Commentary

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Huebner and Garrod’s article contains a brief but brilliant account of the idea of dukkha. As far as I can judge (and with due respect to ‘the speculative esoteric philosophy of the no-self’), the authors succeed marvelously at illuminating the self-affirming sense of efficacy that is associated with the construal of ‘suffering’ (frustration, illness, misfortune) as a means to reduce spiritual debts. And I am deeply sympathetic with the moral pluralism that pervades their article and with the claim that the moral domain is not coincidental with the types of moral concepts (e.g., justice as equality, natural rights) and constructed ‘dilemmas’ (e.g., the right to life versus the right to private property) emphasized by Kohlberg and other moral development theorists [Shweder and Miller, 1985; Shweder and Much, 1987; Shweder et al., 1987; Shweder, 1990]. Nevertheless, moral pluralism is a very difficult position to defend, and, speaking for the defense, I think it matters a lot precisely how it gets argued. If I am slightly uncomfortable with Huebner and Garrod’s formulation, it is because it makes moral pluralism look a bit too easy.

Pluralism as Universalism without the Uniformity

Huebner and Garrod reject moral universalism, arguing that no single moral framework is sufficient to account for moral reasoning on a worldwide scale. Yet they and we are able to understand and perhaps recognize the potential ‘good’ and possibilities for interpretation in Buddhist conceptions of suffering, karmic cause and effect, evil, and selflessness. How could they and we do this unless we and they were already in possession of a single moral and cognitive framework sufficient to account for moral reasoning on a worldwide scale?

Any adequate moral pluralism must give an account of how ‘otherness’ can be imaginable to us. It must answer the question of how, if the ideas of the ‘other’ are exotic, they can possibly be translated into our language in terms that make sense to us. In effect, as paradoxical as it may seem, any adequate moral pluralism must aspire to moral universalism without falling into the trap of uniformitarianism.

I take it to be Huebner and Garrod’s aim to preserve difference without turning the ‘other’ into an incomprehensible alien. That aim is strongly intimated by the quote from Seigfried at the conclusion of the article. Yet Seigfried’s analogy to ‘angles of vision’ is quite misleading, for it is very hard to see how the Western rejection and Eastern acceptance of reincarnation are merely different ‘perspectives’ on, or ‘disclosures’ of, the same reality. So the question remains of how
precisely a defensible pluralistic universalism is to be expressed.

I think I understand the kind of moral universalism that Huebner and Garrod want to reject. They want to reject any moral universalism that first asserts that there is a single true morality and then arrives at a uniform morality by privileging this or that particular moral concept (e.g., justice) or particular view of nature, persons, and society (e.g., the idea that 'you only go one time around' — that there is no reincarnation).

They would presumably want to reject, as well, any moral universalism that first asserts that there is a single true morality and then arrives at a uniform definition of morality by treating the differences between moralities as superficial or illusory and by treating only the abstract common denominators (e.g., the principle 'treat like cases alike and different cases differently') as significant.

All that is fine, for starters. Yet what still needs to be stated explicitly is that moral pluralism is itself a very special kind of moral universalism — a nonuniformitarian universalism. In order to avoid some of the philosophical pitfalls and incoherence of claims about variety without unity, the central tenet of moral pluralism might be expressed as follows: There is a single true morality, and it is a heterogeneous collection of irreconcilable 'goods' (e.g., justice, autonomy, community, protection of the vulnerable, compassion, spiritual sanctity, and so forth), which the various moralities of the world activate, rationalize, and institutionalize selectively and differentially because of, among other things, differences in their beliefs about persons, society, and nature. Nevertheless, because there is a single true morality (consisting of heterogeneous 'goods'), we can, with a little imaginative work, come to recognize each other's 'goods', even when they are not actively our own.

This may appear a somewhat paradoxical formulation (and I am unsure whether Huebner and Garrod would find it congenial), but it is just the beginning of necessary complications. Any sustained defense of moral pluralism in criticism of a universalist formulation like Kohlberg's is probably going to have to justify a cognitive pluralism of beliefs (e.g., the Christian acceptance of evil as a universal force coexisting with the Buddhist rejection of evil as a universal force). To justify pluralism the defense is probably going to have to rely on some version of a moral philosophy that I would like to recommend under the banner 'confusionism' (not to be confused with 'Confucianism').

