Rethinking Culture and Personality Theory
Part III:
From Genesis and Typology to Hermeneutics and Dynamics

RICHARD A. SHWEDER

The first two parts of this essay (see *Ethos* 7:3 and 4) appraised the intellectual agenda that has dominated culture and personality theory during the last three or four decades. Three items received special attention: the theoretical involvement with early experience (Postulate 2), individual differences (Postulates 1 and 3), and environmental reductionism (Postulate 4). The conclusions drawn were largely negative: Early child care practices do not have predictable consequences on adult character. Individual differences in behavior are narrowly context-dependent and do not widely generalize across comparable contexts. Situational comparability is inversely related to cultural variation; hence an individual difference approach to cultural differences is, for the most part, inapplicable. So-called "objective" conditions, reinforcers, and other "external" stimulus events do not guarantee the accommodation of an organism to the constraints of its environment. Unless we already

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know a good deal about a person's goals, preferences, beliefs, ethics, and cultural conventions, most of our "universal" generalizations have little predictive power.

Two other possible agendas for psychological anthropology are examined in the present essay. One derives from Freud, the other from E. B. Tylor. The goal of the essay is positive, namely to identify in some of the ideas of these two founders alternative ways to conceptualize the relationship between psychological processes (including cognitive processes) and the world of cultural things, that is the world that consists of the products of the human mind.

The essay is divided into three sections, the first of which begins with the consideration that it was among culture and personality theorists that Freud received his most enthusiastic reception in the nonclinical social sciences. Certainly, many of the postulates of classical culture and personality theory are thought to be psychoanalytic in origin, and many contemporary formulations are avowedly Freudian. Thus, any reconstructed culture and personality theory will have to reconsider the agenda of the great shaman. What "readings" of Freud continue to be defensible and fruitful?

The second section considers the fact that during the last 15 years, certain nineteenth-century ideas that many had thought extinct have reemerged and flourished among those who study the human mind. These ideas form a school of thought ancestrally related to E. B. Tylor's (1871) and J. G. Frazer's (1890) investigations of the "primitive" mind. It is noteworthy that in the hundred year interim, what was once an ethnocentric portrayal of the shortcomings of the "primitive" mind has today become universalized. Upon examination, the "primitive" or "savage" mind studied a century ago by Tylor and Frazer has become theoretically transformed into the "intuitive" or "everyday" mind of normal adults in all cultures.

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2 For the most part this neo-Tylorian or neo-Frazerian reemergence has occurred without recognition. In fact it has occurred primarily among clinical, cognitive, and social psychologists (Chapman and Chapman 1967, 1969; Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Lyon and Slovic 1974; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed 1976; Ross 1977; Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1977) many of whom may be unaware of Tylor's and Frazer's work and none of whom may care to point out the affinity between their assumptions and the assumptions of two of anthropology's founders. Within anthropology neo-Tylorian contributions include Horton (1964, 1967, 1968), D'Andrade (1965, 1973, 1974), and Shweder (1972a, 1972b, 1977c, 1977d). Although Horton explicitly refers to himself as a "neo-Tylorian" (1968) my use of the term is designed to do no more than suggest that certain of Tylor's and Frazer's assumptions concerning "primitive" thought are alive and well among contemporary researchers of the human mind.
What contemporary researchers have discovered is that most of us have a "primitive" mentality much of the time. In this essay I outline some of the fruitful lines of research on the limits of the human potential for rational adaptive behavior that are intimated by the neo-Tylorian approach. Neo-Tylorian research suggests that the human potential for rational adaptive behavior cannot be derived from what we know of the inductive and deductive abilities of the individual conscious mind. Can it be derived in other ways?

In the third section, I examine the ways in which Tylor and Freud both subscribed to a "control mechanism view of culture." The basic idea (Geertz 1973:44) is that culture can be viewed as "a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call 'programs')—for governing behavior" and that humans can be viewed as "the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such cultural programs for ordering his behavior." For Tylor, as is well known, culture consists of "knowledge, belief, art, morals, law [and] custom," all rule domains. For Freud, what is distinctive of humans is the capacity to monitor and regulate behavior by reference to rules and to engage in self-criticism; language and a "superego" are the sine qua non of humanness. In this essay I reintroduce a notion of self-monitoring with reference to cultural standards as a fundamental explanatory principle and discuss the way everyday "situations of accountability" can be used to analyze the dynamics of cultural control.

