies suggest that from the time young children enter into narrative sense-making, they have the capacity to respond differentially to the ordinary narrative flow, seizing certain stories for especially active and intense engagement.

Studies that trace the natural history of stories in children’s lives are rare. This is unfortunate for cultural psychology because the process of retelling and revising stories goes to the heart of the socialization process. It is assumed to be transformative in theories ranging from psychoanalysis to the Western Apache model of historical narrative. We need especially to know more about how stories operate over the long term in children’s lives.

Again, the Western Apache provide a compelling example. Basso (1996) relates an incident in which an adolescent girl arrived at a ceremonial in hair curlers, a violation of community standards. Some weeks later, when the girl was attending a party at her grandmother’s house, the grandmother narrated a historical story about an Apache policeman who suffered dire consequences because he had acted too much like a white man. At the conclusion to the story, the girl left the party. When questioned by Basso, the grandmother explained her granddaughter’s sudden departure by saying that she had shot her with an “arrow.” Two years later, the young woman told Basso that she threw her curlers away after reflecting on her grandmother’s story. Referring to the place where the Apache policeman had lived, she said, “I know that place. It stalks me everyday” (Basso, 1996, p. 57).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF

As noted earlier, the psychological side of cultural psychology is the study of the things that the “I”s (the subjects, agents, or selves) of particular cultural communities know, think, feel, want, and value, including what they know, think, feel, want, and value about the self as a mental being capable of subjective experiences and of participation as an agent in a cultural community. A powerful way in which culture and psyche constitute each other and come to influence individual behavior, we believe, is through our way of being a subject or agent in a social world—what is often called self-functioning.

Indeed, the self can be conceptualized as a primary focus of culture-psyche interaction and culture-specific being (see Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume). It is where the individual, a biological entity, becomes a meaningful entity—a person, a participant in social worlds (P. J. Miller, 1994; Rogoff, Radziszewsk a, & Masiello, 1995; Weigert, Teitge, & Teitge, 1990). Developing a sense of self as an agentic, continuous entity with intentional powers may appear to arise from highly personal idiosyncratic experiences: A European American self is indeed defined to be individualized and distinct from other selves. Studies highlight, however, that although the experience, structures, and processes of self appear to be primarily individual creations, they are also cultural and historical constructions (Markus & Kitayama, 2003; J. G. Miller, 2003; Oyserman & Markus, 1993).

Before discussing the cultural psychology of the self, we must acknowledge some of the issues and controversies arising in this area. Several trends in philosophy, the social sciences, and world affairs have converged on self and identity as popular topics for research. Perhaps most obviously, as the headlines of any newspaper confirm, nationalism and a concern for maintaining and asserting ethnic or cultural identity are now emerging as a powerful focus in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In this climate of heightened ethnic identification and conflict, we can no longer afford to ignore the role of cultural practices and mentalities as sources of personal and social identity or the role of self-management and self-regard in all aspects of social life, particularly social conflict (e.g., Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Kakar, 1996).

Perhaps less obviously, certain eternal disputes about the character and causal role of personal identity
in psychological functioning have resurfaced. Several quite disparate currents of thought, including skeptical postmodernism, connectionist-parallel distributed process models in artificial intelligence, and Buddhist philosophical thought (Elster, 1987; Gergen, 1991; Sass, 1992; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993) have concluded that the self is illusory or epiphenomenal and plays no causal role in mental functioning, whereas other have argued that the self is “multiple” or “pro- tean” (Lifton, 1993).

We will not debate here whether the Buddhists are right that the self is an illusion or whether the Hindus are right that the self is the real component of pure being. We will simply note that the very existence of human social and moral life seems intimately tied up with the evolution of a species whose central psychological makeup is defined by the existence of a causally active and somewhat unitary self (“One self per customer,” to use the philosopher Daniel Dennett’s phrase; Flanagan, 1992). A self that is free, willful, self-regulating, morally responsible, and conscious; that is the initiator of action, author of texts, holder of rights; and that is the subject of evaluation and social scrutiny when questions about rationality, responsibility, normality, and pathology arise.

Putting aside “epiphenomenalism” (the self as unreal), the choice between “mechanistic” and “vitalistic” conceptions of self seems uninviting (see Kapstein, 1989). Contemporary mechanistic approaches to personal identity argue that our sense of self (e.g., our sense of continuity over time) results merely from the continuity of our memory for discrete mental states (perceptions, pleasure, and pain). Contemporary vitalistic approaches argue that our sense of self is prewired into the human brain. Neither view leaves much room for social, interpersonal, or cultural processes in the construction and maintenance of personal identity.

Perhaps versions of these approaches can be made compatible with cultural psychology, which asserts that the self is not fully reducible to either memory or brain processes. A cultural psychology approach to personal identity examines the part of our sense of self that develops through membership in some local cultural community and symbolically mediated experiences with its practices. This approach examines the effects of labeling and stereotyping, dialogue and narrative, as well as moral agency and social practice on self-functions such as self-regard, self-confidence, and self-definition. It looks at how the self is described, responded to, evaluated, and often regulated by others. Although cultural psychologists acknowledge that the “I” (the subject) is never fully determined by groups’ hegemonic ideologies or interpersonal forces alone, they aim to clarify the ways cultural mentalities and practices (including ideologies of the self and symbolic products such as biographies of community exemplars) can powerfully constitute an individual’s sense of self.

A cultural psychology perspective furthers our understanding of a self’s development by emphasizing that particular ways of representing and being a self, both as object and subject of experience, are grounded in normative understandings and behavioral routines of selfhood in a given sociocultural and historical context (Benson, 2001; Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2003; Oyserman & Kemmelmeier, 1995; Oyserman & Markus, 1993).

From the perspective of cultural psychology, the self is grounded in the mentalities and practices (the custom complex) associated with being an “I” (a subject) in a particular community. Revisiting the insights of some of the field’s early theorists (e.g., Dewey, 1938; Erikson, 1968) reveals that culture does not merely surround or cover the “universal” child but rather that culture completes the child (Bruner, 1990a, 1990b; Tomasello, 1999). Culture provides the scripts for “how to be” and how to participate as a member in good standing in the cultural community and particular social contexts. Simultaneously, cultural psychologists recognize that children and adults actively constitute their own cultures, initiating changes in their relations with others and thus in their immediate cultural settings (see Brandstätter, Chapter 10; Rathunde & Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume).

**DEFINING AND LOCATING THE SELF AS DYNAMIC, MULTILEVEL, AND MULTIFACETED**

The self can be defined as a multifaceted, dynamic system that regulates and mediates behavior (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Markus & Wurf, 1986). Neisser (1988, 1991) explicitly constructs the self as a multileveled entity, defining five types of self-knowledge: (1) ecological, (2) private, (3) interpersonal, (4) conceptual, and (5) what he labels “extended” (i.e., knowledge of the self over time). Neisser contends that regardless of differing locations or beliefs, people are active, embodied.
agents in the natural and social environments, and thus show evidence of ecological and interpersonal selves (Neisser & Jopling, 1997).

This multileveled self is believed to be broadly consequential for individual experience: It provides the blueprint, frame, and foundation for the psyche. Whatever cultural form it assumes, a subject's way of being a person affords and constrains what he or she feels, values, assumes responsibility for, perceives and thinks about, as well as how he or she organizes, understands, and gives meaning to any experience.

The past decade has seen rapidly increasing interest in the nature, functioning, and development of self, and much noteworthy theoretical activity. Several themes can be identified that raise challenging questions about what a self is, how to determine who has one, as well as how and when the self emerges, functions, and develops. Many researchers advocate analyzing the self as not only an object of knowledge but also the subject of experience. Attention to the embodied self, to the role of intersubjectivity in constructing the self, to the situation, context, or niche in which the self participates and to the self as socially engaged rather than isolated or decontextualized is needed (Cole, 1999; Crook, 2003; Harter, 1996; Higgins & Parsons, 1983; Stern, 1985; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Cultural psychology research forcefully underscores such issues' importance and raises many complementary concerns (e.g., Greenfield & Cocking, 1994;Valsiner, 1988).

The Conceptual Self

The self has been variously defined as the insider’s grasp on the person, as the answer to the “who am I” question, and as a theory or set of schemas that provides the individual with a sense of continuity. The focus has been on the self as object of knowledge (Allport, 1937; Eder & Mangeldorf, 1997; Epstein, 1973; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; Sullivan, 1940). Historically, despite many theoretical statements to the contrary, the tendency has been to reify the self and regard it as a thing, as exemplified in thousands of studies on the self-concept, the self, or self-esteem.

Research on the development of self has tended to concentrate on what Neisser labels “the conceptual self.” Given the general European American tendency to imagine the mind as the source of experience and thus equate selves with minds, the emphasis on how children think about and represent the self is perhaps obvious. From this theoretical perspective, the self becomes an object of knowledge and it becomes natural to imagine that the self as represented or the self-concept is the most significant aspect of individual experience.

In research on development of the self-concept, the critical indicator of the self has been visual self-recognition as assessed by mirrors and photographs. Summarizing the work in this paradigm, Bullock and Lüthenhaus (1990) conclude that self-recognition begins between the ages of 9 and 16 months and by 2 years of age, most children recognize themselves in the mirror and photographs. Some (e.g., M. Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989) have argued that self-awareness requires such self-recognition. Other studies have examined speech for cognitive representations of self. During their 2nd and 3rd years, children begin to use their name, the pronouns “I” and “me,” and possessively claim objects as theirs (L. E. LeVine, 1983; Van der Meulen, 1986).

The idea that thinking about the self is the main element of self is also underscored by a large collection of studies that have explicitly tied the development of self to advancing cognitive capacities (Lea & Dionne, 1981; Lea & Shirk, 1985; Montemayor & Eisen, 1977; Rosenberg, 1984). Many studies based on the Piagetian model of cognitive development have shown that as a child advances from preoperational thought to formal operations, the focus of self-definition shifts from concrete, objective, and visible characteristics to abstract, private features of the psychological interior. A widely cited review by Harter (1983) notes:

Young children focus on concrete, observable aspects of self such as physical attributes and behaviors, whereas older children increasingly couch their self-descriptions in terms of traits. With adolescence, there is a further shift toward the use of abstractions and psychological processes such as thoughts, attitudes, and emotions in defining the self. (p. 305)

Still other studies have shown a link between the level of cognitive development and characteristics of the self-concept such as hierarchical organization, integration of opposing conceptions of the self, and the stability of self-conceptions across time and context (see Harter, 1990; Rosenberg, 1984, for reviews).

Indeed, studies with people living in European American contexts demonstrate that such self-concepts exist. These self-concepts include images and conceptions of the person in the present but also in the past and
in the future—narratives of what could have been and what might be (Higgins, 1990; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Oosterwegel & Oppenheimer, 1993). This self-concept is also functional: It mediates behavior and is implicated in all aspects of behavior from strong academic and athletic performance to general well-being and life satisfaction. A negative self-concept of this type is related to delinquency, drug use, and depression (for a review see Bracken, 1996).

The Cultural Self

A cultural psychology approach emphasizes the need to analyze more extensively the experience and understanding of self and to examine critically the cultural presuppositions implicit in much research on the development of self. As stated earlier, the cultural psychology approach to development is skeptical of most attempts to universally define progressive development using abstract criteria, for instance, from behavior to traits or from context-dependent to context-free.

In studies of selves in non-European American cultural contexts, one quickly confronts selves that are not easily characterized by complex mental representation of traits, attributes, preferences, or possessions. It becomes evident that studies on the development of self have proceeded primarily from one cultural viewpoint and drawn on a set of invisible and untested assumptions about the self as an idea or as an objectified and cognitively represented entity.

Comparative research in other cultural communities suggests that selves are not primarily more-or-less stable concepts at all but rather a set of processes or ways of being. Moreover, in some groups, a description of self or others in terms of internal, decontextualized attributes or qualities simply does not occur (Fajans, 1985; Hart, Fegley, Hung Chan, Mulvey, & Fischer, 1993; Lillard, 1996; J. G. Miller, 1984; Ochs, 1988; Rosen, 1995; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). Hart and Edelstein (1992) describe a study conducted with adolescents in Iceland in which one student struggled mightily to answer the “who am I” question and finally in despair looked up from his blank questionnaire and asked, “Are people meant to have these kinds of thoughts about themselves?” In many cultural communities, the nature of self is referenced not to an internal self but instead to a particular social context and characterizing a self outside that context is unnatural and irrelevant.

Goodnow (1990a, 1990b) has argued that cognitive development involves learning the community’s definition of being intelligent. Similarly, developing a self requires incorporating the community’s definitions of being a self. Once self-development is considered in cultural context, it is almost immediately apparent that what a self is and what it means to be an acceptable or good self can vary dramatically from one cultural place to another (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). As C. Taylor (1989) has argued:

My self-definition is understood as an answer to the question Who am I. And this question finds its original sense in the interchange of speakers. I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family tree, in social space, in the geography of social status and functions. We first learn our languages of moral and spiritual discernment by being brought into an ongoing conversation by those who bring us up. The meanings that the key words first had for me are the meanings they have for us, for me and my conversation partners together. So I can only learn what anger, love, anxiety, the aspiration to wholeness, and so on are through my and others’ experience for us in some common place. (p. 35)

THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF

The study of self in psychology, as with many aspects of child development, has incorporated the European American definition of being a person and has been firmly rooted in the ontology of individualism (Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Ho, 1993; Markus & Kitayama, 1994a; Sampson, 1988). This ontology is extensively incorporated in most child-care practices and the main societal institutions such as schools.

The Person as an Individual

The Latin word “individual” means indivisible and whole, and the central tenet of individualism is the epistemological priority accorded to the separate, essentially nonsocial, individual. The person is assumed to exist independently and to enter into social relations based on need and by mutual consent with other individuals. The focus is on the individual rather than on the social unit of which the individual is a part. The person is cast as an entity whose behavior is determined by some amalgam of internal attributes apart from the external situation.