Confusionism

'Confusionism' has but one tenet: Human beings who strive to be self-reflective and rational (i.e., who strive to have good reasons for what they believe, value, and do) ultimately discover that all self-reflective rational projects terminate in 'original multiplicity', 'cognitive undecidability', and 'eternal mystery'.

The postulate of 'original multiplicity' states that there is no homogeneous backdrop to our world; we are multiple from the start. It is that 'original multiplicity' or heterogeneity inherent in our own cognitive makeup that makes it possible for us to comprehend others without denying the existence of variety.

The postulate of 'cognitive undecidability' is needed to protect 'difference' in belief from intellectual disparagement. No alternative moral philosophy is deserving of our respect
and appreciation if it is premised on demonstrably false beliefs, conceptual muddles, irrelevant distinctions, or fallacious reasoning. Advocates (such as Kohlberg) of moral monism and uniform moral standards do not deny the existence of differences in moral reasoning; they simply treat all differences as revelatory of error, ignorance, and confusion.

It is imperative to recognize that Kohlberg was a ‘cognitivist’. He quite properly claimed that moral arguments have a truth value and can be examined and criticized by rational means [Kohlberg, 1981. Minimally, if one adopts the stance of a moral pluralist, the differences between Jewish, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist beliefs about the existence, nature; and fate of the soul must be ‘cognitively undecidable’. Huebner and Garrod’s young Buddhist monks are simply wrong, and they are hardly pluralists, if they think that reincarnation is simply an ‘indisputable’ fact or if, trying dogmatically to keep things simple, they fail to imagine and appreciate the power of those worlds in which the proposition ‘you only go one time around’ is also an ‘indisputable’ fact.

I will not discuss ‘eternal mystery’, except to say that it is an acknowledgment of the need for unstateable, ‘things-in-themselves’ starting points, so as to avoid the hazards of infinite regress. [For more on ‘original multiplicity’ and ‘cognitive undecidability’ see Shweder, 1991; on ‘cognitivism’ see Shwed er, 1990.]

Perhaps it is because I am a ‘confusionist’ (and believe that the acknowledgment of ‘cognitive undecidability’ is a prerequisite for a convincing moral pluralism) that I get nervous, as well, when Huebner and Garrod seem to suggest that the mere existence of the doctrinal beliefs of young Buddhist monks – for example, the dogma that karma ‘is an indisputable and inescapable fact of the world’ – presents some kind of fundamental challenge to Kohlberg’s theory of moral development.

Let Me Tell You a Story about Karma and Kohlberg

I can perhaps illustrate some of the complexities of the debate about moral universalism and moral pluralism with a story about my own journey to the East and into ‘confusionism’. In 1982, I walked into a post office in the Hindu temple town of Bhubaneswar, India, and mailed to Kohlberg a ‘Heinz dilemma’ interview, which he and his associates subsequently scored and analyzed. I sent him the interview because I believed my informant, who had only a few years of formal education, had articulated a powerful and characteristically Hindu postconventional argument against ‘stealing’ a drug to save the life of one’s wife.

It was not that my Hindu informant had argued against ‘stealing’ the drug that fascinated me. What fascinated me was that he had done so without ever balancing the right to life against the right to private property, indeed without ever speaking about rights (or justice as equality) at all, yet with a clear (and what I took to be) ‘postconventional’ understanding that his moral obligations transcended personal and social opinion and civil authority. [The complete interview, a detailed exegesis of its argument structure,
and the stage scoring can be found in the 1987 chapter by Shweder and Much.]