**FREUD'S LEGACY: THE POSTULATE OF A FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS**

...certain seemingly unintentional performances prove, if psychoanalytic methods of investigation are applied to them, to have valid motives and to be determined by motives unknown to consciousness (Freud 1909:23). Obsessional ideas, as is well known, have an appearance of being either without motive or without meaning, just as dreams have. The first problem is to give them a sense and a status in the subject's mental life, so as to make them comprehensible and even obvious. The problem of translating them may seem insoluble; but we must never let ourselves be misled by that illusion. The wildest and most eccentric obsessional ideas can be cleaned up if they are investigated deeply enough (Freud 1909:186).

Since we only experience stimuli of which we are aware, it is understandable if people draw the unjustified conclusion that there are no behaviorally effective stimuli of which they are not aware (Dixon 1971:1).

There are at least four perspectives from which Freud can be read: (1) the typological, (2) the genetic, (3) the hermeneutical, (4) the dynamic.
The typological perspective focuses upon questions of person classification. Typologically oriented researchers search for global consistencies in the way people differ from one another, and try to sort people into character types, for example, oral, anal, or genital. Freud was not typically concerned with individual differences. He begins one discussion of character types (1925:311; also see 1924) as follows:

When a doctor carries out the psychoanalytic treatment of a neurotic, his interest is by no means directed in the first instance to the patient's character. He would much rather know what the symptoms mean, what instinctual impulses are concealed behind them and are satisfied by them, and what course was followed by the mysterious path that has led from the instinctual wishes to the symptoms.

To the extent that Freud turned his attention to questions of character he seemed to treat the occurrence of global consistencies in behavior as a relatively rare and curious phenomenon, something to puzzle over, certainly not something to assume. Our examination of Postulates 1 and 3 (Part 1) calls for an abandonment of the typological perspective. Our examination, however, is not a rejection of Freud's perspective on the problem of consistencies. Broad transcontextual generalizations in a person or a people are a problem because they are relatively rare. When they occur, they call out for explanation.

The genetic perspective focuses on questions of genesis or origins (see Postulate 2, Part 1). It tries to relate current events to past events and seeks to explain present behavior by reference to early influences. A classic genetic formulation might link miserliness in adulthood to anal fixation in childhood. Now, as I have suggested (Part 1), it is one thing to recognize an intelligible analogical connection between events, for example, that hoarding gold in adulthood is like holding in feces in childhood. It is quite another to discover an empirical relationship between events. Genetic insight often confuses the statement "X is like Y" or "X is the inverse of Y" (when both X and Y have occurred in me) with the statement "X is caused by Y." Genetically oriented psychoanalysts have enchanted our symbolic world with their search for analogies but have rarely gotten around to systematically assessing the validity of the rather magical notion that like events influence each other over large gaps in time and space.

**Hermeneutics: From Chaos to Cosmos**

The hermeneutical perspective focuses upon psychoanalysis as an interpretive process. It is concerned with the way meanings are created. From a hermeneutical perspective a crucial question is,
How does the human mind restore meaning to inchoate, equivocal, or ambiguous events (e.g., dreams)? (See Habermas 1971 and Ricoeur 1970 for discussions of hermeneutics with reference to Freud.)

It seems clear that Freud himself viewed his task as one of discovery, not creation. For example, in dream interpretation he searched for rules of translation that would enable him to go back and forth between two texts. On the one hand is the manifest dream content—the dream material as recalled. On the other hand are the hypothesized “dream-thoughts,” or the latent content of the dreams. Freud viewed these texts as two versions of the same subject matter rendered in two different languages. His goal was to unearth the special rules (or transformations) that would permit inter-translation. More specifically, he states, “the dream content seems like a transcript of the dream thought into another mode of expression, whose character and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation” (Freud 1900:277).

A curious feature of Freud’s translation task is that he really has only one text, the manifest dream content. He constructs the original. He provides us with a set of rules of transformation—condensation, displacement, overdetermination, etc.—for creating a new text out of the old. It may be worth considering the possibility that Freud discovers nothing about the cause of dreams in this process. Rather, it seems likely that his rules of transformation are so powerful they would be sufficient to create a new and meaningful text even if the manifest dream-content were entirely random. In one sense the process works: the world seems meaningful when we finish with it. Chaos has been fashioned into cosmos. Let me illustrate with an instance far removed from dream interpretation.