Individualism is typically analyzed as the critical element of Western society (e.g., Baumeister, 1987; Car-
rithers, Collins, & Lukes, 1987; Gutsinger & Blatt, 1994; Sampson, 1985; Triandis, Bontempo, & Villareal, 1988), and many analysts argue that the Enlightenment gave birth to the notion of the Kantian individual and the importance of individual reason and free will. Others suggest that individualism shows the stamp of late industrial capitalism or results from a Cartesian categorization system that draws a sharp distinction between the self and others (Lebra, 1992).

In the framework of individualism, it seems natural to assume that selves are objects and should be unified and integrated, reflecting but not focusing on the concerns of others. Thus, a child's central task is to progressively realize that he or she is separate from others and autonomous, efficacious, in control of his or her actions. The idea of a bounded individual separate from and not unduly influenced by others also leads to a consistency ethic in which a good or authentic self is the same, unchanging self across different situations. (See Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Gergen, 1968; Johnson, 1985; Markus & Kitayama, 1994b; Morris, 1994; Shwed & Bourne, 1984, for a more elaborate discussion.)

The literature on the development of self is also replete with unexamined presuppositions that reflect individualism interwoven with other cultural and historical assumptions. In this literature, interest persists in being a true rather than a false self, which probably echoes Victorian concerns with secret or hidden parts of the self (Baumeister, 1987; Harter, 1986). Currently, there is also pervasive attention to raising children who feel good about themselves and have high self-esteem, aims that derive from societal appropriation of expressing rather than inhibiting feelings, actualizing the self, and fulfilling our potential (Maslow, 1954). The literature on self development also incorporates presuppositions about what type of parenting practices produce these proper or good selves. Thus, the child with high self-esteem is believed to be a product of accepting and approving parenting that highlights a child's successes rather than failures (e.g., Coopersmith, 1967; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999).

The Person as Relational

The individualist model of self that provides the infrastructure for the field's understanding of self is an obvious, natural model for European American researchers. This model is rooted in a set of Western philosophical positions about human nature and in layers upon layers of practice and institutions that give it an objective reality. This model is indeed powerful and practical for characterizing selves in European American contexts, but it is not the only model of how to be. Other ontologies and ideologies of human nature exist that are as yet unrepresented in the literature on the development of self. Analyzing the self in cultural context brings these other ontologies and ideologies of self to light.

Another model of self contrasts significantly with individualism and is pervasive throughout Japan, China, Korea, Southeast Asia as well as much of South America and Africa (Triandis, 1989). According to this perspective, the self is not and cannot be separate from others or the surrounding social context, but is experienced as interdependent with the social context: the self-in-relation-to-others is focal in individual experience (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Triandis, 1989, 1990). According to Kondo (1990), the self is fundamentally interdependent with others from a Japanese perspective, and understanding this Japanese sense of self requires dissolving the self-other or self-society boundary that forms such an obvious starting point in European American formulations.

An important imperative in this alternative way of being is to avoid becoming separate and autonomous from others and, instead, to fit in with others, to fulfill and create obligations and, in general, to become part of various interpersonal relationships. Individuals are naturally understood to exist interdependently with others. Sharing, interweaving, or intersubjectivity is the established cultural rule, not a mystical or magical project (Anes, Dissanayake, & Kasulis, 1994). From this perspective, the individual is an open, communicating center of relationships and thus is intimately connected with other selves. From a Confucian perspective, groups are not separate from individuals. The nature of individuals is to work through others, and to reveal themselves, they must be parts of groups such as families, communities, and nations (Tu, 1994). Moreover, sources of action are found in a person's pattern of involvements with others, rather than internal mental states or processes.

An interdependent view of self does not, as might be imagined from a European American perspective, result in a merging of self and other, nor does it imply that people lack a sense of themselves as agents originating their own actions. This interdependent view requires a high degree of self-control, self-discipline, and agency to effectively adjust oneself to various interpersonal contingencies. Control, however, is directed primarily to
personal desires, goals, and emotions that can disturb the harmonious equilibrium of interpersonal transaction.

This understanding of self stands in contrast to a European American notion of control that entails asserting our desires, goals, and emotions, and attempting to change features of the social situation. Hamaguchi (1985) for example, reports that for Japanese the "straightforward claim of the naked ego" (p. 303) is experienced as childish. Self-assertion is viewed as a sign not of authenticity, but instead of immaturity. This point is echoed in M. I. White and LeVine's (1986) description of the meaning of suiniao, a term Japanese parents use to characterize what they value in children:

A child that is suiniao has not yielded his or her personal autonomy for the sake of cooperation; Cooperation does not suggest giving up the self, as it may in the West; It implies that working with others is the appropriate way of expressing and enhancing the self. Engagement and harmony with others is, then, a positively valued goal and the bridge—to open-hearted cooperation. (p. 58)

Being responsive to or influenced by others does not indicate inconsistency or false selves at work; rather, it reflects tolerance, self-control, flexibility, and maturity. In many Asian perspectives, children are assumed to be both naturally good and capable of developing the needed sensitivity to and empathy for others through encouragement and example. The good child is believed to be a product of highly responsive parenting practices attuned to the child.

Nevertheless, good parenting does not ignore a child's failures, shortcomings, or transgressions. In Japan, children are encouraged to engage in self-reflection and self-criticism as necessary steps to self-improvement and mastery (e.g., C. C. Lewis, 1995). Similarly, Chinese parents often use an explicitly evaluative, self-critical framework with their children as opposed to an overtly self-affirming one (P. J. Miller et al., 1996). Chinese caretakers claim that shaming as a caretaking practice keeps children from falling into disgrace or losing their all-important connection to others.

Much more could and must be said about these apparently startling differences in ontological assumptions, to which we are alerted when we conduct research in other cultural communities. A comprehensive investigation would not merely contrast "individualism" and "interdependence," but also draw on other ontologies that must exist on a worldwide scale. Nor should we imply a lack of variability in Japanese, Chinese, or Korean populations. We simply underscore that comparative research reveals divergent views of what the self is and should be on a worldwide scale, and that these views critically underpin self-relevant experiences.

If the self functions as an interpretive, integrative, or orienting framework for individual behavior, then whether one has a self shaped by prevalent European American or Asian ontological traditions can matter greatly for individual psychological processing. Comparing behavior constructed in a European American individualistic frame to behavior constructed in other cultural frames may illuminate how cultural processes are implicated in the etiology, nature, and functioning of psychological systems, and how "multiple, diverse psychologies" arise.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN WAYS OF BEING

Much of the rapidly expanding literature relevant to cultural variation in the development of self does not focus directly on the nature and functioning of the psychological self system as it has been operationalized in American and European studies. Nevertheless, such comparative literature is pertinent to research on the origins of culture-specific selves.

In examining the culture-specific nature of selves, Markus et al. (1997) have described the custom complexes associated with being a person. They suggest that cultural and social groups in every historical period are associated with characteristic patterns of sociocultural participation or, more specifically, with characteristic ways of being a person in the world, which they call selfways. Selfways are patterns or orientations, including ways of thinking, feeling, wanting, and doing, that arise from living one's life in a particular sociocultural context structured by certain meanings, practices, and institutions. People do not live generally or in the abstract: They always live according to some specific, substantive set of cultural understandings (goals, values, pictures of the world). Selfways thus include important cultural ideas, values, and understandings of what it means to be a self and how to be a good self. Selfways, however, are not just matters of belief, doctrine, or ideology, but are also manifest in everyday behavior, language practices, patterns of caretaking, schooling, religion, work, the media, and social episodes, both formal and informal.

The notion of selfways implies that every sense of self will be grounded in some shared meanings and customary practices and will necessarily bear some meaningful resemblance to similarly grounded selves. From
ticipation in the custom complexes characterizing European American and East Asian cultural contexts. We aim to highlight the diverse selfways that develop from such participation. Most of the recent research has focused on a contrast between patterns of cultural participation that construe the person as an independent, autonomous entity and those that construe the person as an interdependent part of a larger social unit. Some researchers suggest that variations on the interdependent pattern characterize about 70% of the world’s population (Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Triandis, 1989).

Selfways in Some European American Contexts

Speaking generally and probabilistically, the European American middle-class cultural region is characterized by selfways that promote independence of the self. Being a European American person requires the individualizing of experience. A person’s subjectivity is sensed as a more-or-less integrated whole, configured by attributes and values distinct from others’ or society’s (see Geertz, 1984). The self is experienced as the individual’s meaningful center and is understood to be rooted in a set of internal attributes such as abilities, talents, personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states, and attitudes. A major cultural task often mutually pursued by caretakers, friends, and teachers is to continually, progressively individualize the child. As researchers become aware that conceptualizing the self as an object and describing one’s self in abstract psychological terms are culture-specific tendencies rather than consequences of general cognitive development, they can investigate practices that afford these tendencies.

Despite an explicit cultural emphasis on being nice and caring and helpful (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 1990), development in the European American style is almost synonymous with individualizing and decontextualizing the self. Even as people seek and maintain interdependence with others—social tasks that must be accomplished everywhere—they will maintain a sense of boundedness, relatively greater separation from others, and being in control. Caring, connecting, and relationality will likely assume a more individually agentic form. Many cultural practices that contribute to a sense of agency are so much a part of everyday, domestic life that they are, for all practical purposes, invisible.

In many English-speaking cultural communities, language use itself helps create the decontextualized, agentic
"I" Ikemoto (1991) notes that English is a language "which focuses on the human being and which gives linguistic prominence to this notion, while Japanese is a language which tends to suppress the notion of the human being, even if such a being is involved in the event" (p. 301). In characterizing an event, English focuses on the particular person involved, but Japanese emphasizes the event as a whole, submerging the individual in it. Because the human subject is foregrounded in English, one might say "I have a temperature," but in Japanese, one would say roughly "As for me, there is a temperature" or "A temperature goes with me." The English phrase "John ran out of money" might become "As for John, money became null" in Japanese.

Along with foregrounding the subject (the "I") in English, American English speakers tend to be direct and assume that a speaker must make him- or herself clear to listeners. This tendency begins early. Compared to Japanese mothers, American mothers talk more, and more directly, to their children (Azuma, Kashiwagi, & Hess, 1981; Caudill & Weinstein, 1969). In a study of mother-infant interaction patterns, Morikawa, Shand, and Koshima (1988) compared American and Japanese mothers interacting with their 3-month-old infants. American mothers elicited more vocalizations and exhibited more expressions of positive affect, and vocalizations occurred while mothers looked at the baby and the baby was happy and alert. This pattern contrasts with the Japanese studied who more often expressed negative affect and did so while the baby was looking away.

Direct, explicit verbal instruction characterizes teacher-child interactions in the American cultural context (Tobin, Wu, & Davidson, 1989; Wu, 1994). In such interactions, the child's distinctive attributes are identified, then persistently noted and affirmed. Personal attributes and abilities are assumed to define the self—to sustain one's uniqueness and drive one's current, past, and possible actions. The explicit goal is the development of individuals' potential. American institutions may realize the idea of defining attributes by grouping and tracking children according to ability (Stevenson & Stigler, 1992). When resources permit, the curriculum is often individualized on the assumption that each child has a unique learning style and pace.

The American schoolchild is objectified, made to feel special, praised, encourged, and complimented. In many schools, children may be a VIP or star for a day or a week, celebrate their birthdays, and be honored (Markus & Kitayama, 1994a). Writing projects often involve autobiographies and personal narratives, and art projects focus on self-representation. Many middle-class American children are thus continually encouraged and given chances to express themselves and present their ideas in speech and writing. A common elementary practice in school is show-and-tell: Children bring items then stand before the class and tell a story about their object. All these everyday practices foster an objectification of self and a sense of self as a source of action (Heine et al., 1999).

Moreover, children are encouraged individually and collectively to think of themselves positively as stars, winners, above average, and the repositories of special qualities. It has become routine for every child who plays on a soccer or basketball team to receive a trophy. This practice may discourage competition or invidious comparison among team members, but it underscores the importance of the group, not of the individual. Even as many current educators worry that they may have used praise too liberally in the past and try to focus on the learning process rather than on evaluating the child (Damon, 1984, 1995; Damon & Hart, 1988), teachers are persistently urged to find some unique aspect of each child's product.

American children are also encouraged to be independent, autonomous, and self-determining (Bellah et al., 1985). Families in European American middle class contexts often give infants their own beds and bedrooms to foster autonomy (Shweder et al., 1995). Similarly, most developmental markers center on autonomous activity—rolling over, sitting up, walking, and eating by oneself.

Additionally, American children are socialized to have distinct preferences. Long before the child is old enough to answer, caretakers pose questions like "Do you want the blue cup or red cup?" Caretakers' questions signal to children that the capacity for independent choice is a necessary, desirable attribute (Markus & Kitayama, 1994a), and thereby instantiate an "ethics of autonomy" that prevails in certain cultural communities but not others (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder et al., 1997). Moreover, the availability of choice necessitates preferences by which to make choices. Preschool settings are arranged such that children have an extensive choice of activities and need not conform to the group except during limited parts of the day (C. C. Lewis, 1995). Presumably, such efforts to incorporate self-determination into the school day are designed to safeguard the child's intrinsic motivation.
This is an instance of culture and psyche making each other up. Particular kinds of psychological processes (e.g., construing the self as a positive, unique entity) emerge through years of socialization and enculturation as an individual receives then perpetuates social practices and meanings recurrent in a given cultural community (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). These psychological processes, in turn, reproduce those same cultural patterns. Becoming a self (a meaningful cultural participant) in a European American context thus involves maintaining an autonomous self separate from other selves and the social context. Those with such independent selves may be more attuned to positive characteristics of the self, and may be especially motivated to discover them, express them in public, and confirm them in private. They often develop processes to buoy their own self-esteem.

