Why Cultural Psychology?
Author(s): Richard A. Shweder
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Accessed: 04/04/2009 11:05

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at [http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp](http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp). JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at [http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black](http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black).

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Thanks to the ordering of speakers on this panel, I am in a position to begin my remarks responsively. So I am able to offer some comfort to Ted Schwartz by telling him that next month at the University of Chicago there will be a conference called “After Postmodernism,” in which a number of anthropologists and philosophers will try to imagine a future after the present age of radical skepticism about the very possibility of ethnographic research. So don’t lose faith; there is hope.

Mel Spiro just noted and regretted the absence of Beatrice and John Whiting on this special occasion. As it turns out, I visited Bea and John two weeks ago at their home on Martha’s Vineyard, and I asked Bea if there were any messages she would like me to convey to you on this occasion. There were three. Number one: Stay interdisciplinary. Number two: Developmental psychology is a rich source of ideas for psychological anthropology, and the two fields should stay in close touch. Number three: Americans are all hung-up about sex and can’t tell the difference between eroticism and tactile touching. Those are her messages.

My own remarks are a continuation of a theme introduced by Bob LeVine. I am going to start by talking about “cultural psychology.” Then I want to share with you a few field incidents and experiences, as a way of indicating some of the lines of investigation I have been involved with over the years, all of which I have written about before. Then I will conclude with a couple of conceptual issues related to the future of cultural psychology.

Last night at dinner Mel Spiro asked me, “Why cultural psychology?” Why not use “culture and personality” as the designation of our field? That issue has also come up this afternoon. The question deserves an answer.
Perhaps part of the answer (although surely only a small part) has to do with the value of using language to symbolize "new beginnings," as when Bank of America cards were renamed VISA. It has been mentioned at this session that within anthropology there has been a stigma associated with the phrase "culture and personality." I think this stigma probably has two dimensions to it: the association of "culture and personality" with national character studies, and its association with a particular psychoanalytic view of the person, emphasizing sex and aggression as the central motives in life.

But there are other more important problems with the label "culture and personality." Part of the problem has to do with the "and." One of the advantages of the grammatical form "cultural psychology" is that it lends itself to saying things such as, "I am studying the cultural psychology of the emotions," or "I am studying the cultural psychology of the self [of the body, of morality, etc.]." That way of stating what you are up to does not imply (as does that and in between culture and personality) that one of those things is an independent variable and the other a dependent variable, or that cultural things and psychological things can be neatly separated from each other. In other words, there is an emphasis inherent in the phrase "cultural psychology" on the reciprocity and mutual embeddedness of culture and psyche. So the phrase "cultural psychology" highlights the iterative character of the way culture and psyche make each other up, as well as signaling rebirth without stigma.

There are additional problems with the name "culture and personality." In the contemporary discipline of psychology the study of "personality" tends to be set in contrast with (and is sometimes even competitive with) other types of subdisciplines, such as social psychology or cognitive science. Unlike "culture and personality," the phrase "cultural psychology" seems more inclusive and able to encompass the study of social practices, cognition, emotion, motivation, and the self under a single broad rubric.

So those are some of the reasons I think the phrase "cultural psychology" has caught on. Obviously it is a bit unfortunate that "cultural psychology" tends to sound like a subfield of psychology. It is unfortunate because there is much more to cultural psychology than any one discipline can offer. Cultural psychology is meant to be an interdisciplinary field. I, for one, think it is absolutely crucial that psychological anthropologists play a central role in the development of this reactivated field.