My informant had argued that the world is a karmic world in which moral, physical, and biological events are seamlessly interconnected, and that in a karmic world wrong actions (violations of Hindu dharma) such as 'stealing' lead to suffering and spiritual degradation. He reasoned that if one truly understands the natural karmic laws of cause and effect, it is irrational to commit a sin. He believed that only those who are ignorant, irrational, or otherwise spiritually degraded would commit the sin of stealing or be so confused and arrogant as to think that swimming against the karmic current (stealing) could be an effective or compassionate thing to do, in the face of the imminent transmigratory journey of the soul of one's wife. He suggested that there exists a relationship between spiritual and material well-being and that the degree of purity of one's soul has a decisive influence on the state of one's body in this and subsequent births. He dismissed as illusory the idea that any end (such as seeking to forestall the departure of the soul from the body) could be worthy if the only means to pursue it were sinful ones (stealing). He recounted several relevant scriptural and folk narratives as evidence in support of his account of the laws of nature. He enumerated several alternative and virtuous means of responding to the wife's illness (for example, painful sacrifice) that might, given the uncertainties and limitations of human knowledge about long-term karmic consequences and divine plans, help in the determination of whether this was the right time for her to die.

It was not the existence of a doctrine of karma per se that impressed me about the interview or tempted me to hold out the interview to Kohlberg as an instance of an alternative postconventional moral form. Rather, what impressed me was the skill and (within the terms of some defensible definitions) the 'objectivity' displayed by the informant in making use of various traditional Hindu conceptions to defend his moral stance. He caused me to entertain an alternative intellectual vision of things — to think about the relationship of actions and outcomes (especially in the health domain) in a different way; to recognize that in a karmic world there are no victims, only transgressors; and to see traces of karma ('blaming the victim') in my own world. (The epithet 'blaming the victim' is, of course, misleading, for it is perfectly reasonable in a karmic world for sufferers to blame and thereby empower themselves.) My informant caused me to wonder about the deeper meaning of 'unintended' consequences and about the limitations of human insight into the long-term causal structure of nature.

Nevertheless, I knew very well that for anyone schooled in cognitive developmental theory, the appearance of the idea of karma in a moral judgment interview, interpreted as evidence of an alternative form of advanced reasoning, was only going to make it harder to argue for moral pluralism. While it is true that the doctrine of an immortal reincarnating soul is uncharacteristic of Jewish and Christian thought, the proverb 'old sins cast long shadows' is, after all, a Western precept. It is, moreover, an aphorism that many social scientists associate with the 'dark ages' or the confusions of early childhood.

Indeed, while gathering up the karmic narratives in the temple town in India, I often caught myself imagining some dubious Piagetian remarking facetiously that the idea of karma is so foreign to the West that one has only to go to Switzerland to discover it, as
Piaget [1935/1965] had long ago among 5- and 6-year-old children who believe that nature punishes vice and rewards virtue and that for every fault of conduct there is some physical catastrophe that serves as its penalty.

The following is an example of the kind of story that gets told and retold in the temple town of Bhubaneswar by the many residents who comprehend reality in karmic terms. It is 'The Story of the Bauri Who Accepted Food from a Kachara Bangle-Seller'.

There was an old Bauri woman [Bauris are one of several "untouchable" or "scheduled" castes in the community] who was suffering a painful and lingering death. She suffered for a long time but could not die. Finally, her relatives asked her to remember if there was any sin that she had committed in her lifetime, and to confess. She confessed that she once accepted Kutcha food [boiled food, which is more readily 'polluted' when handled than fried Pucca food] from a member of the bangle-seller caste, a Kachara. [Although the Bauris are "untouchables", they regard themselves as superior to the Kacharas; Bauri morality prohibits the acceptance of Kutcha food from a Kachara.] The woman also confessed that on one occasion she had bound a cow [a sacred life form] in a cow shed, and, as a result of the way she tied it, the cow had died during the night. Only after the woman confessed these sins did she die peacefully.

Now, as far as I can tell, the mere existence of such stories is hardly a challenge to cognitive universalists (or developmentalists) such as Piaget or Kohlberg. Piaget [1935/1965] referred to this kind of thinking as the belief in 'immanent' justice. He thought one could find it among children, 'simple souls', 'primitives', 'those who never learn from the facts', and dogmatists who 'would rather assume some hidden fault to explain a neighbor's misfortune than admit the fortuitous character in the trials that befall mankind' [p. 262]. [See Shweder and Miller, 1985, for a critical discussion of Piaget's research in connection with the Hindu idea of karma.]