The data on European American selves in middle-class contexts support these generalizations. Examining earliest childhood memories and self-reports, Wang (2001a) found that Americans described themselves using individual attributes and reported lengthy, specific, self-focused, and emotionally elaborate memories. Chinese self-reports were briefer and respondents described themselves by roles. Their memories centered on collective activities, general routines, and emotionally neutral events.

In a series of studies with young children, Hart and his colleagues (Hart, 1988; Hart & Edelstein, 1992) asked American children to imagine a “person machine” that makes the original person (respondent) disappear but at the same time manufactures other people (copies of the original) who receive some, but not all, of the original person’s characteristics. The respondent’s task is to judge whether the new manufactured person with the same physical attributes (looks like respondent), with the same social attributes (has same family and friends), or with the same psychological attributes (same thoughts and feelings) will be most like the original person. They have found that by the ninth grade most respondents believe the copy with the original’s psychological characteristics is most like the original.

Consistent with a number of earlier studies of the development of the self-concept (e.g., Harter, 1983; Stein, Markus, and Moeser, 1996) have found that 11- to 14-year-old European Americans asked to describe themselves depict a consensual self whose attributes include being caring, friendly, nice, and worried. Moreover, the self-descriptions of adolescents with high rather than low self-esteem matched the consensual self more closely. Such findings suggest that adolescents’ tendency to characterize themselves in abstract terms stems from a particular collective idea of “how to be” rather than from increased cognitive ability. These findings are consistent with several other studies on cultural variation in self-categorization (Cousins, 1989; Harter, 1983; Triandis, 1990), which suggest that internal features of the self—the traits, attributes, and attitudes—are privileged and regarded as critical to self-definition.

Furthermore, in a study comparing the self-efficacy levels of children from Los Angeles, East and West Berlin, and Moscow, researchers (Little, Oettingen, Stetsenko, & Baltes, 1995) found that children from Los Angeles had the most optimistic self-efficacy beliefs, while children from East Berlin had the most pessimistic beliefs about personal efficacy. The authors argued that the higher self-efficacy ratings of the Los Angeles elementary school students reflect the high levels of individualism and the low power distance between students and teachers.

Oettingen (1995) argues that efficacy depends largely not only on one’s own evaluations in individualistic cultures but also on evaluation by in-group members in collectivist cultures. In cultures with a large power disparity between members, children will tend to treat parents and teachers as clear superiors. Children in cultures with a lesser power disparity will have more opportunities to see themselves as “origins” of their own actions. It would be interesting to know how those children of Bielefeld, North Germany, who were reared to be hyper-independent and unspoiled (Grossmann & Grossmann, 1981, 1991; Grossmann et al., 1985; and see earlier discussion of culture-specific presuppositions in attachment research) would have fared on a self-efficacy index.

As researchers develop methods of assessing the selves of ever-younger children, they have found that apprehending and experiencing the world through bounded selfways begins quite early in individualistic cultural communities. European American children appear to have some sense of who they are and which attributes characterize them by 3 years of age (Eder & Mangelsdorf, 1997), and by 4 years of age they show psychological tendencies that reflect the cultural emphasis on individualization and separation from others. They describe themselves as better than their peers in all domains, and studies with adults suggest that this type of self-serving bias or false uniqueness correlates.
positively with self-esteem (Josephs, Markus, & Tarafode, 1992). In a cultural system organized around promoting the individuaility and uniqueness of the self, a general proclivity to positive self-regard has positive social and psychological consequences.

**Selfways in Some East Asian Cultural Contexts**

A rapidly expanding literature in psychology, anthropology, and philosophy now provides an increasingly nuanced understanding of the cultural form of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean selves. Systematic analyses of Japanese settings reveal a pervasive concern with and attention to the relational side of social life and to individual position in the social structure (Bachnik, 1994; Lebra, 1993; Peuk, 1987; Rosenberger, 1992). Markus and Kitayama (1991a, 1991b) suggest that Asian selfways emphasize the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other and that the relationship rather than the individual may be a functional unit of consciousness, and claim:

> Experiencing interdependence entails seeing oneself as part of an encompassing social relationship and recognizing that one’s behavior is determined by, contingent on, and to a large extent, organized by what the actor perceived to be the thoughts, feelings and actions of others in the relationship. (p. 227)

Lebra (1994) argues that among the Japanese, empathy is a psychological mainstay and must be understood if one is to comprehend almost any aspect of Japanese behavior. Empathy (omotayari) “refers to the ability and willingness to feel what others are feeling, to vicariously experience the pleasure or pain that they are undergoing, and to help them satisfy their wishes” (Lebra, 1976, p. 38). Lebra sees this focus as diametrically opposed to the self-focus common in many European American practices.

This emphasis on empathy implies that Japanese selves should not be conceptualized as lacking individuality or a separate identity or that autonomy is unimportant in Japan (Greenfield & Cocking, 1994; Kim, 1987; Oerter, Oerter, Agostiani, Kim, & Wilbowo, 1996). It does imply, however, that such empathic ways of being a self, which explicitly highlight the state of being in relation, are different from selfways that emphasize and reify the individual. In this particular Japanese mode of being, subjectivity is sensed as interdependence with a larger whole that includes both the person and others and is configured by constantly referencing the self to the situational setting or context.

Throughout much of the world, the task of child rearing is not the European American one of making a dependent child into an independent adult, but instead one of cultivating an unruly asocial baby into a civilized social being (Caudill & Weinstein, 1969). The need to uphold interpersonal obligations as well as to maintain connection and harmony with others is highly elaborated in every sphere of social life. Caudill and Weinstein (1986) find that Japanese mothers hold their 3- to 4-month-old infants more and have more body communication with them than mothers in the United States. Furthermore, as noted earlier, co-sleeping and co-bathing are common. Sleeping babies are rarely left alone in Japan. The close, fully interdependent mother-child dyad is particularly idealized in Japan, and many other relationships (e.g., between boss and subordinate) are organized around this familial model. Greenfield and Cocking (1994) characterize interdependent and independent developmental scripts as sharply contrasting, intertwined but never fully balanced. From an East Asian cultural perspective, a self—European American style—distinct, positive, and attribute-based—is not a mature, fully civilized form of human agency. A strongly held, clear sense of self signals childishness because it entails failure to take full account of and show sufficient regard for the relationships of which the self is a part. Agency Japanese style results from (a) the sense that the self is afforded and appreciated through the relationships in which it participates, and (b) the sense that the self must flexibly maintain and further the welfare of those relationships.

Such a sense of agency does not mean that the self is passive or just going with the flow. Inter-individual harmony requires active attention. Mulder (1992), in describing Indonesian harmony (rukun), notes that it “does not come as a gift but is the result of the active orientation toward mutual respect and adjustment to each other.” From this orientation, one must be empathic and flexible to avoid hurting or embarrassing others by one’s action. Oerter et al. (1996), in characterizing a Japanese perspective on human nature, quotes a respondent as claiming that “adulthood” means “good understanding, being flexible and following the general rules set by society. The more you grow as an adult, the smaller your own private fantasy world becomes.... You become softer-minded, better fitted to the society, but you also become less sensitive” (p. 41).
Interdependence characterizes many different aspects of Japanese life. As noted previously, the Japanese language minimizes the person as an agent. Self-reference in Japanese is accomplished with an elaborated set of communicative customs based on individual status in each particular relationship. The Japanese word for self (jihban) means "my share of the shared space between us." Japanese-style interdependence emphasizes living correctly and self-improvement.

Even maternal practices toward infants in Japan seem to involve communicating correct and expected ways to be. Caudill and Schooler (1973) noted that Japanese mothers’ speech is apparently aimed to shape directly their infants’ physical and emotional states in normative directions. They seem especially concerned with preventing infants’ crying and with calming babies whose serenity has been disturbed (Morikawa et al., 1988). Compared to European American mothers, Japanese mothers appear especially alert to infant vocalizations, which they often interpret as signs of distress to which they must respond (Bornstein, Azuma, Tamis-LeMonda, & Ogino, 1990). American mothers, by contrast, seem to talk more to their infants, without trying to directly influence their infants’ behavior. Bornstein and colleagues cite a Japanese mother saying to her 3-month-old baby who was looking away ("What is wrong with you?" and "Look at me"). Apparently, to reestablish a dyadic connection when the infants were gazing away from them, Japanese mothers were more likely than Americans to express negative affect, try to establish mutual gaze, or seek information (see also Rothbaum, Pott, & Azuma, 2000; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Pott, 2000; Shimizu & LeVine, 2001).

Such East Asian parenting and teaching practices encourage interdependence through interaction and mutual engagement. When American mothers and toddlers interact with a new toy, American mothers typically focus on the object and draw the child’s attention to it. Japanese mothers use the toy to engage the child in a relational or interactive game and do much less talking, explaining, and questioning (Bornstein et al., 1990; Fernald & Morikawa, 1993). According to Lewis’s (1995) survey of over 50 Japanese preschools, the focus is on developing children’s connections to one another and engaging them in the pleasures of group life. Instead of celebrating individual success, special events recognize the whole group. Children routinely produce group pictures or storyboards, and no child may go to the playground until all are ready. Attention to others is among the primary aims of Japanese education and is fostered in many routine practices. Classroom walls are adorned with group goals, such as “let’s cooperate” or “let’s pool our strength" (C. C. Lewis, 1995).

Similarly, Chinese parents and teachers consider developing a sense of connectedness to be essential for children’s socialization. Child-rearing practices focus on obedience, reliability, proper behavior, social obligation, and group achievement (P. J. Miller et al., 1997; Mullen & Yi, 1995; Wu, 1996). In a study that content-analyzed children’s stories and early memories, Wang and Leichtman (2000) found that compared to American children, Chinese children showed greater orientation toward social engagement, a greater concern with moral correctness, greater concern with authority, a less autonomous orientation, more expressions of emotion, and more situational details. To illustrate these differences, Wang and Leichtman provided the following examples from 6-year-olds:

Memory 1 (American boy): When I didn’t get to get a toy, I like to get lots of Legos and there was an underwater one, and it was a little big. It was a medium one and it had one of the things I’ve been waiting for. But I forget what it was.

Memory 2 (Chinese boy): One day, my mom bought many flower seeds. They were alive. She planted them there. I stepped on them by accident. Then my mom scolded me and spanked me twice. So I cried. I felt a little angry that she spanked me.

Differences by cultural context are especially evident with respect to emotions (Mesquita, 2001; Tsai, Simenova, & Watanabe, 1999). In many middle-class European American contexts, emotions constitute an important aspect of the self and should be emphasized and explained as one develops individuality. In Chinese contexts, emotions result from the child’s relations with significant others and serve to both encourage proper behavior in the child and reinforce a sense of connectedness (Wang, 2001b).

Studies of East Asian child-rearing and schooling practices also suggest an emphasis on knowing one’s place, role, station, and duties in the social order, particularly in Chinese cultural contexts that explicitly value self-improvement, order, and hierarchy. In a study of Chinese American and European American mothers’ beliefs about what matters for raising children, Chao (1992) found that Chinese American mothers stressed sensitivity to other’s expectations and the situation, while European American mothers emphasized nurturing the child’s
sense of self. Here the former were primarily concerned with the hierarchical, interdependent relationship between self and others and the integrity that derives from doing your duty, but the latter were primarily concerned with furthering their children's independence and encouraging a strong, positive, even assertive, self-regard.

Chao (1993a, 1993b) found an emphasis on order and respect for hierarchy among Chinese American mothers. They scored higher on scales of parental control, authoritarianism, and what Chao calls "Chinese child-rearing ideologies" than their European American counterparts. These Chinese American mothers were more likely to endorse items such as "I have strict, well-established rules for my child," "I do not allow my child to question my decisions," "I make sure I know where my child is and what he is doing at all times," "I teach my child that one way or another punishment will find him when he is bad," "Mothers can teach children by pointing [out] good behavior in other children," "When children continue to disobey you, they deserve a spanking," and "Children should be in the constant care of their mothers or family members."

Similarly, Rohner and colleagues found that, in contrast to Americans, Korean adolescents perceived parental control as manifesting not hostility and mistrust but love and concern (Rohner, 1984; Rohner & Pettengill, 1985). Notably, strictly controlling parental practices that aim to create a morally dutiful, disciplined sense of agency are also found in some European American contexts and merit further study.

Differences in selfways also come across in play practices. Farver, Kim, and Lee (1995) found that in free play among European American and Korean American preschoolers, European American children primarily described their own actions, rejected their partners' suggestions, and used directives (e.g., "I am your king! Do not obey the bad king! I'll save you!"). Korean American children described their partners' actions, used tag questions, semantic ties, statements of agreement, and polite requests (e.g., "He is a king, isn't he? He's the bad guy, isn't he? The good guy caught him, right?").

Overall, in many East Asian contexts, personal sense of well-being is tied less to meeting an individual's goals (the ethics of autonomy) and more to doing what is required in a given situation, or doing something the right or appropriate way (ethics of community; for more on the ethics of autonomy and community see Shweder et al., 1997). Already in the first months of preschool, Japanese children are required to perform complicated activities, such as arranging their lunch boxes or putting on their clothes for outside activities, in the required way (Peek, 2001). As a child, being part of a family or a school group often means thinking about the social unit and your place in it, and then doing what is proper for this situation. It involves considerations such as "What do my parents or my peers want me to do?" or "Did I do what they wanted me to do?" In a Japanese cultural context, a sense of self is developed by being finely attuned to the expectations of others, by not being left out of their sympathy, and by making sure you are part of the social process. Perceptually, cognitively, emotionally, and motivationally, others—the encompassing social unit, the group and its standards of excellence—are important. Thus, the most useful kind of information about the self concerns your shortcomings, problems, or negative features. Self-criticism is encouraged in all societal settings from the classroom to the boardroom. Cultural participation entails discovering what may be lacking in your behavior and then closing the gap between the actual and expected behavior (Kitayama et al., 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1994a, 1994b).