The psychologists who work in cultural psychology (for example, Hazel Markus, Shinobu Kitayama, Kuo-Shu Yang, Richard Nisbett, Lee Ross, Claude Steele, Jerome Bruner, Durganand Sinha, Joan Miller, Jan Valsiner, Jon Haidt, Paul Rozin, Biranchi Puhun, Phoebe Ellsworth, Peggy Miller, Heidi Fung, Michael Cole, Jacqueline Goodnow, Giyoo Hatano, Jim
Wertsch, Patricia Greenfield, Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Ann Fernald, and many others) know a lot about anthropology, and they appreciate good ethnography. They are fascinated by the idea that there are distinctive psychologies associated with alternative ways of life. They want to move beyond some of the methods that have been used in research on the psychology of Western (or Westernized) college students. They are attentive to local meanings. However, if we are all going to succeed in the interdisciplinary endeavor called “cultural psychology,” there must also be a major input from psychological anthropologists, who have years of field experience. Given the history of our intellectual enterprise, we, the members of the Society for Psychological Anthropology (SPA), should be eager to step outside of our disciplinary locations and engage in collaborative research projects and in lots and lots of discussion with people in other mutually relevant fields: psychologists, linguists, philosophers, biologists.

I now want to say a few more things about cultural psychology and to clarify my notion of the meaning of the words cultural and psychology in that phrase. I recently prepared a summary description of cultural psychology for the MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (1998:211–213), which, in slight paraphrase and with some expanded comments, I am going to recapitulate here. In that summary statement, I had the following to say about those two concepts “culture” and “psychology”: The word cultural, in my view, refers to local or community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient. Isaiah Berlin in his discussion of Herder, in Vico and Herder (1992), makes mention of the study of “goals, values, and pictures of the world.” The focus in cultural analysis is on those goals, values, and pictures of the world that are socially inherited and customary. In other words the focus is on those goals, values, and pictures of the world that are made manifest in the speech, laws, and routine practices of some self-monitoring group.

Now there is a lot packed into that formulation, of course. There is the notion that actions speak louder than words and that “practices” are a central unit of analysis for cultural psychology. And there is the problem of defining a “self-monitoring group.” It is problematic because one cannot know in advance what the relevant self-monitoring groups are going to be within any society. A nationality, for example, is not necessarily a culturally relevant self-monitoring group. The units of analysis for cultural analysis are probably not going to correspond to political or bureaucratic categories such as Asian or Hispanic or Jewish or Native American or whatever. We are going to have to do the hard work of identifying the relevant contemporary “tribal landscape,” if indeed there still are “tribes” out there in our postmodern cosmopolitan world. Of course, I think there are.
In any case, "culture" refers to conceptions of what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient. The idea of culture invites us to make some kind of distinction between different ways of life, such as the Amish way of life, the way of life of Brahmins living in a Hindu temple town, the way of life of secular northern upper-middle-class urban Euro-Americans who don’t believe in "tribes," and so forth. It is assumed in cultural psychology that it continues to be meaningful to talk about different ways of life. The type of cultural analysis called for in cultural psychology is different, I think, from the type of analysis that tries to dissolve any concept of “tribe” and treats any reference to cultural groups as fictitious or illusory or even dangerous. It is different from the type of analysis that views the world as simply made up of “individuals” under the yoke of repressive or authoritarian power structures.

The type of cultural analysis done in cultural psychology is different, as well, from the type of analysis that tries to look right through different ways of life for some common denominator of the “human mind.” Finding the common denominators of “human nature” is a goal for some researchers and you can do it, but the focus in cultural psychology is on the “way of life.” What makes this way of life work and seem so meaningful? How do the practices and the mental states of a people reinforce each other and keep each other going? Cultural psychology does not want to give up the focus on the way of life. It does not want to view a way of life as merely a data point or means for getting at what you are really interested in—human nature.

That is not to say that there is no such thing as human nature or that the idea of “human nature” is worthless or meaningless. Indeed, it would be illuminating to compare notes about “human nature” during the discussion period today and to put on the table our various views. But that is not the focus in cultural psychology. There must certainly be certain common denominators that are presupposed by cultural psychology (see, for example, Shweder, Goodnow, et al. 1997), but the main goal for cultural psychology is not to draw up lists of common denominators. It is to understand a particular way of life, from a psychological point of view.

