Introduction

The Astonishment of Anthropology

If there is a piety in cultural anthropology it is the conviction that astonishment deserves to be a universal emotion. Astonishment and the assortment of feelings that it brings with it—surprise, curiosity, excitement, enthusiasm, sympathy—are probably the affects most distinctive of the anthropological response to the difference and strangeness of “others.” Anthropologists encounter witchcraft trials, suttee, ancestral spirit attack, fire walking, body mutilation, the dream time, and how do they react? With astonishment. While others respond with horror, outrage, condescension, or lack of interest, the anthropologists flip into their world-revising mood.

Undoubtedly, there is some irony in this pious devotion to the virtues of astonishment. In the postmodern world that cultural anthropology has helped to construct (see, for example, Clifford and Marcus 1986; Clifford 1988; Geertz 1988), everything from science to literal description to one’s own subjectivity is self-consciously redefined and revalued as artifice or art. In that world, piety is figured as a form of either innocence or insincerity, both of which stand, quite naturally, in need of defense. The following essays try to provide one part of that defense of astonishment, by “thinking through cultures” in search of our psychological nature.
The expression “thinking through cultures” is polysemous; one may “think through” other cultures in each of several senses: by means of the other (viewing the other as an expert in some realm of human experience), by getting the other straight (rational reconstruction of the beliefs and practices of the other), by deconstructing and going right through and beyond the other (revealing what the other has suppressed and kept out of sight), witnessing in the context of engagement with the other (revealing one’s own perspective on things by dint of a self-reflexive turn of mind). Because these essays are exercises in thinking through cultures in search of the human psyche it seems appropriate to refer to them as expeditions in cultural psychology. They are expeditions in cultural psychology that, it is to be hoped, exhibit some of the astonishment of anthropology.

The idea of a cultural psychology is the idea that individuals and traditions, psyches and cultures, make each other up. Because the idea of a cultural psychology implies that the processes of consciousness (self-maintenance processes, learning processes, reasoning processes, emotional feeling processes) may not be uniform across the cultural regions of the world, any serious or astonishing treatment of the topic must address the problem of rationality (or psychic unity), as well as several closely related issues, including relativism, romanticism, realism, and the trilogy of modernisms (pre-, post-, and pure).

One of the central myths of the modern period in the West is the idea that the opposition between religion-superstition-revelation and logic-science-rationality divides the world into then and now, them and us. According to this myth the world woke up and became good about three centuries ago when Enlightenment thinkers began to draw some distinctions between things that premodern thinkers had managed to overlook.

Many modernist authors (for example, Ernest Gellner in anthropology, Jean Piaget in psychology) construct an image of the premodern period as a dark age of intellectual confusions: the confusion of language with reality, of physical suffering with moral transgression, of subjectivity with objectivity, of custom with nature. That image of the premodern mind is built out of presupposed separations or distinctions—of language versus reality, subject versus object, custom versus nature—that over the past several decades have been challenged by postmodern scholarship. Today, deep into the postmodern age, there are other stories about rationality and religion waiting to be told.

The problem of rationality (or psychic unity) is one of the central themes of Thinking Through Cultures. The problem presents itself to anthropologists and other students of cultural psychology in the following form: What inferences about human nature are we to draw from the apparent diversity of human conceptions of reality, and what justification is there for our own conceptions of reality in the light of that apparent diversity?

Nicolas Rescher (1988, p. 140), in his recent writings on rationality, formulates nicely what is at stake in debates about conceptual diversity. The logic of his formulation goes like this, although I have taken considerable liberties with his wording and added the examples.

Consider the following four propositions. Each will seem plausible to some readers, yet taken together they are incompatible. One or more of them must be rejected, but which?

1. We, the members of our ethnic group, are rationally justified in our conception of things; for example, that when you are dead you are dead, that virtuous people can die young, that souls do not transmigrate, and that authors have a natural inalienable right to publish works critical of revealed truth.

2. They, the members of some other ethnic group, have a different conception of things; for example, that the spirits of your dead ancestors can enter your body and wreak havoc on your life, that widows are unlucky and should be shunned, that a neighbor's envy can make you sick, that souls transmigrate, that nature is a scene of retributive causation and you get the death you deserve, that a parody of scriptural revelation is blasphemous and blasphemers should be punished.

3. They, the members of that other ethnic group, are rationally justified in their conception of things.

4. If others are rationally justified in their conception of things and that conception is different from ours, then we cannot be rationally justified in our conception of things, and vice versa.

The four propositions are mutually incompatible. Accepting any three entails rejection of the fourth. Here one is presented with a fateful choice, for rejecting first one and then another of the four can resolve the inconsistency in a variety of ways.