In Japan, a constant focus on social expectations and meeting them appears to go hand in hand with a simultaneous focus on self-improvement and self-criticism. In studies comparing self-improving and self-enhancing motivations (Heine et al., 1999, 2001), Japanese participants who failed on an initial task persisted more on a follow-up task than those who succeeded. In contrast, North Americans who failed persisted less on a follow-up task. In Japanese contexts, failures are important and diagnostic and thus serve to highlight where corrective efforts are needed. The emphasis on self-improvement as a virtue can be seen everywhere in Japanese life. An advertisement urging Japanese workers to take vacations exhorted, "Let's become masters at refreshing ourselves" (New York Times, May 1995).

The desire for self-improvement has cognitive consequences: Many Japanese tend to focus on areas needing improvement while discounting positive aspects of their performance. This tendency to discount the positive is often misinterpreted by European Americans as self-deprecation, but in Japan it works very well to establish the person as a community member in good standing. Humility might better describe this culturally valued disposition. In contrast to European Americans, who often focus on a self's positive features and equate self-improvement with individual achievement.
Japanese are more sensitive to a self's negative features in a given context.

Further, Japanese practices are often framed in terms of hitonami (average as a person). Difficult as it may be for European Americans to believe, many Japanese feel relieved to know that they are average because being different entails the risk of being insensitive to and not belonging in your community. From an interdependent perspective, the self seems best described as a process of self-improvement that requires being sensitive to the expectations of others and not disrupting harmony or equipoise.

Studies of self in Asian contexts all point to self-criticism as integral to the self. Chinese respondents answer the Twenty Statements Test using fewer positive statements about themselves than Americans do (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Karasawa, 1998). Ryff, Lee, and Na (1995) also found that Korean respondents were more likely to endorse negative than positive statements about themselves; European American respondents showed the reverse pattern. Stigler, Smith, and Mao (1985) found similar results among Chinese and United States elementary school students' perceptions of competence: Chinese students rated their competence lower in cognitive, physical, and general domains than did European Americans.

These studies suggest that members in good standing in Asian cultural contexts avoid calling attention to the self, deemphasize their own specialness, and adjust to the immediate situations in which they participate. Even the universally necessary social tasks of individuation, independence, and maintaining autonomy are grounded in an appreciation of interdependence.

These orientations exist at odds with the very practice of personal self-description and thus with commonly exported social science methods requiring people to evaluate and categorize the self. Interdependent (or sociocentric) and individualistic (or independent or egocentric) mentalities and practices are distinct and may require different methods of study. Considered in their respective cultural contexts, notably, these two selfways are equally normal, reasonable, or viable ways of being, although they are associated with patterned or systematic diversity in psychological functioning.

Both types—individualistic and interdependent selfways—involve the participation and support of others and are saturated with cultural meanings. The instantiation and realization of individualism is then a type of interdependence and a socially endorsed and constructed cultural practice. As Vygotsky (1987) suggests, "Every function in the child's development appears twice: first on the social level, and after on the individual level, first between people (intersubjective) and then inside the child (intrapsychological)."

Selfways in Still Other Cultural Contexts

We have focused on the comparison between European American and East Asian children to highlight divergent selfways. Nevertheless, important variations in selfways can also be found within cultural groups and are increasingly a focus of attention (Strickland, 2000). For example, Harwood and colleagues (Harwood & Miller, 1991; Harwood, Schoelmerich, Ventura-Cook, Schultz, & Wilson, 1996) compared Anglo and Puerto Rican mothers in the United States. They found that relative to Puerto Rican mothers, both middle- and lower-class Anglo mothers placed significantly greater value on self-confidence and independence and significantly less value on obedience, the capacity for relatedness, and proper demeanor. Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, and Mintz, 1990; Miller and Hoogstra, 1992; Miller, Mintz, Fung, Hoogstra, and Potts, 1992, report that autonomy is important in both working-class and middle-class U.S. communities, but is fostered differently according to social class. In a study of the co-narration of mothers and toddlers in two Midwestern communities, they found that middle-class mothers accorded children speech and author privileges in creating stories about past events, and were less likely than working-class mothers to challenge the toddlers' versions of reality. Working-class mothers also granted children speaker rights—and involved children in longer co-narratives than middle-class children—but challenged children more often to tell the "correct" version rather than their own story. Similarly, recent ethnographic accounts of selves in working-class contexts find less focus on self-confidence, self-expression, and developing potential and more emphasis on stability, integrity, and resilience (Harwood, Miller, & Irizarry, 1995; Kusserow, 1999; Snibbe & Markus, 2004).

A study by Rogoff et al. (1995) comparing U.S. middle-class and Guatemalan Mayan toddlers finds that autonomy also matters in the socialization of Mayan children, particularly among toddlers who are accorded special privileges and not expected to conform to the same rules as older siblings. In contrast to the American children, however, older Mayan siblings cooperated
interdependently with the toddlers without caregiver intervention, suggesting that among the Mayans developing autonomy is associated with understanding that one is an interdependent member of the community and is not as completely autonomous as infants are allowed to be.

Only recently have investigators begun to describe how contexts other than European American and East Asian ones influence the constitution of self. For example, a review of parenting among U.S. Latino families finds that despite considerable within-group heterogeneity, Latino parents tend to emphasize the main cultural values of respeto and familismo (Harwood, Leyendecker, Carlson, Asencio, & Miller, 2002). Respeto refers to maintaining proper demeanor, which involves knowing the proper decorum required in a given situation with people of a particular age, sex, and social status. Familismo refers to a belief system linking loyalty, reciprocity, and solidarity toward members of the family, which is seen as an extension of the self (Cortés, 1995).

African American parenting, according to a review by McAdoo (2002), must often address persistent issues that African American children confront, such as devaluation of their own worth and future potential, inadequate financial resources, and the challenge of teaching children about race. Moreover, in African American contexts maintaining communal family traditions is essential. Coreidential extended families and their support systems are common and regarded as an important survival system for African American families (Hatchett, Cochran, & Jackson, 1991).

Research in cultural psychology challenges some generalizations about self and self-development and significantly strengthens others. In the next decade, these shifts will likely result in new paradigms for studying the self. Recent theoretical debates and discussions in psychology and anthropology aim to clarify and elaborate the general propositions that the self is (a) constituted in interaction with others, (b) collectively constructed through sociocultural participation, and (c) a product of history (see Elder & Shanahan, Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume). Each of these propositions reflects a central claim of cultural psychology, namely, that processes of self-functioning encompass not only a single psychology but also multiple psychologies.

The Self Is Constituted in Interaction with Others

It is an old idea that one cannot be a self by one’s self. Although life in the middle-class European American cultural region has highlighted the conceptual self, studies of self in other cultural locations underscore the importance of what Neisser (1988, 1991) terms the interpersonal self. Selves are constituted and develop in interaction with specific others (J. M. Baldwin, 1911; M. W. Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Cooley, 1902; Hallowell, 1955; Ingold, 1991; Rosaldo, 1984; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). Echoing Mead (1934) and the early symbolic interactionists, the self literature includes a growing appreciation of the dynamic, socially constructed nature of self. This idea has the appeal of potentially bridging the gap between focusing primarily on the individual as a cultural learner (Tomasello et al., 1993) versus on the cultural collective of which the individual is an interdependent part (Cole, 1995). This synthesis promises to get the person back in the practice and the practice back in the person.

Efforts to understand the mutual constitution of self and other in the development of self, or just how it is that selves and others make each other up, are ongoing. Outside of middle-class European American cultural communities many people prefer crowded living conditions and regard the physical presence of others, especially family members, as essential to mental health and well-being. Peak (1987), writing about Japan, claims that becoming a person involves learning to appreciate the pleasures of group life and living in human society. Similarly, Ochs (1988) reports that Samoans are self-conscious about their need for others to acknowledge and sympathize with them. Menon’s (1995) interviews with Oriya Hindu women living in extended joint family households reveal that in local moral worlds steeped in an ethics of community the idea of living alone while sane and happy is almost a contradiction in terms (see also Kakar, 1978).

In much European American research on the development of self, others become relevant when selves learn to take the perspectives of these others and get inside their heads (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995), or as specific relationships are forged with particular others. It is increasingly evident, however, that others have a pervasive impact on any person’s psychological development throughout life in all cultural contexts. Even prior to birth, individuals are immersed in social relations and activities. Human infants only become selves through their engagement in particular, culturally organized settings (Markus et al., 1997; Weisner, 1982, 1984, 1987). Even more investigators now assume that mutual involvement of self and others is so fundamental to human functioning that others are automatically perceived as relevant to one’s sense of self. Gopnik (1993) refers to an innate bridge or intersubjectivity between self and
others. Infants are responsive to others' affective expressions, and thus others are immediately expected, implicated, and involved in one's becoming a self (see also Ingold, 1991).

The Self Develops through Sociocultural Participation

A cultural psychology perspective places considerable emphasis on what Kitayama and colleagues (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1995; Markus et al., 1997) term the collective construction of self. The concept is that selves develop in a dynamic, recursive process in which sociocultural participation in a given cultural system of meanings, practices, and institutions affords characteristic tendencies of the self that further serve to integrate the person into the meanings and practices of a given cultural community (see also Bourdieu, 1972; Giddens, 1984; Martin, Nelson, & Tobach, 1995). This perspective emphasizes that from their earliest moments, selves arise from being a person in particular worlds. From a child's earliest days, partial, incomplete, rudimentary gestures and vocalizations are “infused with specific meanings and significances crucial to enabling the child to become a progressively more competent partner” (Bruner, 1993, p. 532). Children are immediately engaged in the settings of everyday life and are subject to the specific normative expectations and the institutional entailments of what Super and Harkness (1986) label a “developmental niche.” People always live in culture-specific ways. To live otherwise is impossible.

Super and Harkness's theorizing is one of many attempts to resolve the tension between psychology's excesses in viewing development as natural growth or an unfolding of abilities in stages and anthropology's excesses in viewing development as cultural molding or conditioning. Super and Harkness claim that a child's developmental experience is regulated by (a) the settings—physical and social—in which the child lives; (b) the customs of child care and child rearing; and (c) the mentality of the caretakers. These three mutually interactive subsystems function together with other elements of the large culture and environment to constitute a culture-specific child.

Cultural psychology's approach to the study of self does not deny the individuality, idiosyncrasy, and uniqueness of the self observable in even the most tight-knit and coherent collectives. Children do not become general people; they become particular persons or selves. One of the most significant facts about us, writes Geertz (1973a), "may finally be that we all begin with the natural equipment to live a thousand kinds of life but end in the end having lived only one" (p. 45). Every person participates in combinations of significant cultural settings or niches, which in contemporary American society could include specific groups, such as the family or workplace, as well as contexts defined by ethnicity, religion, profession, social class, gender, birth cohort, and sexual orientation. Some of the remarkable variation among people arises at least in part because people are unlikely to participate in identical configurations of group memberships. Even those living in similar configurations of cultural contexts will diverge in the specifics of their everyday, symbolically mediated experiences and due to prior, innate, received, or temperamental differences in their sense of self will differentially attend to, seek out, elaborate, or reflect some features of these experiences and not others. Moreover, participation or engagement in the activities of a given cultural setting can assume divergent forms. Cultural participation can be straightforward and unquestioning, resistant, or ironic. Consequently, there is little danger that people of the same sociocultural and historical niches will be clones of one another. Between-group differences do not imply within-group homogeneity.

The Self as a Historical Product

A cultural psychology approach to the development of self has led researchers to appreciate Bourdieu's idea that processes of self are "history turned into nature" (1991, p. 7). Many Western researchers focusing on the self have participated in their discipline long enough now to have observed historical change in the European American cultural zone in the natural and normative self. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a need to discover the true self and feelings. Currently, there is the need to say no not yes to experience and to create the proper self. Many current self researchers were themselves raised according to the dictates of Dr. Spock but as parents find his prescriptions rigid and inappropriate. Similarly, American educators note that requiring children to be happy and feel good about themselves has produced a generation of children with high self-esteem and no basic skills. Programs under development aim to raise the educational expectations for American children and to replace an emphasis on positive self-evaluation with an emphasis on building specific skills (Damon, 1995).

General societal imperatives of "the way to be" promulgated by the advertising industry and media have
a strong effect on nurturing practices and on both lay
and scientific conceptions of self. In a comprehensive
historical overview of the American self, Cushman
(1995, p. 24) argues that to understand the formation
of the American self one must understand the interplay be-
tween this nation and what it means to be American, be-
tween what it means to be an American and what it
means to be human, and between the construction of the
self and the construction of the country. It is of no small
significance to the renewed field of cultural psychology
that self researchers are beginning to heed Kessen’s
claim (1983):

The study of children is not exclusively or even mainly a
scientific enterprise in the narrow sense but stretches out
toward philosophy and history and demography. If we were
to recognize such an expanded definition of child study,
we might anticipate a new (science) whose object of study
is not the true child or a piece of the true child but the
changing diversity of children. (pp. 37–38; see also Bron-
fenbrenner. 1979; Bronfenbrenner, Kessen, Kessen, &
White, 1985; Kessel & Siegel, 1983; Lerner, Chapter 1,
this Handbook, this volume)

CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

In the previous sections, we have been considering some
selected content areas, using these to bring out features
of cultural psychology and to demonstrate how these
alter our understanding and analysis of development, in-
fluencing concepts, methods, and research questions.
Those content areas have had to do with interpersonal
relations during childhood, language and communication
practices, and the development of self. The fourth
and last area chosen is that known as cognitive develop-
ment. Terms with a cognitive cast to them—mind, men-
tality, meanings, understandings, competencies—have
already appeared throughout the chapter. The area of
cognitive development, however, gives them a particular
place and deepens their analysis.