The mere existence of the idea of karma can (all too readily) be assimilated to Kohlberg's universalistic theory as well. Stripped of its pretensions to be a general theory about all moral reasoning, Kohlberg's theory is, after all and at the very least, a hypothesis about the cultural evolution and individual development of justice reasoning. What is the idea of karma, I can almost hear Kohlberg saying, if not an extremely primitive and undifferentiated principle of justice in which all of reality is viewed as a scene of retributive causation and every inequality - in health, wealth, status, beauty and happiness - is viewed as just desert? Is it not an early stage in the evolution of an adequate idea of justice? Is it not a 'dark age' conception? Is it not a stage characterized by an erroneous conflation of retributive and distributive justice? And how much respect should we have, anyway, for the views of informants who claim that it is an 'indisputable' fact that souls reincarnate?

1 This and other stories and practices of the Hindu temple town linking suffering to moral transgression are described by Mahapatra et al. [1991].
does not really make the case for moral pluralism, not yet.

Prima facie, the idea of karma is an idea of justice, and thus well within Kohlberg's domain. To make the case for moral pluralism, Huebner and Garrod must show us that, in the abstract and in general, a world of karmic justice is neither intellectually inferior nor intellectually superior to the highest stage ideas of justice propounded by Kohlberg. They must show that it is not premised on false beliefs. They must show that it is not based on vicious intellectual confusions. They themselves must reject the view of their informants that karma is an indisputable and inescapable fact of the world; for if they accept that dogma, they are merely substituting one moral monism (karmic justice) for another (Kohlberg's Rawlsian justice). All of this is possible to do, but none of it actually has been done, at least not by Huebner and Garrod in this article. I much look forward to their exegesis of the interviews.

To complete my earlier story, Kohlberg wrote back while I was still in India. He had coded my interview as stage 3/4 (conventional reasoning) in his system, although he expressed interest in the interview and some surprise over the results of his own stage scoring. I had an attack of definitional anxiety. It was not my first attack [Shweder, 1982]. I thought he was wrong and that the stage 3/4 stage classification revealed the limitations of his interpretive scheme [Shweder and Much, 1987]. I began to formulate what today I still take to be some of the central questions in the moral development literature: Are moral judgments in fact coincidental with judgments of harm (welfare to self and others), rights, and justice? Is there a useful distinction to be drawn between conventional and postconventional moral reasoning, and if so how should the distinction be drawn? Are differences in moral judgment ultimately differences in belief, and, if so, how can moral pluralism be defended?

Are Those Really 'Muddles in the Models'?

In light of the personal history just described, it is perhaps not surprising that I have occasionally found myself perplexed by some of the 'foundational' issues that Kahn identifies in his article. He engages in the analytic exercise of, as Gellner [1985] has put it, 'separating anything that can be separated from anything else'. It is a smart and knowledgeable analysis fortified by many of the distinctions needed to sort out and identify various philosophical schools of moral thought (consequentialists vs. deontologists; emotivists vs. cognitivists). The most innovative and challenging aspect of the article, however, is the claim that many, even if not all, of the controversies in the moral development literature involve some kind of intellectual muddle or conceptual confusion in which issues (of definition, of ontogenetic process, of interpretation, of variation, of epistemology) that should have been separated were confounded, and because of those unrecognized conceptual confusions, the disputants in the controversy ended up talking past each other.

Now I am in no position to access precisely how many of the controversies in the moral development literature are mired by conceptual confusions, but as a 'confusionist' I find myself rising to the alert when I see 'confusion' used as negative epithet. First I would like to make a brief remark in defense of conflations and confusions and in praise
of those (postmodern scholars and premodern folk) who are reluctant to separate anything that can be separated from anything else. Then I would like to try out Kahn’s thesis on two of the three questions that currently concern me the most (listed earlier) and on one of Kahn’s controversial examples of an intellectual confusion, the Bennett-Kohlberg controversy.

Virtuous Confusion: a Postmodern Agenda

One of the most exciting aspects of so-called postmodern scholarship is that it has begun to overturn one of the central cosmogonic myths of the modern period in the West. According to that myth, the world woke up and became good about 300 years ago in the West when a liberal enlightened antireligious modern mind began to draw some distinctions that the religion-laden, custom-bound premodern mind had somehow managed to overlook. Indeed it is almost commonplace for anti-religious, anti-traditional modernist authors (for example, Piaget) to construct a definition of the premodern (or early childhood) period as an age of intellectual ‘confusions’.