Rejection of the first proposition is entailed by acceptance of the other three. Those who go searching in other cultural traditions for a
lost paradise or age of truth often adopt this stance, which might be described as reverse ethnocentrism or inverse developmentalism. If you are an inverse developmentalist you view your own culture as retrograde, or as oppressive, or as a form of false consciousness, or as a source of illusions. Carlos Castaneda's Don Juan beckons. Colonized peoples sometimes adopt this stance, if they identify strongly with the worldview and practices of the colonizer.

Rejection of the second proposition is entailed by acceptance of the other three. Those who adopt this stance think that all differences are merely apparent, or superficial, or idiomatic. This is the stance associated with the humanistic ecumenical spirit of universalism and the Platonic quest for pure form. From an ecumenical perspective, for example, ancestral spirit attack might be viewed as just a way of speaking about repressed childhood memories or fantasies about malevolent aspects of parents. Or it might be argued, in the name of universalism, that although a queasiness about widows is not part of our public discourse, we, too, manage to isolate them socially and keep them out of sight. In other words, deep down, or viewed in a unitarian light, that faraway place that seemed so different is not so different after all.

Rejection of the third proposition is entailed by acceptance of the other three. This is the stance that underwrites the monotheistic proselytizing spirit of the nineteenth century and the familiar developmental contrasts drawn by Sir Edward Tylor (1858 [1871]) and Sir James Frazer (1890) between magic and science, primitive and modern, superstition and objectivity. Ernest Gellner is a witty contemporary exponent of proselytizing developmentalism. Describing his view of the practice of anthropology, he states:

What in fact [anthropologists] do is give an account of a given society, or some of its practices, against the backcloth of our world, and not of its world. An anthropologist who would explain witchcraft beliefs and practices of a given society by saying, "Well, as a matter of fact, in their country, witchcraft works, like what they say," would simply not pass muster. If relativism genuinely were the practice of anthropology, such an explanation would be not merely possible, but mandatory. In fact, what the anthropologist does do is explain how witchcraft beliefs can function notwithstanding their falsity. (1988, p. 26)

One logical possibility remains: rejection of the fourth proposition. Any defensible anthropological relativism requires the rejection of that proposition and acceptance of the other three. Many of the following essays explore that possibility.

Yet is it coherent to claim simultaneously that we are rationally justified in our conception of things (for example, that nature is indifferent to virtuous conduct; that Salmon Rushdie should be free to publish unharmed) and that others are rationally justified in their conception of things (for example, that nature is just; that Salmon Rushdie should be punished), and that this is so even though our conception of things and their conception of things are truly different, and inconsistently so?

The rub, as Rescher and many philosophers are fond of pointing out, is that we could not possibly know that others are rationally justified in their conception of things (proposition 3) if we could not make rational sense of their conception of things "by our lights" or, as Gellner puts it, "against the backcloth of our world."

In other words, if we can make rational sense of their conception of things, then their conception of things is not that different from ours, for it must make sense in terms that are understandable to us. It is our rationality that we explore when we confront their conception of things, for how else could we understand them, unless their meanings, beliefs, and modes of justification were in some sense available to us?

Does that mean that claims of genuine difference (proposition 2) must be denied? That would seem to depend on what we mean when we claim that the conceptions others have of things are different from our own.

One thing we just cannot mean is that the other is fundamentally alien to us (see Spiro 1990). Others are not fundamentally alien to us, just inconsistently and importantly different in their conception of things (as expressed in their texts, in their discourse, in their institutions, in their personalities) from our conception of things, at the moment.

Yet the conceptions held by others are available to us, in the sense that when we truly understand their conception of things we come to recognize possibilities latent within our own rationality, or existent in the history of our own reason, and those ways of conceiving of things become salient for us for the first time, or once again.

In other words, there is no homogeneous "backcloth" to our world. We are multiple from the start. Our indigenous conceptions are diverse, whether they are centered in our official texts or our underground newspapers, in our public discourse or our psychoanalytic
soliloquies, in our customary practices or our idiosyncratic routines, in our daytime task analyses or our nighttime fantasies.

There is, of course, in that formulation a sense of universal latency, in which everyone has got everything. There is also a sense of manifest particularity, in which it matters a lot precisely how someone has got it—"it" referring to some conception of things (such as the idea that misfortune is punishment for moral transgressions, or that the opposite sex is a dangerous species).