The material is necessarily selective. We have given
preference, however, to proposals and issues that alter
our views not only of cognitive development but also of
development in general, and that focus on concepts, thro
searchable questions, and possible methods. Structu-
rahly, the section is in three sections, each concerned
with ways of moving beyond constraining divisions.

The opening material—on separations between
thought and action—focuses on links between ways of
thinking and ways of acting, on the nature of activities
or practices, and on the concept of participation. The
section that follows—reexamining separations between
hearts and minds—links ways of thinking to feelings,
values, and identities. To the analysis of cognitive de-
development, the argument runs, we need to bring the study
of accompanying feeling states. We need also to add the
recognition that areas of competence and ways of learn-
ing differ in the extent to which they are seen as impor-
tant by the individual or by others, and in the extent to
which they are seen as appropriate to a person’s current
self or possible selves.

For the third large concern—moving beyond tradi-
tional separations between persons and contexts—the
material is in two parts. Both stem from the challenge of
giving specific shape to the general recognition that per-
sons and contexts make each other up. The first starts by
considering changes in approaches to the specification
of contexts, asking how these fit with views of cognitive
development. Here we give special attention to accounts
of contexts as both exerting pressure and allowing inno-
vation, as changing rather than static, as heterogenous
rather than monolithic and as composed of contested or
competing positions, with room for individuals to nego-
tiate what is to be learned or what may be questioned.
The later part starts by considering changes in accounts
of cognition and cognitive development, asking how
color enters into these. Here we give special attention
in accounts of cognition in contrasting domains (do-
 mains where biological predispositions are major and
domains where the bases is more one of gaining expertise),
to the nature of expertise, and to the specific role of
language and communication in an area—the area
known as “theory of mind”—where age-related changes
have been seen as biologically based, with little impact
from sociocultural experience.

The brief final comments then bring together some
comments on the methods highlighted by a cultural psy-
chological perspective: Methods applicable to all as-
pects of development but particularly illustrated by
studies of cognitive development.

Reexamining Thought and Action

The conventional assumption is that the mind comes
first. Thought precedes action, at least as an ideal in
development. We then find it reasonable to account for
what people do in cognitive terms. To take an example from law, we find it reasonable to ask if children are old enough to know the difference between right and wrong and, given that knowledge, whether they can be held responsible for what they do. We also see it as appropriate, in studies of development, to place our emphasis on changes and variations in the way people think rather than on changes and variations in what they do.

That conventional assumption has been questioned on several grounds. Noted especially in the previous edition were two alternative proposals. The first is that we reverse the usual order, with the flow now from actions to thought. To take a well-known example, we begin by ‘doing gender.’ We use, and see others use, different names, games, clothes, spaces, and tasks for males and females. Those everyday practices provide the bedrock for the category of gender. They lead us also to think of gender distinctions as fixed and natural, and they move development in the direction of less reflection rather than more.

The second proposal is that we specify both contexts and the course of development in activities, practices, and the nature of participation. In one society, for example, the main activities for children may be strongly age-graded, with each school group or playgroup made up of children much the same age, and children usually distanced from adult activities. In another society, school-based activities may play a minor role, younger and older children may be more often part of the same group, and children may be present while adults work, talk, or play.

The main directions seen as prompted by those proposals took the form of closer looks at (a) links between particular ways of thinking and particular ways of acting and (b) ways of specifying the nature of activities, practices, and forms of participation. We now take up those directions, asking what has been added since the previous edition, and highlighting some particular gaps that remain.

Examining links between ways of thinking and ways of acting. A view of actions and ideas as intrinsically interwoven is a core part of the concept of custom complex. The challenge lies in finding ways to bring out the forms of that interweaving. Two ways of doing so may be distinguished. One starts from particular forms of activity and asks about associated ways of thinking. The other starts from ways of thinking and asks what practices or activities might establish or maintain them.

For the first method—starting from particular forms of activity—this chapter has already provided a major example. It takes the form of working from language and communicative practices, asking for example how these are associated with particular divisions between truth and fiction, particular distinctions among relationships or events, and particular ways of perceiving or representing the self. That direction is also very much evident in analysis of the extent to which an understanding of ‘mind’ and of what others know or believe is shaped by the presence of lexical terms such as thoughts or beliefs, by adults’ questions to children, and by games such as 1 Spy or 20 Questions. In acquiring adults’ language, the argument runs, children also acquire their theory of mind (e.g., Viden, 1996; Viden & Astington, 2000).

For a further example involving language, we turn to a study that is especially relevant to the under-explored question: What modes of acting can substitute for one another? We surely learn to distinguish among relationships, for example, by more than one route, by involvement in or exposure to more than one kind of practice. The nature of interchangeability, however, is so far poorly understood. The content area in the study singled out has to do with narrative development. It compares hearing children whose parents are deaf with other children. Narrative development turns out to be the same for both (Van Deusen-Phillips et al., 2001). The narrative practices of people other than parents, it appears, are sufficient to model the expected structures.

Spoken language and communicative practices are by no means the only practices to attract continuing attention to the study of cognitive development. Anthropology and cultural psychology draw attention to a variety of other tools, ranging from sticks to written scripts, number systems, or maps: Tools that bring out the nature of both cultural variations and historical changes. There are by now many analyses of how various tools come to be available, used, or altered and to shape the way thinking or problem solving proceeds. Several of these are contained in the papers brought together by Cole, Engeström, and Vásquez (2000). A set of chapters edited by Hatano and Wertsch (2001) provides several further examples, ranging from the use of a globe in learning about astronomy (Schönherr, Säljö, & Wyndham, 2001) to the use of models or diagrams in planning constructions (Gauvin, 2001).

From these several sources, we abstract two points that may well be extended to the analysis of many practices. The first is that with extended use we are likely to learn more than how to use a particular kind of tool. We may also develop an understanding of it, a mental model.
of how it works, and its possibilities (Oura & Hatano, 2001, describing a particular aspect of development in the course of learning to play the piano). The other is a strong reminder that all such understanding is socially shaped. What is written and used as a basis and purpose for reading, for example, may in some groups cover a wide range of material and of situations. In others, materials and purposes may be strictly limited to writing certain kinds of letters, keeping certain kinds of accounts, or developing religious commitment (Scribner & Cole, 1981).

For the second method—starting from a way of thinking and asking about its possible background—we single out, as a particular case, thinking that involves the emergence of change or innovation.

There are, for example, clearly occasions when people develop ways of being original or creative rather than being only technically and productively expert. That kind of development appears to be influenced by the ways in which forms of teaching and definitions of skill allow some individuality of expression rather than only the strict following of prescriptive directions. Cooking and the performance of music, for example, often allow for some individuality of expression—at least at some levels of competence more readily than do areas such as the feeding of animals or plants (Hatano & Inagaki, 1992; Oura & Hatano, 2001).

There are also clearly occasions when reflection, questioning, or resistance occurs rather than the simple acceptance of a customary way of thinking or acting. Most analyses of practice lead us away from exploring that aspect of development. They emphasize instead the extent to which the routine, everyday quality of practices diminishes the likelihood that they will be reflected on, questioned, or resisted. That emphasis has offered a powerful contrast to accounts of cognitive development that emphasize people as making sense of the world in optimal scientific fashion: asking questions, being quickly alert to discrepancies, and investing effort in resolving ambiguities. It leaves open questions about shifts in conventional views and practices, both across generations and in an individual’s lifetime.

For the circumstances that encourage questioning or resistance, we have so far little developmental evidence. One relevant circumstance, however, seems likely to be what children learn about the fate or status of questioners. They may be pointed out as odd people, as godless or lost souls whose afterlife is not what one would aspire to. “Curiosity killed the cat,” it is said (more often than the rejoinder “Information brought it back”).

A further possible circumstance has to do with repetitions of the same message. Repetition in itself, however, is a concept still in need of unpacking. It may take the form of everyone delivering the same message. There are, for example, experimental studies showing that consensus—especially consensus about the affective significance of a particular view—tends to limit the degree of monitoring for exceptions (Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). Repetition may also take the form of the same message emerging from several practices. Involvement in Western-style schooling, for example, is low among Samoan children. Both adults outside school and the nature of school practices in Samoa, however, all convey the same message: the irrelevance of school for the children’s current or future ways of living (Watson-Gegeo, 1993).

In specifying activities and forms of participation or nonparticipation, any approach to development that emphasizes the importance of activities needs to move toward distinctions among them. Activities have been distinguished by, for example, where they take place, the people who are present, and the psychology of the people present (e.g., their views of how development takes place: e.g., Super & Harkness, 1986). They have also been distinguished by the tools or artifacts that are available or used (e.g., Gauvain, 2001), the patterns of accompanying talk (Gutiérrez, 2002), and the forms and impacts of repetition (e.g., Hatano & Inagaki, 1992). Practices, for example, are activities where repetition, by oneself or others, gives rise to the sense of the natural or proper ways to act (e.g., Goodnow et al., 1995; P. J. Miller & Goodnow, 1995).

Activities may differ also in the extent to which they allow various forms of participation. We draw particular attention to this aspect. One reason for doing so is that changes in participation have been proposed as promising ways of characterizing the forms that development takes. They may then characterize both the shape and the bases of development. Another is that descriptions of participation build on descriptions of activities as joint and on distinctions among them as how two or more people contribute to a task.

Currently, the most familiar form of attention to changes in participation revolves around teacher-learner or expert-novice relationships. Prompted, especially by Vygotskian theory, the course of development is often seen as one in which the expert provides guidance and structures the task in ways that allow the novice to take over more and more responsibility for the task.

That description of a shift is a rich starting point, but it needs, several expansions that involve (a) the kinds of
relationships considered, (b) the steps or processes involved, and (c) the nature of nonparticipation.

On the first score (the nature of relationships), we need to continue questioning the benign and cooperative quality presented as typical of teacher-learner relationships. Teachers or experts are not always eager to give up their control and novices are not always eager to learn or to take on responsibility (Goodnow, 1990b). Teacher-learner relationships are also not the only forms of relationship that can apply. In some situations, for example, people function or are expected to function more as a team. In still others, one person (e.g., a concert pianist) may seem to take the only active part. Even here, however, the audience listens with expectations about what will be played and how pieces will be played. The performer will take those expectations into account and also try to persuade the audience that the choice of pieces or of interpretation is a reasonable or exciting one (Oura & Hatano, 2001).

For expansions on the second score (specifying steps or processes in participation), we turn to proposals from Rogoff and from H. Clark. Rogoff (2003) describes participation as involving two processes. In one, people seek to achieve some mutual understanding: for example, some mutual understanding of what each knows, what each seeks, what each understands the task to be. In the other, they seek to structure what each will do. They offer choices, invite some actions rather than others, or shape events so that some actions become more likely than others. In effect, they engage in some "mutual structuring of participation" (Rogoff, 2003, p. 287).

H. Clark's (1996) analysis starts from conversation or "language in use" as a prime example of "joint activity." His analysis is not developmentally oriented; however, it does suggest several new directions for developmental research. In any joint activity, Clark (1996) argues, we should ask what each person contributes and is expected to contribute, what they regard as their shared task, how they go about that task, and when some perceived limit to what they can do is reached. In a conversation between a telephone operator and a caller, for example, one person seeks information and the other provides it. Each person checks from time to time that the other has heard what was said, has heard accurately, that the information provided is what was sought and has been understood (in essence, "are you with me?"). Moves toward establishing mutual understanding (Rogoff, 2003) are not only a way of describing what people do but also an indication of a particular competence whose acquisition we might well seek to trace.

In any joint activity, to take a second part of H. Clark's (1996) argument, we should specify the rules, regulations, and etiquette that apply. In any team game, for example, people may be present as players, referees, coaches, fans, or observers. Each is expected to act within certain limits. Acting in violation of these limits incurs penalties. For any game also, the number of people and the rules for participation define the game. People can play football with fewer than the number of required players, for example, but then the game is no longer an official game. Varying the rules as to what each piece may do in a game of chess is also possible but the game is then no longer chess.

In any area, that kind of description suggests, the acquisition of skill may lie in learning both the rules of the game and the limits to which they can be pushed. We learn, for example, that some departures from the expected rules or procedures rule one out of the game while others are tolerated. We learn also that failing to observe the expected patterns (e.g., the patterns for conversations) may not rule one out of the game but is likely to result in fewer invitations to join in on later occasions.

Learning the collaborative rules (Goodnow, 1996b) seems likely to apply to many situations, from turn taking to story telling, school tasks, or teamwork of any kind. How children learn such rules, however, is still far from clear. An intriguing beginning is Martini's (1994) observation that young children who spend a great deal of time with older children (the older children are often their minders) learn quickly that their presence is tolerated as long as they do not interrupt the older children's games. Household tasks bring out a similar aspect of development. They also bring out the extent to which what needs to be learned or negotiated are the reasons for participating, the expected styles for doing so, and the limits to variations in what can be contributed (e.g., variations in what can be delayed, downsized, delegated, swapped, substituted, or taken over; Fuligni, 2001; Goodnow, 1996c, 2004b).

The third and last needed expansion that we single out has to do with the occurrence and the nature of nonparticipation. Most analyses of participation assume that participation always occurs, even at times—as in the example of a concert pianist's audience—when participation is not highly visible. What needs to be accounted for then are the timing and the shape of changes in the way people participate. Nonparticipation, however, can also occur, and may be encouraged in some areas, with attempts at participation regarded as forms of interference (Goodow, 1996a). Where it is encouraged, learning how
not to do so, in acceptable ways, may be a major part of developmental skill (Goodnow, 2004a).