A community’s cultural conception of things will also usually include some received, favored, or privileged “resolutions” to a set of universal, scientifically undecidable and hence “existential” questions. These are questions with respect to which answers must be given, for the sake of social cooperation and coordination, whether or not they are logically or ultimately solvable by mere human beings. It is inherent in the nature of such questions that they are not solvable in any single way. I have in mind questions such as: what is me and what is not me?; what is male and what is female?; how should the burdens and benefits of life be fairly distributed?; are there cultural rights that take precedence over the freedoms (of
speech, of religion, of association) associated with individual rights?; when does a fetus become a social person?; what is the reasonable legal judgment to make in cases of presumptive or apparent guilt or transgression where there is a lack of definitive evidence?; and so forth. Locally favored and socially inherited answers to such questions are made manifest and are thus discernible in the speech, laws, and customary practices of self-monitoring groups. So in sum, local conceptions of what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient plus discretionary answers to cognitively undecidable existential questions, all made apparent in and through practice, is what the word “cultural” in the phrase “cultural psychology” is all about. At least that is the way I described “culture” in the MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.

I hope you can see in this formulation a way of talking about “psychic unity.” Psychic unity could be said to be the facing up to those existential questions. All human beings have to face such questions, but human beings don’t resolve them in the same way. Indeed, those questions are not resolvable in a single way. There is undoubtedly more that can be put into a notion of “psychic unity.” But whatever is put there should not require that you minimize cultural process or underestimate the fact that there is substantial diversity in psychological functioning across human populations.

As I also wrote in that summary description of “cultural psychology,” the word “psychology” refers broadly to mental functions, such as perceiving, categorizing, reasoning, remembering, feeling, wanting, choosing, and communicating. What defines a function as a mental function, per se, over and above or in contrast to a physical function such as digestion, has something to do with the capacity of the human mind to grasp ideas, to do things for reasons or with a purpose in mind, to be conscious of alternatives and aware of the content or meaning of its own experience. This is one reason that mental states are sometimes referred to as “intentional states” or “symbolic states.” Cultural psychology is the study of those intentional or symbolic states of individuals (a belief in a reincarnating soul, a desire to have your marriage arranged by your parents) that are part and parcel of a particular cultural conception of things made manifest in, and acquired by means of involvement with, the speech, laws, and customary practices of some group.

As an aside, I would suggest that given that actions speak louder than words the current research emphasis in anthropology on sharing versus nonsharing of culture, which starts out by determining whether or not informants in a community articulate the same ideas, may not be the best starting point for cultural analysis. An alternative approach is to focus on those institutionalized practices (e.g., love marriage, joint family living) that members of a cultural community share or at least collectively hold
in high regard, and then go from there, eliciting reasons and justifications for the esteemed practices.

It has been noted by Clifford Geertz (following Brentano, if I remember correctly) and by others who study lived realities that “one does not speak language; one speaks a language.” Similarly, one does not categorize; one categorizes something. One does not want; one wants something. On the assumption that what you think about can be decisive for how you think, the focus in cultural psychology has been on content-laden variations in human “mentalities” rather than the abstract common denominators of the human mind.

Cultural psychologists (I have in mind scholars such as Robert Levy, Arthur Kleinman, Hazel Markus, Shinobu Kitayama, Kuo-Shu Yang, Uichol Kim, Dov Cohen and Richard Nisbett, Anna Wierzbicka) want to know why the Tahitians and the Chinese react to “loss” with the experience of back pains and headaches rather than with the experience of sadness so common in the Euro-American cultural region. They seek to document population-level variations in the emotions that are salient in the language and feelings of different peoples around the world. They are interested in how the mental life is partitioned. They don’t assume that reactions to the world are “emotionalized” to the same degree or with the same structure of feelings in all populations. They aim to understand why southern American males react more violently to insult than northern American males, why members of “sociocentric” subcultures perceive, classify, and moralize about the world somewhat differently from members of “individualistic” subcultures, and so forth. It is precisely because cultural psychology is the study of the content-laden symbolic states of human beings that cultural psychology should be thought of as the study of peoples (in particular, Chinese Mandarins, Oriya Brahmins), not the study of people (in general or in the abstract). The subject matter definitive of cultural psychology thus consists of those aspects (which, of course, are not all aspects) of the mental functioning of individuals that have been ontogenetically activated and historically reproduced by means of some particular cultural conception of things and by virtue of participation in, observation of, and reflection upon the activities and practices of a particular group. People reflect on their own practices. Personal intuitions get built up through participation in everyday practices, which are then the grounds for reflection and for the working out of doctrines. Doctrines then do or do not play some kind of role in motivating behavior, and all that has to be studied.