Typically, the cross-cultural differences that interest us are differences in the way in which some conception of things has become manifest—the degree of its salience, centrality, generalization, legitimacy (local rationality), and institutionalization as a customary practice or personal motive in this or that ethnic tradition. In some parts of the world whether or not men and women sleep together and make love during the woman's menstrual period is discretionary, perhaps even a matter of taste; in other parts of the world it is mandated that women stay secluded for several days.

"Maintenance-loss" models of the capacity for cross-language speech perception, as described by Janet Werker (1989), provide a suggestive metaphor for the idea that an original latent multiplicity of highly differentiated forms (everyone has got everything) coexists with specialized institutionalizations of incompatible and diverging manifestations.

While I would not want to suggest that babies are the bearers of the universal subjectivity of humankind, it appears to be the case that the newly born come into the world with a very complex, detailed, and elaborated capacity to detect categorical distinctions in sound. The research on speech perception has been done with infants of English-speaking parents listening to language-specific phonemic contrasts in Hindu and in the appropriately difficult-to-pronounce American Indian language Nthlakapm. The dramatic finding is that four-month-olds seem able to discriminate the phonemic distinctions peculiar to those disparate languages, a capacity that adult English speakers no longer possess. If this early capacity to detect a sound contrast in foreign tongues is kept alive through even a small amount of initial second-language learning during the first two years of life, it is maintained into adulthood. Typically, however, it disappears by the end of the first year of life, with the onset of exclusive single-language learning, and can be recovered later in life only with difficulty. It is recoverable. For example, [ra] versus [la] is not a phonemic contrast in Japanese, and monolingual Japanese adults are unable to discrimi-
everything sensuous, subjective, embodied, temporary, local, or tradition-bound is viewed as prejudice, dogma, or illusion, and pure being is reserved for only those things in which an autonomous reason could have absolute confidence, namely, its self and deductive logic.

Others have made famous a method of subtraction, well known in the social sciences through the notions of “convergent validation,” “interobserver reliability,” and “data aggregation,” whereby everything different about different ways of being in the world (or different ways of seeing the world) is treated as error, noise, or bias, and pure being is the abstraction of those common denominators that make people the same.

Yet “prejudice,” “dogma,” “illusion,” “error,” “noise,” and “bias” are not the only locations with which to possess or (as the structuralists would have it) dispossess a tradition, and our ability to recognize each other as pure beings does not necessarily arise out of what is left over after we subtract all our differences.

Anatole Broyard, the American writer and literary critic, once remarked, speaking in a very continental voice, that “paranoids are the only ones who notice things anymore.” The essays in this volume are variations on that theme: that our prejudices make it possible for us to see; that traditions not only obscure but also illuminate; that our differences make us real; that while traditions are particularizing (who could live by ecumenism alone?), a peculiar existence can be a selective affirmation of pure being; that the freeing of consciousness goes hand in hand with feeling “astonished” by the variety of ways there are to see and to be. In other words, reason and objectivity are not in opposition to tradition, and they do not lift us out of custom and folk belief. Reason may lift us out of error, ignorance, and confusion. Yet error, ignorance, and confusion are not proper synonyms for tradition, custom, and folk belief.

Friedrich Nietzsche once said that he could believe only in a God who could dance. In India, where I do my research, and in other traditions as well, the gods are often desperate for an experience (for a fight, for a good meal, for a romance, for a vacation, for a chance to go dancing). They are eager to assume a human form and to extend themselves into nature, for the sake of a sensible compromise between the purity of a disembodied spirit and the dreary materiality of a disenchanted world. The gods know that when matter rests mindless and spirits float free it is either before the dawn or after the twilight of time and of existing things.

The New Standard Encyclopedia of Universal Knowledge (1931), a pocket-size compilation of tidbits of Enlightenment wisdom—the kind of “culture” one used to be able to pick up in a grocery store (I picked it up at a secondhand book sale)—defines romance as “a passion for adventure, the strange and the marvelous and a tendency to exaggerate the virtues and vices of human nature.” It is a superficial definition—sort of like learning a punch line without the joke—and it is quite incomplete, but it will do, as a first approximation. More than one ethnographer of my generation, and of earlier generations as well, went off to the field with visions of the Arabian Nights or the Thief of Baghdad or the Tolkien Trilogy in mind, to adventure beyond the perceived limits of the self, to conduct research on the transformative power of words and deeds—performatives and rituals—and to write up ethnography as a narration of unusual and larger-than-life typifying events or as a record of encounters with exalted persons.

But the definition can be deepened. Romanticism stands out against the view that existence is the negation of pure being, by offering us its alternative, namely, the view that existence is the infusion of consciousness and pure spirit into the material world, thereby narrowing the distance or blurring the boundaries between nature, humanity, and the gods.