At this point, before we go further in attempts to track down sources, the major need appears to be one of differentiating among forms of nonparticipation. People may, for example, be physically absent. They may stay away or drop out. More subtly, they may be present but unengaged in what occurs. Children may, for instance, participate in the sense that they stay in the classroom (they do not drop out physically). They are, however, uninvolved, uninvested, or not engaged (behaviorally, cognitively, or emotionally) in the formal work of the classroom. Increasingly, that kind of nonparticipation is attracting both attention and proposals to the effect that the difficulty may lie more in the nature of social and classroom contexts than in characteristics of the nonparticipants (e.g., Blumenfeld et al., in press). Delineating forms of nonparticipation, establishing how they come about, and finding ways to change them seems to be one of the next challenges to rise to in analyses of how thought and action are related to one another.

Hearts and Minds

Cultural anthropology has long contained an awareness that matters of the mind cannot be separated from matters of the heart. Feeling cannot be regarded as a separate state from thinking or treated simply as a force that provokes thought (Shweder, 1992). Forms of competence need to be regarded as the skills that communities value (D’Andrade, 1981). Development needs always to be framed by the social group into which one moves: for example, “Becoming a Kwoma” (J. W. M. Whiting, 1941). At issue, to take a statement that has moved into popular discourse, is the battle for hearts and minds.

Cognitive psychology has tended to cover a somewhat different set of concerns. A set of chapters on “affective minds,” edited by Hatano, Okada, and Tanabe (2001), illustrates two recurring lines of approach. One focuses on the ways in which emotions influence the nature of processing, with effects ranging from what is attended to or given processing priority to how far information is sought. The other focuses on the ways in which aspects of cognition prompt various emotions, ranging from fear in the face of perceived threat to the pride, shame, or embarrassment rest on some sense of self and of standards.

What does our cultural psychology perspective add to such analyses of hearts and minds? To consider that question, we take up the place of feelings, values, and identities, again summarizing very briefly the points made in the previous edition and asking what might now be added.

Feelings

The only point covered in the previous edition was the widespread recognition of the need to avoid a two-box approach to thinking and feeling. We now expand on that point in three ways.

One is the use of feeling states as a way of differentiating among shared points of view (D’Andrade, 1992). All members of a cultural group, for example, may hold the view that “everyone should help the poor” or that “each of us can be whatever we want, provided we work hard enough.” For some members of the group, however, that idea may be held at the level of a cliché. For others, the idea may be held with a conviction that guides action when a choice arises. For still others, the idea may be held at a level that initiates action: We seek ways to implement it. How some ideas come to be held with various levels of commitment is clearly a question about development that still needs to be explored.

The second expansion has to do with occasions when some ways of thinking or problem solving give rise to strong negative emotions. These ways strike us as terribly wrong, as violating some basic principles, as—to borrow from others—unthinkable, heretical, or taboo (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). These feelings may well be an important part of our sense of a major difference between cultures. They also suggest that people may be regarded not only as “intuitive scientists” but also as “intuitive theologians” (Tetlock, McGraw, & Kristel, 2004). That kind of proposal is not only an interesting challenge to any “cool scientist” view of cognition but also nicely linked to a useful method: presenting people with errors of various kinds (essentially variations of expected patterns) and exploring both judgments of seriousness and the kinds of emotions reported.

The third and last expansion to the place of feelings attracts attention because it also challenges conventional concepts and some particular methods. It has to do with variations in the level of attention paid to feeling states as part of understanding others. A study of attention to two aspects of words provides an example. Adult speakers of English and Japanese were presented with words that were pleasant or unpleasant in meaning, and spoken with either a smooth, round tone or a harsh, constructed tone. They were then asked to ignore vocal tone and judge whether the words are pleasant or un-
pleasant in meaning, or to ignore meaning and judge whether the tone was pleasant or unpleasant. Japanese speakers found the first task more difficult than English speakers did. English speakers found the second task more difficult than Japanese speakers did (Ishii & Kitayama, 2001). The course of development for that kind of difference would now be of interest to establish, with one possibility being that English speakers grow out of an initial sensitivity to tone and into a preoccupation with the lexical meaning of words.

Values

At first glance, it may seem strange to use the term values in relation to cognition. Values surely belong to accounts of social or moral development. Cognitive values are ubiquitous: embodied in distinctions between what we call basics and frills, significant problems and trivial pursuits, elegant and pedestrian approaches to a problem, original and regurgitated pieces of writing, and proper and odd ways of adding up numbers.

In the previous edition, we noted the ubiquity of cognitive values and raised the question: How are these acquired? What is the nature of such cognitive socialization (Goodnow, 1990a)? We can now offer three expansions: one related to where values occur, a second to how values are acquired, and a third to the range of value tags or value judgments that are made.

For the areas where values are salient, we focused in the previous edition on the nature of the end product: on what is to be learned, what is said, understood, written, or worked on. Values are also attached to particular ways of proceeding or learning. In many cultures, for example, learning by watching is valued over learning by doing (Rogoff, 2003). In any culture, teachers and students may also vary in the value they attach to various ways of learning. Teachers in many Western societies, for example, often favor a process of learning by exploring differences of opinion—by argument or by attempts at resolving different views. Pupils, however, often devalue that procedure and avoid it on the grounds that it may jeopardize their relationships with one another (Lampert, Rittenhouse, & Crumbaugh, 1996). The values attached to play and to formal or academic learning provide a further example. Chinese parents of preschoolers place far less value on play as a source of cognitive development than European Americans. Moreover, their preschoolers themselves also place high value on learning in ways that suggest an “awakening of the unity of learning and morality” (Li, 2004, p. 126) that is slower to develop among European American children. The difference is seen as reflecting—for the Chinese preschoolers—a cultural model of learning in which a combination of “heart and mind for wanting to learn” is central (Li, 2002, p. 246).

For the acquisition of cognitive values, we turned in the previous edition to accounts that are essentially borrowed from theories of social learning. The emphasis was on what happens in dyadic interactions; on the way, for example, that what is said is responded to, built on, ignored, scorned, or actively corrected. We drew especially from accounts by Wertsch (1991) of how children even in the early years of school learn to use “the voice of science”: sprinkling their stories or arguments with references to numbers, citing “evidence,” and talking about the physical properties of objects rather than personal meaning for the speaker. Noted also were several closely observed accounts of what happens when children bring to school ways of speaking and story telling that are not in a teacher’s preferred style. They are quickly made aware that their stories and their ways of story telling are not good, and teachers actively seek to dismantle (Michaels, 1991) the children’s styles.

The ways in which we acquire cognitive values, however, need not be limited to such direct interpersonal interactions. Values are also embodied in practices. Take, for example, a school timetable or a school curriculum. In a timetable, some school subjects are allotted prime times of day, taught every day, and seldom rescheduled. Others are given lower priorities: inevitably dropped or cut short whenever class juggling needs to take place. In the material used for teaching, there may be no references to a child’s country of origin, no images of people from a child’s identity group, or no stories that are part of a child’s heritage. It may not even occur to kindergarten teachers that there is something absurd about using stories such as Red Riding Hood in Samoan classrooms (Watson-Gegeo, 1993). School subjects may also acquire various status tags: Some are thought of as a must-be-taken course, some are only for the brightest (Latin and Greek once had this status), and some are best for the less bright (typing once had this status). Still others seem to exist on sufferance: In most secular Western schools, for instance, religion or scripture—if taught at all—is usually an option, and it is often taught by someone who is not part of the regular school staff. In many ways, its position parallels the low degree of attention given in most current analyses of development to religious ways of viewing events and people (Hudley et al., 2003). It is small wonder then that many of us are unprepared for the significance of religious thought in many other parts of the world.
Direct social learning and embedding in the teaching and linguistic practices of a group are then two lines of cognitive socialization. To these, a third needs to be added. It has been considered so far in terms only of judgments about the work of adults, yet is extendable to children. It also points to a way in which practices may be linked to one another: a recurring concern in this chapter. This core proposal is part of Bourdieu’s (1979) analysis of intellectual values—of “taste” or “distinction”: An analysis that brings out the extent to which some of the same criteria for judging value may apply in several situations. For example, we bring many of the same dimensions to judgments about intellectual productions that, we use for judgments about food, distinguishing between rich and thin, refined or rough, and well or poorly presented. The essence of taste for the European middle-class, Bourdieu (1979) comments, may well lie in the values it attaches to various forms of presentation, for both material and intellectual productions. That proposal not only helps illuminate an area of difference among social groups but also raises developmental questions about the extent to which a common presence makes values easier to pick up or more difficult to set aside in successive situations.

The third and last expansion in the area of values has to do with the range of value judgments. We have so far described various kinds of thinking, learning, or problem solving only as being more versus less valued, more versus less privileged. That is surely an incomplete description. At the least, we might extend the range by adding a term dispreferred from Ochs (1990, p. 299), which covers what is actively discouraged. We might extend it also by describing values as what is regarded as ideal, what is tolerated, what is discouraged, and what is regarded as out of the question, impossible, intolerable (Goodnow, 1995, 1996a), heretical, or unthinkable (Fiske & Tetslock, 1997; Tetslock et al., 2000).

We have a great deal to learn about what are regarded as the most serious violations of expected ways of thinking. Building on Fiske’s (1991) account of social orientations, Tetslock and his colleagues propose that the underlying base is a violation of “spheres of exchange.” With one example being the violation of a distinction between what can be treated as a commodity (traded, sold, or discarded) and what cannot. All cultures, for example, draw distinctions between what can be sold and what cannot. They may differ in their views of what can be sold (e.g., people, sex, loyalties), but the distinction is always deeply felt. We have as well a great deal to learn about the developmental background to such distinctions and the feelings associated with them. At the least, however, these judgments at the far end of a scale of values point to the need for expanding the range of value tags or value judgments among ways of thinking beyond any simple sorting into the more versus the less valued.

**Identities**

In the previous edition, we divided the argument for the need to link analyses of cognitive development to issues of identity into three ways, which break the line often drawn between analyses of cognitive development.

The first noted that certain ways of thinking, problem solving, or expressing oneself mark one as a schooled or educated person, promoting the choice of some ways of proceeding even when others are available (Nunes, 1995), and often provide the motivation needed to acquire a difficult skill (Hatano, 1995). The second was that changes in competence can lead to some changes in the identity that others assign to us. A person may now, for example, be recognized as a legitimate member of some community of practitioners (Lave & Wenger, 1991); a change in status noted as not always occurring. The third was that the acquisition of competence covers only part of the story. Not acquiring certain forms of competence can also be a way of signaling identity (e.g., an identity of one of “the lads”; Willis, 1977) or a way of protecting one’s identity, one’s sense of an essentially capable self (e.g., Cole & Traupmann, 1981). The critical skill may also lie in managing to maintain a double identity: for example, an official identity, for teachers, as a reasonable child who obeys the rules and, for one’s peers, an identity as one who appears to stay in the letter of the rules but subtly bends or flouts them (Corsaro, 1992).

We have still a great deal to learn, as we noted in the previous edition, about the strategic presentation of identity in the course of development and about what is seen as in keeping with an assigned identity (e.g., the identity of child or beginner). Not in keeping with some definitions of a child, for example, is a precocious knowledge of sex or of money values. Not in keeping with some concepts of a beginner is the open and non-deferential display of skill or ease.

What might now be added? The expansions seen as especially needed have to do with (a) the nature of membership, (b) asking which members of a group matter, and (c) the implications of moves toward recognizing social and personal identity, multiple identities, and both a current self and possible selves.
On the first score (membership), developmentalists are now familiar with the argument that increasing competence needs to be seen as involving not only a change in the individual but also in the individual's coming to be an accepted, recognized member of a group. One needed expansion on that argument consists of noting that this second shift may not always happen. In a less-than-ideal world, acceptance may still be withheld. The official qualifications may never be enough. More finely, we now need to take a closer look at the meanings of terms such as community and membership.

Rogoff (2003) provides one example of that move, distinguishing participation from membership. She describes herself, for example, as having "participated for several decades in a Mayan community in Guatemala, but people from that community (and I) do not regard myself as a member of that community" (p. 83). We may, she continues, do better to focus on "the more dynamic concept of participation, rather than the categorical concept of membership" (p. 83). We may also need to think more about the defining features of a community. Communities need not, for example, be "limited to people who are in face-to-face contact or living in geographic proximity" (p. 81). They should, however, "be defined as groups of people who have some common and continuing organization, values, understanding, history, and practices.... A community involves people trying to accomplish some things together, with some stability of involvement. ... A community involves generations that move through it, with customary ways of handling the transitions of generations" (pp. 80–81). Moreover, "participants in a community often continue to regard their involvement and their continuing relationships as central to their lives, whether this is expressed in affection or loyalty or efforts to avoid community ways" (p. 81). How people acquire these understandings of community and these feelings of belonging are questions still to be pursued.

On the second score (some people in a group matter more than others), we take as an example some proposals by Minsky (2000, 2001). Those proposals start by considering people as equipped by nature with "detectors" for praise or censure. The impact of praise or censure, however, depends on the extent to which there is an attachment or close relationship between the person making judgments and the person receiving them. The remarks of a stranger, for example, generate less shame than do the remarks of a parent to whom the child feels attached. The experience of emotions such as pride and shame, and the development of the standards, rules, and goals that M. Lewis (1993) sees as their basis, depend then on the development of attachments and, presumably, the range of people that in any culture are regarded as sources of praise or censure that should "cut to the quick."

The last expansion (closer analyses of identity) takes several forms. Each suggests a different facet of what develops and, in some cases, of conditions that shape cognitive development.