Four of the most famous, supposedly vicious premodern (and early childhood) confusions proffered in modernist enlightenment writings are the confusion of language and reality (so-called ‘word magic’, or the idea that symbols are part of the reality they describe), the confusion of moral reality with physical reality (so-called ‘immanent’ justice, i.e., karma, or the idea that suffering may be the consequence of one’s transgressions), the confusion of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’, or the idea that evaluative conclusions can be derived from factual descriptions of the world), and the confusion of nature and convention (the so-called ‘fallacy of reification’, or the idea that there is an objective moral basis to social norms).

Today, fortunately, deep into the postmodern age, it has become possible to achieve a more balanced and appreciative understanding of premodern thought. It has become possible to recognize that there are many ways in which words and other symbols (e.g., ‘performative utterances’) are part of the reality they describe, in which suffering (e.g., disease) is mediated by behavior and the transgression of customary prohibitions, in which factual descriptions (e.g., that is a lawnmower and it does not cut grass) entail evaluative conclusions (e.g., it is a bad lawnmower), and so forth. Some ‘confusions’ make lots of sense; some distinctions don’t. Needless to say, there is no general rule for deciding when it makes sense to separate things and when it does not. One proceeds case by case. [For a defense of ‘is’-to-‘ought’ reasoning see Shweder, in press.]

So, as useful as I find Kahn’s list of ‘foundational’ issues, I am not convinced that all confusions are vicious or that most ‘controversies’ are the product of conceptual confusions. For example, as we have seen in the article by Huebner and Garrod, one controversy in the literature is whether moral judgments are coincidental with judgments of harm (welfare), rights, and justice, or whether they include other types of judgments as well. [See Shweder, 1990, for a discussion of variety in moral discourse realms.] This is a controversy about definition per se, and in large measure it is an empirical controversy over how to best map (rather than stipulate) the meaning of folk judgments about right and wrong, good and bad.

The controversy arose because, through the influence of Piaget (and Kohlberg), some-
thing like a consensus had emerged among cognitive developmentalists that the domain of genuine moral reasoning could be circumscribed by means of concepts such as ‘justice’, ‘rights’, and ‘harm’ (the welfare of others), addressed to concerns such as life, liberty, property, and the allocation of resources. Evaluative judgments that relied on other concepts (e.g., ‘tradition’, ‘sin’, ‘feelings of shame’, ‘hierarchy’, ‘interdependency’, ‘sacredness’) were classified as premoral by Kohlberg [1981] and nonmoral by Turiel [1983]. It was predicted that the justice, rights, and harm judgments – the ‘genuine’ moral judgments – would display certain distinctive ‘formal’ or ‘structural’ characteristics of moral evaluation. The obligations associated with the moral judgments would be addressed to the subject’s most important concerns – breaches would be considered serious – and those obligations would bear the mark of objectivity – they would be universalizable and unalterably binding. The controversy is over the question of whether obligations that have nothing to do with harm, rights, and justice (e.g., consensual incestuous relations between a brother and sister practicing safe sex) also bear the marks of moral evaluation. It is largely a matter of getting straight the empirical maps. (Some of the best recent data on the topic of victimless and justice-free moralities has been collected in the USA and Brazil by Jon Haidt of the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania.)

I am also not so sure that the Bennett-Kohlberg ‘controversy’ discussed by Kahn is the result of a conceptual muddle. Bennett and Kohlberg no doubt adopt different stances regarding definitional and ontogenetic issues, but there is no confusion on either side, and the controversy could be formulated in the following unconfusing terms:

For some people morality is an intuitive habitual system consisting of virtues (e.g., honor, compassion, courage) built into character, while for others morality is a self-reflective intellectual system consisting of interconnected reasons and consistent arguments. Which system is more likely to produce moral behavior? In addressing this question, the Bennett-Kohlberg controversy (as presented) may even be helpful in pointing the way to a more useful conception of ‘conventional’ moral reasoning.

What is Conventional Moral Reasoning, anyway?