Romanticism shares with skeptical empiricism the view that the senses and logic alone cannot bridge that gap between existence and pure being. Left to their own devices, all that the senses and logic can see is a mindless nature, “fallen and dead.” Transcendental things are beyond their scope. To make contact with the really real, the inspired (= divinelike) imagination of human beings must be projected out to reality; or, alternatively, the gods must descend to earth.

It is the doctrine of romanticism that existence is best appreciated (that is, understood and experienced) as a sensual manifestation of the transcendent, and that time and space, history and local variations in color (and culture), deserve to be examined inspirationally, imaginatively, and artfully for diverse signs of our divinity.

The subordination of existence to pure being has, over the centuries, generated a whole series of other subordinations: of the apparent to the real, of earth to heaven, of the profane to the sacred, of the polluted to the pure, of the body to the mind, of the dirty to the clean, of the pagan to the godly, of the artificial (the “plastic”) to the genuine, of the imposed to the chosen, of the exterior to the interior, of custom to individual autonomy, of the superficial to the deep, of rae
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11 ones to fear—perversity is not to be denied—as a general evaluation of romanticism the emotivism nihilism line of criticism is not well founded. For one thing, satire, travesty, and irreverence are regular attendants in the service of reality. Inversions of the order of things rendering this or that world topsy-turvey are the customary instruments of parody, jest, cathartic rites, and Dionysian ecstasy, and of many other deeds corrosive of dogma and thus protective of consciousness. One fears that it is the critics' wholesale disparagement of the techniques of satire and ecstasy that is the real threat to pure being.

More important, the criticism misjudges the true project of romanticism. For the aim of romanticism is to revalue existence, not to denigrate pure being; to dignify subjective experience, not to deny reality; to appreciate the imagination, not to disregard reason; to honor our differences, not to underestimate our common humanity.

The negative intent behind the doctrine of romanticism is to expose the pretense that literal truth is artless. The positive intent is to develop theories about how realism—the experience of transcendent things as direct, transparent, or close at hand—is achieved artfully (see the Conclusion of this volume).

Romantic works aim to portray the infusion of the transcendental into nature. Some romantic texts bridge the gap between existence and pure being through heroic depiction of the descent of the gods, or, alternatively, in a secularized world dubious of discourse about the gods, by self-consciously foregrounding the revelatory role of the imagination. It is not unusual for a romantic text to draw attention to itself as a piece of writing or as a constructed creative act. Clifford Geertz (1973, 1988) writes the way he writes for a good reason. It is part of his point that we should notice what he is doing and how it was done.

Romanticism inclines toward an interest in those inspirations (of religion, of tradition, of individual literary or scientific genius) that take us beyond our senses to real places where even logic cannot go.

Romanticism strives to be a discernible manifestation of its own doctrine and to promote the feeling of astonishment in the face of itself and of many other strange and marvelous things.

Astonishment, unlike fear or anger or sadness, is not one of the universal emotions, yet it deserves to be. Victor von Gebsattel, the existentialist and psychiatrist, in a graceful essay half a century ago about
the world of obsessive-compulsive patients (1958 [1938]), described astonishment as the experience of “fundamental existential wondering” that arises in the encounter with the differentness of the count-erworld of a fellow human being.

Yet there is a deep problem here. I think it was when I heard Mortimer Adler accuse cultural anthropology of ethical incompetence on William F. Buckley’s TV interview program, “Firing Line,” that I really started to worry about the fate of astonishment, romanticism, and cultural anthropology in contemporary Western society. Adler was supposed to be critiquing Allan Bloom’s book The Closing of the American Mind (1987), in which the author describes “Make love, not war” as an obscene remark, regrets the lost opportunity to censor rock music before it became popular, and finds it difficult to distinguish Woodstock from Nuremberg.

Bloom’s provocative denunciation of the philosophical doctrine of emotivism—the claim that subjective experience is the only reality, that beauty is in the eye of the beholder and values merely a matter of taste—is an extended complaint about the romantic intellectual heritage that he holds responsible for the shallowness, even disappearance, of contemporary moral discourse. Today’s American college students, Bloom claims, are so morally inarticulate, nihilistic, and tolerant—“to each his own bag”—that they even hesitate to condemn such obvious abominations as suttee (the Hindu practice of cremation, in which a deceased man and his surviving widow are immolated in the same funeral pyre); worse yet, they lack a moral vocabulary for doing so.

In The Closing of the American Mind Bloom uses the term relativism as a synonym for emotivism (or subjectivism) thereby equating them, in effect linking both relativism and emotivism to permissive and pernicious nihilism. When I first noticed his equation I initially discounted it as a rhetorical flourish. Wherever Bloom wrote “relativism” I read “emotivism” or “subjectivism.”