So without denying the existence of some psychological uniformities across all human beings, the focus in cultural psychology is upon differences in the way members of different communities perceive, categorize, remember, feel, want, choose, evaluate, and communicate. The focus is
upon psychological differences that can be traced to variations in salient community-based “goals, values, and pictures of the world.”

Cultural psychology is thus the study of the way the human mind can be transformed, given shape and definition, and made functional in a number of different ways that are not uniformly distributed across communities around the world. Indeed, “universalism without the uniformity” is one of the slogans I like to use to talk about “psychic unity.”

Let me now turn from my MIT Encyclopedia statement about cultural psychology to quickly mention two or three field experiences and research agendas that I have also written about in recent years. Then I will move on to a couple of other conceptual issues.

I am in Orissa, India. I am speaking to some of my friends and colleagues who are bilingual in Oriya and English. Someone says, “You should hire her to work with you. She is a very shy girl. Yes, hire her. She is a very shy girl.” I immediately realize there is some kind of communication problem here because my Oriya friends are using the English word shy and they are recommending someone to me for a job, but they don’t seem to realize that is not the way you recommend someone for a job in the United States. As I ponder and examine this failure in communication, I come to realize that they are using the word shy as a translation of the Oriya word lajja. This sets me off on a project to understand how one can most effectively render intelligible the mental state terms of other languages.

I don’t think there is a single lexical entry for lajja in the English language. I believe, as does Steve Parish, that perhaps something like lajja was on Clifford Geertz’s mind when he wrote about Balinese “stage fright” (or lek), although there would be problems with that kind of translation of lajja. Ultimately, my former student Usha Menon and I (1993) arrived at the notion of “respectful restraint” as a translation of lajja. It is a mental state that Jane Austen knew very well. Those of you who have seen the movie Persuasion or read Jane Austen’s novels will perhaps recognize in lajja the late-18th- and early-19th-century English virtue of “respectful restraint” and “reserve,” which in Orissa, India, today is seen as powerful, good, and civilized (and has other positive associations as well).

That kind of experience in cross-cultural translation led me to the question, What are the component parts of the concept of an “emotion” that might enable us to make reasonable decisions about whether mental state terms are equivalent across languages? One of the kinds of projects that I think is terribly important for psychological anthropologists right now is collaborative research with biologists, psychologists, linguists, and others on the translation of mental state terms and concepts (the work of Roy D’Andrade, Anna Wierzbicka, Michelle Rosaldo, Geoffrey White, Catherine Lutz, Steve Parish, Takie Lebra, and others comes to mind). When it comes to analyzing the emotions I have tried (inspired by a
number of psychologists working on this problem, for example, Richard Lazarus, Nico Frijda, Phoebe Ellsworth) to specify the various components of the idea of an "emotion." Among those components there are, for example, the "environmental determinants" that elicit an emotion. There are what might be called "self-appraisal" components, where the person asks "is this a loss?"; "is this an insult?"; "is this goal blockage?" There are "somatic phenomenology" components. There are "affective phenomenology" components. There are "action or response tendency" components: do you attack, do you withdraw, do you confess? There are various kinds of "communication" components (face, voice, etc.). You have to break the emotions down into components and then develop a metalanguage for each of the components. Using a language of components, one can then see what the distribution is like for any emotion term or concept across cultural communities. One then has a warrant for saying that this is the same emotion (e.g., sadness, anger, love) in these two cultures or for saying that X, Y, or Z emotion is peculiar to the English-speaking world. So that is one kind of project in which I have been engaged.