One is a distinction between social identity and personal identity. Personal identity is identity captured by asking whether people see themselves as competent or creative or as being the same person now that they were at an earlier age. Social identity refers to the social categories in which we place ourselves or others place us. We may, for example, describe ourselves as Asian American, Chinese, or Cantonese, or as first-, second-, or third-generation. Others may assign a person to a looser category, using a term such as Asian to cover everything from India to Japan. Interest in social identities and social categories has a considerable history, especially since the work of Tajfel (1981). Much of that work, however, has stayed in the realm of social psychology and in references to the life of adults. Increasingly, it shows signs of a much-needed move into analyses of development.

Seen as a mark of cognitive development, for example, is an increasing skill in the description of oneself in ways that fit what is required in various situations and with varied audiences (e.g., Banarjee, 2002). There are age changes, for example, in the appropriateness of children's answers on a task such as the following: "Imagine you are lost in a mall. I'm a detective and it's my job to find you. I've never seen you before and I don't have any pictures of you. Tell me what I would need to know about you to find you." What may also develop with age or experience is skill in shaping a presentation of identities to suit one's own strategic needs. To take an example from observations by Cooper, Garcia Coll, Thorne, and Orellana (in press) two girls in an Oakland school use to good purpose their mixed backgrounds (mixed is the term used in the school and the playground). For one, the mother is described in this report as Chinese-American, the father as Jewish. For the other, the mother is described as white, the father as Egyptian. Both girls were noted as using their mixed backgrounds as ways "to avoid fights (mixed meant not on either side of ethnically charged conflicts) or avoid the slight stigma of being
white and build alliances (I told the Black kids that I’m Egyptian and that’s in Africa).

A second expanded look at identity distinguishes between personal and collective identity. It is collective identity that is involved in the sense of “we” (Thioits & Virshup, 1997): reminiscent of J. W. M. Whiting’s (1941) description of development as “Becoming a Kwoma.” As Ruble and her colleagues point out, most of the work on collective social or cultural identity has been with adults. In contrast, most of the work with children has been on the developing sense of gender and gender constancy (Ruble et al., in press). There is some initial work on the extent to which a sense of racial constancy and a sense of gender constancy follow similar lines (Rhee, Cameron, & Ruble, cited by Ruble et al., in press). There is also the beginning of work on whether and when a sense of collective identity in children has similar consequences to those observed in adults (e.g., an effect on what is attended to and how information is processed, or—a point taken up in research with adolescents by Yip and Fuligni, in press)—an effect from the strength of collective identity to successful coping with transitions such as changes in school.

A third expansion is the recognition of identities as multiple, especially when an individual occupies more than one social world: Most children occupy more than one world—home, school, and peers, for example. The children of foreign-born parents have been regarded as especially likely to occupy social worlds that differ markedly in their linguistic practices and values, with the inevitable development of a sense of being torn between two worlds. What they—and all children—may instead develop is a set of border-crossing skills that make it possible to negotiate a reasonably comfortable time in more than one place (Phelan, Davidson, & Yu, 1988).

A fourth and last move in analyses of identity is a distinction between a current self and future possible selves. What may matter most for performance or engagement in school, for example, may be not only an image of oneself at present but also an image of what one might become, and an awareness of the steps that need to be taken to achieve those futures. That kind of proposal not only makes intuitive sense but also is well supported by the results of a California program designed to provide the children of immigrant families with both an understanding of the paths they needed to take from one point in school to another (e.g., the particular levels in mathematics that they needed at various points) and a strengthened belief in their ability to move along the “pipeline” in their “identity pathways” (Cooper, Dominguez, & Rosas, in press).

Much of this work is in its early stages. What is clear, however, is that these directions of research promise to yield a richer understanding of the ways in which issues of identity, along with feelings and values, are part of cognitive development.

Persons and Contexts

Salient in many areas of development is the issue of how to consider contributions from characteristics of both the individual and the social contexts in which they live. Surprisingly, an emphasis on both is still needed because there are still times when an emphasis on instruction or socialization seems to treat the individual as a blank slate or a sponge that needs only to have information provided in absorbable amounts. There are also times when an emphasis on the individual as actively constructing meanings seems to treat the outside world as essentially blank, ignoring the history and the directiveness with which individuals must work or make sense:

Once both contributions are fully acknowledged, questions arise about how the two are interwoven. The first move has been a recognition of the need to regard “persons” and “contexts” as influencing each other in ways that are not one-directional, static or linear. The second has been toward some ways of specifying interdependence. Persons and contexts have been described, for example, as “creating each other” (Briggs, 1992), “shaping each other” (Cole, 1990), “making each other up” (Shweder, 1990a), or “co-constructing each other” (Valsiner, 1994).

What are the specific meanings of such phrases, especially in relation to cognitive development? To answer that question, we divide a large body of material into two parts, varying in their starting points. The first starts from several descriptions of contexts and asks what do these imply for the shape or course of development? The second starts from several descriptions of cognitive development and asks how do social or cultural contexts enter into these pictures?

Both parts start with the recognition that any description of either term (context or individual development) carries implications for the nature of the other. Ecological descriptions of context (e.g., the world as a set of nested circles starting from the home and working outwards into parts of society) carry with them the connotation of development as a journey, with the individual discovering routes, acquiring navigational skills, or finding helpful guides. Descriptions of the world as a stage in which we all play roles or learn our place carry
with them the implication that development involves acquiring effective ways of self-presentation or emotional management.

To take the reverse direction, descriptions of development as coming to make sense of events or to discover regularities imply a world that is not immediately comprehensible, a world in which order or structure is hidden beneath a shifting surface appearance. Descriptions of development as coming to make effective use of the symbols or artifacts available imply worlds in which various tools are available, with some probably more accessible or more promoted than others, varying over groups or across time. Descriptions as activities and changing forms of participation imply worlds that vary in the opportunities they offer for participation or for establishing routines in what one does. In effect, one way of mapping part of the person/context universe always suggests a way of mapping the other. Working from such cross-mapping is likely to be more productive than trying to link analyses that use quite separate dimensions for the description of persons and contexts (Goodnow, 2004a, 2004b, in press).

**Starting from Descriptions of Contexts**

There are by now many descriptions of contexts: a variety especially brought out in a review by Cooper and Denner (1998; see also Cole, Chapter 21, this *Handbook*, Volume 2).

As an opening step, we distinguish between descriptions by content and descriptions by quality. Descriptions of a culture as shared meanings and practices, or as a warehouse of narratives, for example, place their emphases on content. Descriptions of contexts as always changing, or as multiple and contested, place their emphasis on quality.

The descriptions we choose for particular comment are far from exhaustive, and the selection leaves us with a sense of regretted omissions. We would have liked, for example, to give more space to descriptions of contexts that emphasize opportunities for children and families to establish the routine, everyday activities that are seen as so crucial to development (e.g., Gallimore, Weisner, Guthrie, Bernheimer, & Nihira, 1993; Weisner, 2002). The descriptions chosen for closer comment, however, strike us as offering some particular shifts in the way we think about the shape and course of development and as containing some particular gaps.

We start with some examples of context descriptions. The first two are descriptions of cultural contexts as linked practices and warehouses of narratives. For both, and for all other descriptions, we take it for granted that cultures, like people, are always changing.

**Contexts as Linked Practices.** We noted in the previous edition (p. 913) that “it is always an open empirical question whether a mentality generalizes across many practice domains (the Hindu mentality) or is specific to a particular practice domain (the mentality of Hindu sleeping arrangements).” That question is prominent also in the present chapter. We are still, however, short of proposals that consider the nature of linking among practices. We noted earlier a possible linking by ways of similar dimensions being used for evaluative judgments about what is produced, using as an example Bourdieu’s (1979) analysis of “taste” or “distinction” in judgments about food and about intellectual productions. A further example comes from Rogoff’s (2003) analysis of the practices that go with the kinds of arrangement usually found in Western schools. Occurring together are agegrading, a concern with readiness in relation to age, the use of praise for a child’s interest or achievement, the asking of questions to which answers are known, particular kinds of demands by children for adult attention, and the move of school type conversations into home settings. In another grouping, Rogoff (2003) sees an emphasis on particular kinds of relationships (horizontal or vertical, dyadic or multiparty in type) as related to differences in “sleeping arrangements, discipline, cooperation, gender roles, moral development, and forms of assistance in learning” (p. 9).

We now need further examples of such possible groups, further indications of the occurrence and the extent of linking, and a check on whether—where linked practices occur—this makes a difference to the pattern of development. The indications of linking come so far from the way adults pattern a child’s social world. Do children then shift easily from one linked practice to another? Do they, for example, pick up a distinction embodied in one practice more easily when they have already experienced a linked practice rather than one that is not linked?

**Contexts as Warehouses for Narratives or Interpretations.** This way of viewing cultural contexts picks up the argument that all social contexts need to be seen in historical terms. In essence, the argument is that the past provides a set of texts or narratives. Each generation may then draw from the warehouse, add to it, or rediscover forgotten treasures. Each generation may also bring, to the available set, attitudes ranging from respect
to indifference, disdain, or scorn. Among cultural psychologists, Wertsch (1991) best exemplifies this approach to culture. More broadly, this concept is central to the work of Bakhtin, who noted the ways in which novelists such as Rabelais or Joyce broke the pattern of previous narratives: the one by covering topics previously regarded as not proper topics, the other by changes in structure, even at the level of sentences (Kristeva, 1980), provides a brief and readable account. In time, the argument continues, some ways of breaking up past patterns become taken up by others. They then become part of what Valsiner (1994) has described as a spiral of influence that alters the nature of what is available to draw from or is regarded as a reasonable selection:

Novels, we would add, are not the only kinds of texts or narratives that have attracted this kind of attention and that raise questions about aspects of selection or transformation. Martin-Barbero (1993), for example, is one scholar who has brought a similar style of analysis to the way cultural expressions in the form of art, music, film, or television spread from one culture to another. It is not the case, he argues, that cultures in areas such as South America are "over-run" or "swamped" by the cultural expressions of the North. What occurs instead is a process of selection, utilization, and adaptation.

What are the implications of that kind of position for the nature of cognitive development? One is that we may now see development as including the acquisition of a stance toward the texts of the past. That stance may be one of respect and a view that the best way to approach a problem or to provide evidence for one's argument is to turn to the past. In contrast, it may be one of regarding the past as having nothing to do with the present, or as inevitably biased (the product, for example, of old people). That stance, for reasons we still need to pin down, may well change over the course of development.

Overall, warehouse accounts of contexts remind us that the central processes are likely to take the form of selection and transformation. Turning those processes into developmental form then becomes the challenge. Children's selections and transformations of narrative, an earlier section of this chapter suggests, are likely to provide an especially productive starting point. They clearly offer a base for asking about the particular narratives or narrative styles that are held out for children as the best or the ones they should take as models. We may explore also the ways in which children come to incorporate the texts they read into what they themselves produce. When a 10-year-old, for example, starts a story with the sentence—The sun rose over both worlds: the world Sven knew and the one he would be transported to—we can readily hazard a guess that the background reading includes some form of science fiction. What parts of a setting, a plot, or a collection of characters are more readily taken over or more quickly transformed than others? What makes them more likely to be treated in some ways rather than others? All told, narrative selection and transformation seems to capture especially well historical and cultural variations in what children encounter as well as processes of selection, rejection, and transformation.

**Contexts as Shared Meanings or Practices.**

These descriptions of contexts are especially prominent in anthropology in the form of emphases on the presence of cultural models (shared ways of viewing events or people), cultural practices (shared ways of proceeding), or custom complexes (an approach that combines both actions and meanings). We have, throughout the chapter, brought out several implications of these positions for the study of development. We now add several others, prompted by a focus on cognitive development and on the quality of ideas or practices as being shared.

In some anthropological work, the quality of sharedness has given rise to questions about the degree to which there is consensus and about the position of people whose views are modal for the group as against being out on the edge of the variations that occur (e.g., Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). That work is with adults but suggests a new way of viewing development. In any content area and at any age, what is the degree of consensus? Are there some areas or some ages when not being part of the consensus—to be out on the margin or to disagree—is to be avoided, virtually seen as the kiss of death? What promotes an interest in coming to share the same understandings or to act in the same ways as others? The usual emphasis is on the wish to understand others and to be understood by them in ways that make easy the communication of meanings. The reasons seem likely to involve also the strategic presentation of self.

The quality of sharedness prompts other questions about what happens when there are clear departures from everyone being of one mind or acting in the one way. How do children deal with such situations? We use the example of a California classroom that served as a base for observing how children dealt with social categories (Cooper, Garcia Coll, et al., in press). In this classroom, children came from several ethnic backgrounds, signaled in some cases by skin color and in oth-
ers by the style of dress, with the most obvious dress signal being that of girls from Islamic families wearing a veil or headscarf. Teased by another child for wearing something so different, the reply by one girl was “It’s part of my tradition,” a reply taken from the school’s orientation—conveyed in many lessons—of respecting others’ traditions. The shared meaning, in effect, was used as a way of justifying an unshared practice. The selection of the reply, and its quick effect, illustrate aspects of shared meanings and practices for which other developmental examples might be sought.

Contexts as Multiple and Contested. No society is monolithic. In most industrialized societies, for example, there are usually to be found more than one religion, political party, or form of schooling, more than one class, and more than one country of origin. Some of the alternate forms may be known by adjectives that imply their minority status (e.g., alternative medicine, alternative schooling, or independent film producers). It is not only the presence of variety that matters but also the way in which these several segments compete or negotiate with one another. The people in one group, for example, may regard the people in another as best avoided, kept at arm’s distance, or suppressed. Where these actions do not achieve one’s purposes, some form of negotiation or takeover needs to occur. Churches may unite, union activists may be pushed into management, or independent film producers may be co-opted into studio affiliations and productions.