I benefited greatly from Bloom’s critique of emotivism (if you do not speak for anything higher than your self, why should anyone listen to you?). Yet, as I pondered his critique, its implications for cultural relativism did not seem very severe. After all, if we live differently in the world we just might live in different “objective” worlds, and not just in different heads. Nonmotive relativism is not an oxymoron (see Chapters 1 and 3); and trying our hand at some version of it is at least one of the games in town, in a town in which many of the players (for example, Goodman 1968; Geertz 1973; MacIntyre 1981, 1985; Putnam 1987; Booth 1988) are able to tell the difference between Woodstock and Nuremberg. There were far more mud and good will at Woodstock, and fewer restrooms, than at Nuremberg.

It was somewhat later, when I tuned in to Mortimer Adler in front of a national television audience, ostensibly there to criticize Bloom, pointing his finger at cultural anthropology and adding it to the equation (relativism = emotivism = nihilism = cultural anthropology; “logical positivism” was added to the list as well), that I began to worry about the fate of astonishment in the contemporary world, and to sense that anthropologists have a lot of work to do. This would seem to be the moment to move forward with a new-wave anthropology or cultural psychology that avoids the excesses of the old and tired oppositions monism versus nihilism, reason versus revelation, the absolute public object versus the transitory private subject.

So what is it that makes something like the obsessive-compulsive world encountered by von Gebsattel a true object for “fundamental existential wondering”? What makes it astonishing? The answer is that to answer those questions you must be willing to explicate that world. For if you do explicate a world that is a true object of fundamental existential wonder you will find out what makes it astonishing. You will find yourself wondering about fundamental existential things. (See Chapter 9 for the cognate notion of unperturbed viewing.)

Of course, not every world is a true object for astonishment. Not every world deserves to be spelled out. Yet there are always worlds other than your own that do. In between monism and nihilism there is still plenty of room for the varieties of the really real (and perhaps there is more room than ever, as we have come to appreciate that space). Whatever the perils of experience, to recognize a true object of astonishment you must look at it, and be curious about its peculiarities, so as to see.

The obsessive-compulsive world encountered by von Gebsattel and others (Freud 1939 [1907]; Rapoport 1989), for example, is an astonishing one because it is a world in which the Platonic tension between existence and pure being is acute. It is a world in which the skeptical metaphysical and existential speculations of philosophy and religion have become the stuff of personality. It is a world in which our fellow human beings teach us what it is like to live with an unrelenting nostalgia for the transcendental, for purity, perfection, and peace. It is a world in which we see what it is like to live not just with metaphysical uneasiness but with ontological terror of the “form-destroying powers of existence” (von Gebsattel 1958 [1938]), sym-
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The Indologist Paul Courtright described in a 1988 lecture at the University of Chicago a nineteenth-century eyewitness account by a British officer. Throughout the preparations for her cremation the widow appears jovial. She talks with onlookers. Immediately before her immolation she is handed a mirror. She looks in it and sees her past and future lives, which she narrates to the crowd, a testimonial lending support to the local doctrine of reincarnation. She goes up in flames, without signs of pain. The act seems unforced; no one has bound her to the funeral pyre. The British provide the fire permit.

Now what did the eye witness? Is it an act of heroism or of moral idiocy? And from which world or counterworld should we speak when we praise or blame such a practice? Is it really emotivism ("to each his own bag"); morality is merely subjective preference, as Allan Bloom suggests, that leaves some of us astonished, and tolerant? Is it really the dictates of an autonomous reason that leads others to condemn suttee and legislate against it or to suppose, like Allan Bloom, that it is obviously an abomination?

On September 4, 1987, Roop Kanwar, a beautiful eighteen-year-old college-educated Rajput woman, received national press coverage in India when she immolated herself in front of a large supportive crowd, with her dead husband resting on her lap. Immediately the scene of the event became a popular pilgrimage site. The cremation ground was enshrined as a romantic memorial to an extraordinary act of devotion and as a place in a sacred geography, that could be pointed to as tangible evidence of the reality of the divine and the descent of the gods.

The country was divided in its response. Everyone agreed that no mortal being could voluntarily stay poised on a funeral pyre during immolation and experience no pain or fright. Critics of suttee argued that it therefore could not have happened as reported—Roop Kanwar must have been forced to the funeral pyre, where she must have been agitated and wanted to flee; or, if it did happen as reported, then it could not have been voluntary—Roop Kanwar must have been drugged or hysterical or crazy. Supporters of suttee argued that therefore Roop Kanwar was no mere mortal—she was infused with the spirit of a goddess or she was a goddess.