Here is a second experience and kind of project. I took Lawrence Kohlberg's moral development interview to the field—his famous Heinz dilemma. Should the husband steal the drug in order to save the life of his wife? I gave it to several informants in Orissa, India, but let me mention one particular informant. Kohlberg set his interview protocol up as a conflict between the right to life and the right to private property, and most Americans talk about the dilemma in terms of those kinds of rights in conflict. I went through an entire interview in Orissa in which never once did the idea of "rights" get mentioned. Nancy Much and I analyzed this interview in detail. The informant spoke only about the irrationality of committing a sin. He provided an impressively cogent argument about the irrationality of committing a sin. This led us to realize that Western psychologists had imported into their moral development research a rather restricted conception of the moral domain, which was focused almost exclusively on issues of harm, rights, and justice. It led us to start thinking about other subdomains of the moral. A number of colleagues and former students (Nancy Much, Lene Jensen, Jon Haidt, Manamohan Mahapatra, Paul Rozin, and others) and I have developed a theory of the moral domain that argues that there is a "big three" of morality. There is an "ethics of autonomy," which strongly emphasizes harm, rights, and justice. There is an "ethics of community," which emphasizes such issues as duty, hierarchy, and interdependency. And there is an "ethics of divinity," in which the emphasis is on issues such as the sacred, pollution, sin, sanctity, and so forth.

I alluded to the "big three" in my article "The Surprise of Ethnography," which appeared in a recent issue of Ethos (1997), and what I have
to say here simply revisits what I said there. Each of the three ethics high-
lights a different aspect of the self. Elaborated, highlighted, and rational-
ized within an “ethics of autonomy” is a view of the self as a preference
structure in which people are free to have the things they want. Elabo-
rated, highlighted, and rationalized within an “ethics of community” is a
view of the self as an office holder, in which your social roles are part of
your identity, and the roles you draw upon to form an identity are part of
an interdependent and often hierarchical community structure. Elabo-
rated, highlighted, and rationalized within an “ethics of divinity” is a view
of self that has a piece of divinity in it. This “divine” self is experienced as
transcendent, as connected with something beyond itself; the self is expe-
rrienced as something that you do not want to degrade or demean by en-
gaging in behaviors or practices that might sully it. I believe that different
cultural communities differentially emphasize those three aspects of the
self. I believe that cultural communities institutionalize those three types
of ethics to different degrees. So that is a second kind of project in which
I have been engaged.

There is a third experience and kind of project that I will simply point
to, because it was described in some detail in that Ethos article (Shweder
1997). It is the experience, which can be startling, of actually stepping into
the metaphysical frameworks of the people you study and activating in
oneself psychic structures that you had not previously realized were there.
In my case, it was the experience of dread in the face of a meal in which
vegetarian food offered to God (prasad) had been recooked with chicken;
it was the profound experience of the karmic sense that “something bad
will happen” if I eat this. That experience among others, led me to the view
that everyone has got everything, that in us we already have a heteroge-
neous collection of psychic structures, just waiting to be activated. That is
where the psychic unity resides, I think, in that heterogeneous and over-
abundant set of psychic structures that everyone has.

I believe that different traditions selectively activate those psychic
structures. If they are not selectively activated in your cultural tradition
they become peripheralized. Now, of course, people also differ in tempera-
ment, and, of course, different individuals may come into the world with
different thresholds for activating different psychic structures. (The fol-
lowing aside is related to an earlier comment in the symposium about Bert
Kaplan’s famous, decades-old study of Rorschach test responses in four
cultures. My recollection of Bert Kaplan’s findings, by the way, is not “Hey,
look at this, everyone is similar around the world.” What he found was
that within-culture variance overwhelmed between-culture variance.
There was a lot of variation in inkblot response types within any culture.
At the level of the imagination, which is the type of thinking those inkblots
stimulate, people could entertain all sorts of things—and did. In fact, if you
give the Rorschach test repeatedly to the same person, an outside coder
cannot easily tell that it was the same person, because individuals give
different types of responses on the second, third, or fourth pass through
the cards. The human imagination is highly generative, even protean.)

So there is a complexity and richness of psychic structures available
to every person, but such psychic structures are selectively privileged,
institutionalized, rationalized, and turned into doctrine. When certain
psychic structures are culturally privileged, members of a cultural com-
community are more likely to see and react to the world in this way rather than
that way.