This way of viewing cultures is widespread in the area often known as cultural studies (the work cited by Martin-Barbero, 1993, is from this field). Part of its attraction for the study of development is that it leads us away from a view of culture or context as a state or thing. The emphasis falls instead on the presence of various cultural groups, on their perceptions of each other, and on their relationships with each other. In addition, recognition of the extent to which encounters with other people or other positions are usually controlled is prompted.

Control over access to knowledge is a long-standing theme in sociological analyses (e.g., Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Foucault, 1980). In developmental studies, it is represented by studies comparing the understanding of animal biology that develops when children can vary their approaches to feeding and care against being restricted to the teachers’ prescriptive routines (Hatano & Inagaki, 1986). In a more social fashion, it is represented by questions about the nature of children’s encounters with other people. Parents may act in cocoon fashion, structuring a child’s world so that experience with different others is at least delayed (Goodnow, 1997), or they may engage in more direct preparatory work. When a child is seen as likely to encounter discrimination, for example, parents may encourage pride in the group’s own history, or teach specific ways of responding to name-calling or other derogatory actions (Hughes & Chen, 1999). Both kinds of experience should affect the social categories, the stances toward others, and the degree of reflectiveness about differences among people that children develop. We have a great deal yet to learn about the nature of such effects. They are likely to provide, however, some sharp examples of how particular qualities of social/cultural contexts are related to some particular qualities of cognitive development.

Starting from Descriptions of Cognitive Development

In the previous section, we started from descriptions of cultural contexts and asked about links to descriptions of cognitive development, noting any suggested new ways of considering development or new research questions. In a change of method, we now reverse directions. We start from some particular descriptions of cognitive development and ask how cultural contexts enter the picture.

There are many ways of describing cognitive development. In the previous edition, we noted three: (1) a shift from an initially weak or fluid state to one that was better established or more smooth in its execution; (2) a change in the nature of information processing: changes, for example, in what is attended to or rehearsed; and (3) a move toward dividing cognitive development into domains, with proposals for differences in the nature of development by domain.

The third direction is the one to which we gave most attention then and now. The focus reflects the extent to which debates about domain specificity have been prime sites for exploring questions highlighted at the start of this chapter such as whether, in the area of cognitive development, there is a place for social or cultural factors (innate predispositions might offer a sufficient account of development), what that place might be, and how given abilities and cultural circumstances might be brought together.

In essence, the synthesis regards two kinds of domains as varying considerably in the way cognitive development proceeds. A distinction is drawn between core or privileged domains and other domains (Keil, 1984; Siegler & Crowley, 1994; Wellman & Gelman,
First, in privileged domains, humans are genetically prepared to acquire knowledge systems that deal with important aspects of the world. Second, in nonprivileged domains, development relies on general learning mechanisms (Keil, 1984) or module acquisition modules (Sperber, 2002). In these domains, cognitive development is usually conceptualized as the gaining of expertise. In both domains, sociocultural perspectives have something to offer. Because the two kinds of domain have been conceptualized differently, suggestions from cultural psychology vary from one to the other.

Nonprivileged Domains: Cognitive Development as Expertise. Traditionally, expertise means the accumulation of rich and well-structured domain knowledge, consisting of “chunks” that can readily be used (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). There is also wide agreement among cognitive researchers that gaining expertise requires years of experience in solving problems in the domain, carried out with concentration and often taking the form of deliberate practice (Ericsson, 1996).

What does cultural psychology add to these characterizations? A central addition, as we see it, is the elaboration of what expertise consists of and how it is acquired.

We begin with the argument that through repeated participation in culturally organized practices, both children and lay adults acquire the skills and knowledge needed to perform competently in those practices (Goodnow et al., 1995). To this we add, first, what matters is not only the amount of time spent in repetition but also the nature of what is repeated. Studies by Oura and Hatano (2001) with a group of nonprofessional pianists bring out this point especially. All of these pianists had started piano lessons at 6 years of age or younger. Some, however, had reached a junior expert level. Others were still at a more novice level. Oura and Hatano (2001) asked both to practice a short piece of music. Those who had stayed at the novice level tried only to perform accurately and smoothly. Those who had reached the junior expert level checked and refined their performance from the perspective of an audience in mind. In effect, the two differed in the practice in which they had engaged. The less successful students had expected to play for the teacher who would evaluate how smoothly and how accurately they played. In contrast, the successful students had practiced for playing in public, with an eye to ways of creating their own expression.

Second, we add that the process of gaining expertise is assisted by other people and artifacts. Novices are not expected to solve problems all by themselves. A study by Takahashi and Tokoro (2002) of experienced amateur photographers (senior shutterbugs) brings out this point. Most senior shutterbugs explicitly expressed their appreciation of their supporting networks: networks involving peers, the instructor, and family members who provided transport, prepared lunchboxes, and so on. Even when learners’ problem solving activities were apparently solo, other people entered the picture in the form of possible competitors or possible buyers of what one produced. The senior shutterbugs, for example, wanted to take at each moment shots that they and others would regard as good. Their skills improved, unlike school learning, almost as a by-product of keeping these audiences in mind.

A third addition, again broadening our understanding of what is acquired in the course of gaining expertise, emphasizes that the acquisition of knowledge and skills is accompanied by socioemotional changes—for example, changes in interest, values, and identity. That position has been stated with particular strength in Lave’s (1991) argument that the practices that developing individuals engage in are embedded in a community of practitioners. All practices, it has come to be recognized, involve socioemotional interactions as well as cognitive divisions of labor. The process of gaining expertise is not likely to be an exception. It cannot be purely cognitive. In one example, Japanese students who develop expertise in the use of the abacus do so in a national climate of admired expertise and in the company of others who are also members of abacus clubs or competitive teams (Hatano, 1995). To take another, volunteers serving at a soup kitchen for homeless people became not only skilful at helping them but also, more important, more favorable toward and sympathetic to those people (Youniss & Yates, 1997).

Finally, cultural perspectives help us as well to distinguish among domains in terms of the kind of expertise required and the occurrence of innovation. Some domains of expertise are knowledge lean: Expertise in these domains is reproductive in nature. Other domains are knowledge rich: In these, individuals, after gaining expertise, are most likely to contribute to cultural change. Expert cooks, for example, may invent new dishes by combining a variety of materials and modes of cooking. The invented dishes may then be incorporated into the culture of cooking, if the new productions attract a number of members constituting the community of cooks.
Conceptual Development in Core or Privileged Domains. In these domains, cognitive development is conceptualized quite differently from what happens in nonprivileged domains. The accounts start from the argument that human beings are biologically predisposed, prior to any experience, to attend to some events rather than others and to make some inferences rather than others (e.g., Keil, 1984). Coherent bodies of knowledge about important aspects of the world are then built on these bases, with many researchers assuming that the acquisition of core domains of thought such as naïve physics, psychology, and biology is early, easy, and almost universal. The ways in which this construction takes place may be varied. As Karmiloff-Smith (1992) notes, the innate constraints may “potentiate learning by limiting the hypotheses entertained” (p. 11), but they may also place limits on what is readily learnable. One early assumption was that the evidence for predispositions tended to minimize the role of culture in earlier conceptual development, especially in the first few years (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994).

How do cultural psychologists challenge views that exclusively emphasize human inheritance from evolution? The domain of naïve psychology or theory of mind (TOM) provides a nice illustration, bringing out how cultural-psychological views change the characterization of the course of development as well as the research methodology.

In a large-scale meta-analysis of studies by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001), for example, many studies emerged as focused on identifying age-dependent developmental patterns. The overall pattern of results is that younger children fail to, but children a few years older correctly, recognize that people act in accordance with what they believe is the case, whether it corresponds with the reality that the child has come to know. The overall assumption is that experience makes little difference in this sequence.

An increasing number of innovative studies are compatible with, if not influenced by, cultural-psychological views. Some of these studies assume that attention to forms of communication with significant others may yield different perspectives on the development of TOM. Some, as we noted earlier, assign particularly important roles in TOM development to the use of language as a tool representing mental states (Astoning & Baird, in press).

In terms of research methods, these studies aim to connect children’s sociocultural experiences to their developing understanding of mental states of themselves and others. One such method is to analyze children’s everyday conversation in families prior to a check on their understanding of beliefs as determinants of behavior. For example, family differences in explanatory conversations have been found to be associated with children’s later development of TOM (e.g., Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Dunn, 2000). Another research strategy is to compare the TOM performances of different populations of children. Convincing evidence for the importance of complex communication with significant others for the TOM development, for example, is given by Peterson and Siegal (1995): Deaf children’s development of TOM is delayed when their parents are hearing individuals who had to learn a sign language later in their life but is not delayed when the parents are fluent signers. Still another method that can show the causal effect of linguistic interaction in the TOM development consists of training studies. Lohmann and Tomasello (2003), for example, have demonstrated that 3-year-olds’ false belief understanding is facilitated both by perspective-shifting discourse and by sentential complement syntax that represents a belief decoupled from reality.

The domain of naïve biology also contains both mainstream conventional studies of age-dependent development and innovative sociocultural studies. For example, among the studies reviewed by Inagaki and Hatano (2002), the majority started from a traditional view of development and focused on the ages at which children would acquire “autonomous” biology. A small number of studies, however (harmonious with cultural-psychological views) showed that the age-dependent developmental patterns observed among urban children (typical experimental participants) are not universal. Instead, the pattern varies with particular kinds of experience.

Most studies have shown that young children’s naïve biology is human-centered: The properties attributed to other animals tend to be generalized from what is known to be the case for humans. This tendency is weaker or nonexistent, however, among children who have had frequent direct contact with nonhuman animals and plants (Atran et al., 2001; Ross et al., 2003). Even among urban children, active and enduring involvement in animal-raising activity mitigates the human-centered nature of biology. Their enriched knowledge about animals they have raised serves as an extra source for the analogical understanding of animals not yet experienced (Inagaki).
Children's understanding can also be influenced by cultural ideas about the categories in which humans, other animals, and plants can be placed (Hatano et al., 1993; Stavy & Wax, 1989). In short, even young children's naive biology is instantiated differently in different sociocultural environments.

Moving beyond specific areas of knowledge are several proposals for the need to take an interactive view of genetic predispositions and sociocultural facilitations or constraints. Gelman (1990), for example, proposes that innate constraints are so skeletal that they always have to be complemented socioculturally. Another possibility is that both types of constraints usually operate in a mutually facilitating or bootstrapping way, with innate constraints becoming less important as rich domain knowledge is acquired through cultural learning. Worth particular note is the argument that, in a few years after birth, children begin to learn in a uniquely human way, exemplified by joint attention and imitation (Tomasello et al., 1993).

Those several proposals go beyond a view of development as shaped only by genetic predispositions or by sociocultural circumstances. People undoubtedly come equipped to make some distinctions—between inside and outside or animate and inanimate objects. Cultures, however, provide usable artifacts that are shared by a majority of people in a community or a subgroup. These artifacts include physical facilities and tools, social institutions and organizations, documented pieces of knowledge, and commonsense beliefs. They also include the behavior of other people, interactions with them, and social contexts created by them. Cognitive development is best seen as interactively constrained by both sociocultural circumstances as well as genetic predispositions (Hatano & Inagaki, 2000).

A Summary Comment on Cognitive Development: Methods

The account just concluded—covering several ways in which people have explored the place of sociocultural experience in cognitive domains often proposed as the province of genetic predispositions—has brought to the surface a variety of methods. Variety in method provides a way of bringing this section on cognitive development to a close and of underlining again some points about method that have been made in earlier sections of the chapter: in particular, the place of shifts in method as one of the prime features of a cultural psychology perspective.

Making comparisons across cultures, although often informative, is not the only method possible. The most informative route may be a concentration on a culture and on some local practices or ways of thinking. Also valuable is working from a local practice and asking what ideas accompany it or, conversely, starting with a stated or inferred belief and asking what practices might be associated with it.

That aspect of methods (across or in cultures) is not only a pragmatic issue. It reflects also, as Cole (2001) has pointed out, the recognition that "all human groups inhabit a world suffused with their predecessors' history... culture and cultural mediation are universal features of human life and an integral part of human development. Consequently, the process of cultural mediation can be studied in a broad range of practices within any large, demographic, culturally constituted group" (p. 168).

We hope it has been evident that we see great benefit in borrowing freely from both experimental and ethnographic approaches, with psychologists perhaps benefiting from a fuller knowledge of how a variety of ethnographic methods may be used (P. J. Miller et al., 2003, is a useful source). Borrowing conceptual analyses from outside psychology is also important. We have drawn on occasion from anthropology, sociology, and—less frequently than we might do—areas often known as cultural or narrative studies. We have regrettably made the least use of history, a deficit that Cole (2001) points out as applying to many psychological analyses of the cultural nature of human development. The historical analysis of how mind, body, and soul or heart have at various times been separated or merged with one another would in itself, for example, round out our steps in this chapter toward moving beyond current dichotomies.

Our hope is that the benefits of cultural psychology for the analysis of cognitive development lie not only in its prompting fresh approaches to questions about what develops and how this takes place but also in enriching the repertoire of methods that we bring to those questions.

CONCLUSION

It is the hope of all those who welcome the return of cultural psychology as a vibrant research enterprise that more and more social scientists from various home disciplines (psychology, anthropology, linguistics, sociology) will become developmental experts on
the psychological functioning of members of particular cultural communities around the world. Only then will the many questions raised in this chapter begin to be answered. Only then will the abstract pluralistic idea of "one mind, many mentalities" become substantial and concrete, and thereby come fully to life. It is when another culture's taken-for-granted categories appear to us to be counter-intuitive, or out of line with what we assume to be present early in life, that we are most likely to experience the need to rethink our sense of what is natural.

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