Both accounts suggest that at the time of immolation Roop Kanwar was, in some sense, "out of her mind" (the expression connotes both insanity and objectivity), but one account validates and dignifies her act, our world, and the events that go in it, while the other disparages them. For which world or counterworld should we speak? For they are different and inconsistently so.
Suttee is a rare and extraordinary act. Viewed as artful realism (literal truth is not artless; see the Conclusion of this volume) suttee works, for those for whom it works, as a representation and confirmation through heroic action of some of the deepest properties of Hinduism’s moral world. In that world existence is imbued with divinity. The gods have descended to earth. Since the world is imbued with divinity it is a just world, governed by laws of retributive causation and just retribution for past transgressions and sins. Since the world is a material world it is in transit, an impermanent place through which the divines circulate, at their own rate, in proportion to the limitations of their particular material incarnation and the quality of their moral careers.

Hindu moral doctrine has it that husbands and wives live in the world as gods and goddesses. She is the Laxmi of the house; he is her Narayan. As gods and goddesses their bonds to each other are transcedental and eternal. Yet they are incarnate. They are able to dance and eat and make love and transgress and sin; there is a place for the demonic in a romantic world. And they are able to die, which means that from time to time they must shed their vulnerable human form and be newly born again, male or female, as a lizard, as an owl, as a dog, as a human being. It is the price that must be paid for the romantic possibilities offered by embodiment.

In the Hindu moral world the death of a husband has more than material significance, and its metaphysical meanings run deep. Traditional widows in India spend the balance of their lives absolving themselves of sin (fasting, praying, withdrawing from the world, reading holy texts). In their world of retributive causation, widowhood is a punishment for past transgressions. The fact that your husband died first is a sign telling you that you must now undertake the task of unburdening yourself of guilt, for the sake of your next reincarnation on earth. In such a world the flame on your husband’s funeral pyre is appreciated (understood and experienced) as though it was the romantic analogue of the last plane to Lisbon in the movie Casablanca. If you are not on the plane it is likely to be a very long time until you see him again, if ever. A shared cremation absolves sins and guarantees eternal union between husband and wife, linked to each other as god and goddess through the cycle of future rebirths.

For those who are in or on the edge of such an inventive world, the extraordinary act of suttee presents itself as an inspiring confirmation of all that metaphysical trafficking between heaven and earth, between humans and gods, between existence and pure being. Indeed, it is conceivable that Roop Kanwar herself understood and experienced her immolation as an astonishing moment when her body and its senses, profane things, became fully sacred, and hence invulnerable to pain, through an act of sacrifice by a goddess seeking eternal union with her god-man.

It is not impossible for us to imagine Roop Kanwar’s conception of things. Nor is it difficult to recognize that that particular imaginative conception of things is inconsistently different from our own. The far more challenging issue is whether we can justify the conception of things that I have imagined for her. Can we justify it within the framework of our own rationality, which is the only framework for rationality that we have? Can we rationally reject proposition 4 above and endorse the other three? Can we successfully defend the idea (the rejection of proposition 4) that we are rationally justified in our conception of things and that Roop Kanwar is justified in her conception of things, too?

I think we can, and must; yet how we reject proposition 4 will depend, quite crucially, on the conception of reality to which we are committed. How do we it will depend on whether or not we believe that real things (concepts, propositions, gods, the really real) must exist independently of our involvement with them.

If we insist platonically that the very idea of reality suggests something independent of any one of its particular material realizations as a “thing” in time and space, independent of our involvement with it, independent of our verification procedures, of our presuppositions and theories, of our purposes and interests, then to represent suttee as a rational practice we would have to invoke the notions of conditionalyzed universals and of time-dependent or space-dependent truths. We would have to say things such as “in India souls reincarnate; in the United States they don’t.” After all, what is true here and now need not necessarily be true there and then, or there and now, or here and then. Perhaps there once were witches in Salem and they have gone away, to the Santa Cruz mountains. Perhaps there is room in Plato’s heaven for conditionalyzed universals; the pure idea of “a witch in the seventeenth century” might qualify as an eternal, unchanging concept.

Yet the positing of time- and space-dependent truths on earth, and of conditionialized universals subsisting eternally in some Platonic heaven, is not the only way to reject proposition 4. One alternative is to insist on an epistemic conception of truth, reminiscent of the late-eighteenth-century romantic view that transcendent objects spring
from the imagination and that there is a spiritual alliance between the mind and the world; they make each other up, as Hilary Putnam, has put it (1987, p. 1). Putnam’s basic idea is that “there are external facts,” and we can say what they are. What we cannot say—because it makes no sense—is what the facts are independent of all conceptual choices” (1987, p. 33).