That is my entry into a couple of other conceptual points, with which
I will end these remarks. I have used the term confusionism in the past to
describe a certain theoretical and philosophical stance. This is not Confu-
cianism I am talking about, but rather confusionism. Confusionism is built
on two or three principles. One is this: The knowable world is incomplete
if seen from any one point of view, incoherent if seen from all points of
view at once, and empty if seen from nowhere in particular. In the choice
between partiality, incoherence, and emptiness, I choose partiality, and
the continuous overcoming of partial views. Alternatively stated, every
“system” is partial, but even though it is partial it may illuminate some-
thing, from its partial perspective. But you have to get beyond any single
system as well. Within the terms of any one system or perspective you
should look, appreciate what you see and what you have learned, and then
move on, to another partial way of seeing, which may also illuminate
something worth understanding. Out of respect for the idea of objectivity,
I suggest that we just grant that you are never going to get away from
partiality or get to the place where you can combine all the points of view
(that is where the incoherency lies). A healthy sense of reality, and of
truth, does not require that you do. So that is principle one of confusionism.

“Cognitive undecidability” is the second principle. When you try to
think through another culture in the sense of “getting it straight,” you
should try to work out their good reasons for action, belief, and desire. You
should try to understand how they explain and understand what they are
doing. Why do they think it is so compelling to have an excision ceremony
for their daughters? Why do they think it is so compelling that menstru-
ating women not go in the temple? Why do they think they are compelled
to arrange a marriage? If you engage in that type of rational reconstruction
of indigenous belief and practice, you will get to a point in which some idea
or proposition will be introduced which (I hold) is cognitively undecidable,
such as “people have souls and they reincarnate.” It is not as though logic
or science is going to resolve that issue. There are always going to be
propositions over which intelligent, rational people can disagree. There
are always going to be points at which intelligent, rational human beings
have no choice but to hold on to some premises that are cognitively undecidable. Cognitive undecidability does not imply that you must give up the idea of truth. It is more a matter of recognizing that whatever the ultimate truth might be about this issue, it is undecidable, at least by human beings. Perhaps that is why the notion of "cognitive undecidability" carries with it the suggestion of "eternal mystery," (and perhaps even tolerance) which is a third principle of confusionism.

Finally, "thinking through cultures" is a phrase I used as the title of a book a few years ago (Shweder 1991). I think that phrase captures what I see as the various aspects or senses of the cultural psychology enterprise. First, there is thinking through others in the sense of seeing others as experts in some area of human experience. You can think by means of their understandings and gain some kind of insight into some aspect of experience that has not been noticed or attended to in your own cultural tradition. Second, there is thinking through others in the sense of getting them straight, trying to work out a rational reconstruction of their beliefs, actions, and desires, to the extent that is possible. And third, there is thinking through others in the sense of going right through others. Anything that is partial suppresses something that might deserve to be uncovered or revealed. It is precisely because "mind" exceeds "culture" that human beings have the potential to transcend every partial point of view. It is precisely because "cultures" give distinctive character to "mind" (thereby constituting a local "mentality") that we are able to talk with enthusiasm about "cultural psychology" and celebrate the renewal of this once again vital discipline.

Richard A. Shweder is a professor in the Committee on Human Development at the University of Chicago.

NOTE

Responses to this article can be submitted electronically to the editors at ethos@po.cwru.edu. Commentary and critique will be posted in the Shadow Ethos area of the journal's website (www.cwru.edu/affil/spa/ethos.html), which is permanently under construction as a zone of dialogue between Ethos authors and readers.

Parts of this talk allude to, summarize, or recapitulate material that can be found in Menon and Shweder 1993; Shweder 1991, 1992, 1998; Shweder and Much 1991; Shweder, Much, et al. 1997.

REFERENCES CITED

Berlin, Isaiah

Menon, Usha, and Richard A. Shweder  

Shweder, Richard A.  

Shweder, Richard A., Jacqueline Goodnow, Giyoo Hatano, Robert A. LeVine, Hazel R. Markus, and Peggy Miller  

Shweder, Richard A., and Nancy C. Much  

Shweder, Richard A., Nancy C. Much, Manamohan Mahapatra, and Lawrence Park  