Moral systems (those that produce moral behaviors) can be theoretically arrayed along a continuum stretching from instinctual moral response systems to customary or habitual moral virtue systems to self-reflective rationalized moral choice systems. If moral systems were instinctual response systems, people would act to produce moral ends without foresight or even knowledge of moral ends and with a minimum of coaching. At the other extreme, if moral systems were self-reflective rationalized moral choice systems, people would act to produce moral ends only by virtue of foresight of the ends and after scientific and calculative assessment of the available means for achieving the end. I suspect, as did Bennett apparently, that most of the interesting action lies between these two extremes, where the moral system is intuitive, habitual, customary, and virtue-driven. Which system is most effective at furthering moral ends, and under what range of circumstances, are open questions.

Dewey [1932/1989, especially chapter 4] understood very well the space between instinctual response systems and self-reflective
moral choice systems. In a brilliant chapter on 'Group Morality', he notes several characteristics of traditional or customary moral ways of acting. They come 'to seem part of the nature of things'. They are deeply connected to the ancestry and narrated history of the group. 'The young are carefully trained to observe' such ways of acting 'under conditions that appeal to the emotions' and which operate 'through associations formed by actually doing certain acts'. 'They are rehearsed with special solemnity.' And quite crucially, they come invested with a powerful sanction—the idea that bad things will happen to oneself, one's family, or one's group if the customary routines are transgressed.

The idea of 'conventional' reasoning probably derives from Dewey through Kohlberg, but there is a Kahnian confusion in the literature as to precisely what 'conventional' reasoning means. By one interpretation (an epistemological one, in Kahn's terms), 'conventional' moral reasoning occurs when an interview subject invokes the idea of a conventional obligation (an obligation based not on rational or objective criteria but on consensus, majority vote, significant others, or the will of the group). By a second interpretation (an ontogenetic one, in Kahn's terms), 'conventional' reasoning occurs when the subject reasons using received categories (e.g., karma) acquired from his or her group. Often these two interpretations are confused or confounded, for example when it is assumed that in order to reason using rational or objective criteria, one must rise above or transcend the received categories and experiences of one's group.

Dewey's original conception of customary morality seems more promising. It suggests another interpretation of 'conventional' moral reasoning. Traditional, customary, or 'conventional' moral systems further moral ends (justice, protection of the vulnerable, spiritual sanctity, etc.) not by formulating moral ends and representing them intellectually and not by providing a language for calculating and choosing between alternative courses of action. Traditional or 'conventional' moral systems accomplish their purpose just the way Dewey suggests—with stories, action routines, and participation in social practices under conditions of emotional activation (e.g., status-loss anxiety, ridicule, and dread) that are self-involving and formative of the deep intuitions of moral character. It is a very good reason to avoid incest because the idea horrifies or disgusts you. It is a very good reason to refrain from nudity in public precisely because it makes you feel ashamed or because it would embarrass or displease friends and relatives. It may not be sufficient to get you classified as a postconventional reasoner, but it is a very good reason, and it may even produce motivated moral behavior.

Moreover, to have deeply felt virtuous intuitions built in or trained into your character is not a lower form of self-organization. Again, it may not be sufficient to get you classified as a postconventional reasoner, but it is not a lower form of self-organization.

My Hindu informant, whose 'Heinz interview' I mailed to Kohlberg, was a traditional man with all the virtuous intuitions that are the benefit of a customary moral education, but he was a postconventional moral reasoner as well. He was able to speak in a foresightful discourse about moral ends and he was able to link customary practices to moral ends in a self-reflective way. If there is a confusion in the literature on conventional and postconventional moral reasoning, it has been created by the false separation or oppo-
sition of reason and tradition. One does not transcend tradition to become a postconventional reasoner. Instead one carries out a self-reflective analysis of the moral and dignified outcomes served by customary ways of acting.

In conclusion, I do not know whether most controversies in the moral development literature are stifled by conceptual confusions or whether Kahn is right about the ubiquity of what Schneider [1965] once described as 'muddles in our models'. I have my doubts. More importantly, however, I hope to have convinced the reader of these stimulating articles of two things. First, 'confusionism' as a philosophy is a moral good. Second, we can heed an alternative thesis, which Kahn has effectivelly advanced: Even if most controversies in the literature have nothing to do with conceptual confusions, you can confuse too many of the people too much of the time.

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References


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