That romantic conception of an interpenetration or interdependency of objectivity and subjectivity, of pure being and existence, has been variously expressed: as the idea that nothing in particular exists independently of our theoretical interpretation of it; as the idea that our measuring instruments are a part of the reality they measure; as the idea that the world is made up of “intentional” objects, such as “touchdowns” or “weeds” or “commitments” or “in-laws.” Intentional objects have real causal force, but only by virtue of our mental representations of them and involvement with them (see Chapter 2).

In all the foregoing Platonic (non-epistememic) and (anti-Platonic) epistemic conceptions of what is real, various apparently inconsistent conceptions of things can coexist because they never really meet head on. They are kept apart by contextualization, either by being made time and space dependent or dependent on our theories, verification techniques, and modes of justification, or by being embedded in some intentional world. They are not contradictions battling with each other in the same world. They are arguments in different worlds, whose “weak” (disconnected) inconsistency (Rescher 1988) just might lead us to appreciate those worlds of difference. When you live in the same world all disagreements are matters of error, ignorance, or misunderstanding. When you live in different worlds there is far more to a disagreement than meets the eye.

Some may wish to argue that all conceptions of things, even totally inconsistent ones, must inhabit the same global mind; that such a global mind is latent within each of us, or “subsists” in some Platonic heaven; and that it is some shared right of access to that global mind that constitutes our common humanity. Those are not unappealing ideas, from which it would seem to follow that psychic unity is not what makes us the same (a universally subsisting global mind stocked with a multitude of disconnected ideas has no causal powers to create an existent psychic uniformity); psychic unity is simply that which makes us imaginable to one another.

If psychic unity is what makes us imaginable to one another, then perhaps the really real truth for us mortal beings is that we can never be everywhere at once (even in a global mind), any more than we can

be nowhere in particular. As mere mortals or, if you prefer, as embodied gods, we are always somewhere in particular, giving partial expression to our pure being. Because we are limited in that way, the inconsistency between Roop Kanwar’s view of sutee and Allan Bloom’s (or a feminist’s, for that matter) is not something we need to resolve; it is something we need to seek, so that through astonishment we may stay on the move between different worlds, and in that way become more complete.

Others may argue that any feeling of this-worldly limitation is a concession to Platonism, and they may be right. Yet that is a concession I am eager to make, for although existence is not the negation of pure being, any particular existence is partial. Of course if you are an “innocent” or a “primitive,” convinced that it is the examined life that is not worth living, then you may not be aware that your life is incomplete. But that is precisely why a civilized penchant for transcendent, in the form of a romantic leap into other ways of being, ennobles the spirit and deserves to be in the nature of things.

In the East those natural (and romantic) leaps toward completeness take place on a very long time scale, over many reiterations. In the West, where we think we go but one time around, we are in a bit more of a hurry to take the necessary steps.

Romanticism is sometimes thought to be antagonistic to science, but that is a mistake. Romanticism is in tension with only the first of the three major scientific world views sketched by Roy D’Andrade (1986). It is antithetical only to those Platonic approaches to science that proceed as though existence were a negation of pure being (see Chapter 2).

In his discussion of variety in science, D’Andrade defines any good science as one in which the scope and nature of the generalizations developed in any domain are appropriate to the kind of order found in that domain (1986, pp. 26–27). He suggests that different scientists think differently because they imagine different orders to reality. D’Andrade then divides the “good sciences” into three kinds—the physical, the natural, and the semiotic—on the basis of the kind of order each science imagines it studies and the kinds of generalizations it seeks.

The physical sciences (for example, physics) seek pure or basic or eternal law—like generalizations about a small number of abstract objects or forces whose “interrelations can be stated in quantitative
mathematical form.” The physical sciences picture a homogeneous universe in which out of “deep necessity” “all generalizations apply equally through all time” (D’Andrade 1986, pp. 20–21).

The natural sciences (for example, geology, biology, economics) seek conditional generalizations about the way concrete historical or evolutionary objects—the human eye, the San Andreas Fault, the World Bank—are put together and work. The natural sciences imagine a “lumpy or patchy” universe made up of “complex contingent mechanisms” (D’Andrade 1986, p. 21).

The semiotic sciences (for example, linguistics, social and personality psychology, cultural anthropology) study things that have meaning to meaning-imposing human beings. They seek contingent generalizations about the regularities that make it possible for people to communicate with each other, with special attention to the learned content—the symbols and meanings—that guide human action. The semiotic sciences imagine a differentiated universe made up of words and categories and presuppositions and propositional attitudes in which different systems of meaning are created, promoted, and spread and become differentially institutionalized in different regions of time and space (D’Andrade 1986, pp. 24, 30, 34) (see Chapters 4 and 5).

As a romantic discipline cultural psychology is a hybrid form of semiotic science and natural science. For it assumes that human consciousness is a complex contingent mechanism whose dynamic functioning is mediated by the system of meaning within which it is embedded (see Chapters 3, 6, 7, and 8). As a semiotic natural science, cultural psychology explores the possibility suggested by Max Weber: that our highest-order systems of meaning—the astonishing world of the Protestant or of the Hindu—have become differentiated into semiotic regions; that as this cultural differentiation has taken place the “contingent mechanism” of human consciousness has undergone shifts in its dynamic functioning (see D’Andrade 1986). Thus, it will come as no surprise to cultural psychology if it should turn out that there are different psychological generalizations or “nomological networks”—a Hindu psychology, a Protestant psychology—appropriate for the different semiotic regions of the world.

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I believe it was Bertrand Russell who once said that the fact that we each have a mother does not mean there is a mother of us all. On the facing page is the mother of us all, in the South Asian Oriya Hindu
conception of things, and she is not quite what the Western mind might imagine.

It is difficult for a Jew, a Christian, or anyone else unacquainted with Hinduism's narrative traditions to grasp the depiction. The viewer is likely to respond to the image with many powerful interpretations, feelings, and evaluations, but most of these reactions will be revealing of a Western frame of mind.

The Oriya artist has drawn mother-goddess Kali, the ferocious demon-slayer. He has portrayed a famous incident that took place shortly after Kali did battle with a notorious and previously invulnerable demon, who, along with his henchmen, had been terrorizing the gods. Kali has emerged victorious, having taken many demonic heads. Throughout the carnage she has been furiously at work, using her tongue and other implements to keep droplets of blood from touching the earth, for each droplet reproduces another demon. (In one local Oriya folk version of the fight, Kali dances before the demon and then slowly exposes her genitals in a celestial striptease. He watches her, loses his powers, and turns to jelly. She cuts off his head.)

Yet from the ador of the slaughter Kali has also gone wild. Her husband—the god Shiva, celibate, erotically empowered by the reabsorption of his own semen—comes down from his cave in the mountains, where he has been meditating, to bring her back to her senses. The scene shown here, according to some local Oriya storytellers, depicts the redomestication of Kali and the restoration of her civility. Shiva lies down on the ground as Kali comes stomping along, enraged. She accidentally steps on her husband's chest, a shocking display of disrespect, given the hierarchical order of things. Suddenly she realizes what she has done. A moment before, she was wild; now, startled into re-cognition of her responsibilities as a deferential wife, Kali feels ashamed and fearful. She is about to be subdued. Her facial arrangement as depicted here (tongue out, eyes widened) is occasionally modeled in everyday life in Orissa as a stylized expression for embarrassment, fear, and surprise.

Kali is a symbol for the challenges of any future cultural psychology. How we are involved with the world and react to it depends on our representation of the ambient facts of our reality. Freud taught us mythically that it is the father who is perceived as dangerous by the son, as the son competes with him for their common object of desire, the mother. In India we learn that when we meet the mother of us all we must tame her or be destroyed. She is powerful and dangerous and may be hazardous to our health. Why not let our father have her? A. K. Ramanujan (1983) has even proposed that in India there is a radical inversion of the Oedipus complex. The son does not rebel against the father to get the mother. Instead the father makes the son an offer too good to refuse: give me your virility and I'll give you immortality. The son does it, eagerly.

People live differently in the world of Kali from the way they live in the world of the Virgin Mary. It is a supposition of cultural psychology that when people live in the world differently, it may be that they live in different worlds. It is an appreciation of those different worlds that cultural psychology tries to achieve. As one might have begun to suspect from our brief expedition into Roop Kanwar's world and the land of Kali, the different worlds that are the true objects of astonishment for cultural psychology are worlds in which truths are literal, in a frame-bound sort of way, and in which things follow logically, from powerful imaginative premises that are neither obviously false nor self-evidently true. Perhaps the truly astonishing thing about an astonishing world is that it is both affirmable and deniable. It is constructable and deconstructable. There is a sublime or “aweful” (as they say in Indian English) existential wonderment in the recognition that your capacity to affirm some astonishing world or deny it, to construct it or deconstruct it, depends, quite crucially, on whether we take our stand in that world or whether we take our stand in some other equally astonishing world. Or perhaps what is most truly astonishing of all is that when “thinking through cultures” there is no place else, no neutral place, for us to stand.