Garfinkel (1967) discusses an experiment in which subjects are asked to help evaluate various techniques for giving people advice about personal problems. The subjects are asked to seek advice on some serious problem by addressing a series of “yes or no” questions to a supposed therapist. The “therapist” and subject are in separate rooms and communicate by intercom. After each question and the subsequent yes or no response by the “therapist,” the subject turns off the intercom and evaluates the response received. What the subject does not know is that the yes or no responses have been preselected from a random number table. This is a typical exchange:

Subject: Okay, this is the situation that I am presented with. I happen to be of the Jewish faith and I have been dating a Gentile girl now for about two months. My
dad is not directly opposed to this situation, but I feel at the same time that he is not exactly pleased with it . . . he will come up with digs and sayings that make me feel very ill at ease about dating the girl. My question is, do you feel under the present circumstances that I should continue or stop dating this girl? Let me put it in a positive way—do you feel I should continue dating this girl?

Experimenter: My answer is no.

Subject: No. Well, that is kind of interesting. I kinda feel that there is no great animosity between dad and I but, well, perhaps he feels that greater dislike will grow out of this. I suppose maybe it is easier for an outsider to see certain things that I am blind to at this moment (Garfinkel 1967:80).

At the end of the "exchange" the subject commented that the answers were "meaningful" and "helpful" (1967:84).

The subjects in Garfinkel's experiment perceive meaningful patterns in random responses; Garfinkel discusses some of the ways this is accomplished. Freud, in his clinical studies, does not focus on random events but, rather, on events that seem "uncanny," "accidental," or "inadvertent" (like slips of the tongue), events that seem "meaningless" (like dreams), or events that seem to be "uncontrollable" and "unaccountable" (like phobic avoidances and compulsive rituals). All these events positively call out for explanation. The human mind is fairly orderly and does not prefer to leave room for the uncanny, coincidental, meaningless, or unaccountable. In this respect we are all like Lévy-Bruhl's "primitives." As Freud well knew, we do not like to admit of chance occurrences.

In the face of the meaningless, the accidental, the inadvertent, and the uncanny, Freud, the master shaman, provides us with some cosmos-creating principles: (1) Don't worry if the dream content is brief. There is a lengthy text hidden behind it (Condensation). (2) Freely generate associations, the more the better. Every element in the manifest dream is connected with every relevant theme in the dream-thoughts (Multiple determination). (3) Many elements in the manifest dream are remote stand-ins or symbols for the true themes in the latent content (Displacement), and so on. With such license to use parts to create wholes, the simple to create the complex, and to richly substitute one element for another, the whole universe is potentially connected to any dream one may have. But of course, in fact, it is not the whole universe one will explore. One will explore only those parts that matter to you, and thus to some extent one will "make sense" or "give meaning" to one's own previously uninterpretable behavior.

Wittgenstein makes a similar point:

The fact is that whenever you are preoccupied with something, with some trouble
or with some problem which is a big thing in your life—as sex is, for instance—then no matter what you start from, the association will lead finally and inevitably back to that same theme. Freud remarks on how, after the analysis of it, the dream appears so very logical. And of course it does. You could start with any of the objects on this table—which certainly are not put there through your dream activity—and you could find that they all could be connected in a pattern like that; and the pattern would be logical in the same way. One may be able to discover certain things about oneself by this sort of free association, but it does not explain why the dream occurred (1974:9).

**Dynamics: "One Brain—Two Minds?"**

The dynamic perspective focuses upon the relationship between unconscious information processing and overt behavior. It is Freud’s contention that psychical events such as phobias, compulsions, slips of the tongue, certain somatic symptoms, and dreams can be explained by reference to “purposive ideas” (1901:240). The major subtlety of Freud’s position, however, is the claim that the actor’s own purposes, goals, choices, and decision-making process “have become inaccessible to him and alienated from him, yet belongs to him nonetheless” (Habermas 1971:218). As Habermas notes, “Freud coins the phrase ‘internal foreign territory’ [Freud 1933:57] to capture the character of the alienation of something that is still the subject’s very own.” The concept of an unconscious purpose is a major Freudian innovation.

From a dynamic perspective, then, the human being is double. It is as though each of us is possessed by another agent, whose intentions we are unaware of, yet whose goal strivings and decisions have a decisive influence on how we behave. Another subtlety in Freud’s position is that unconscious purposes and decisions have a causative influence over overt behavior only as long as they remain unconscious; unlike physical causes such as gravity, the causal influence of an unconscious purpose can be overridden or eliminated by awareness. Freud also recognized that given the typical conditions of human existence, unawareness and hence the unconscious causation of our own overt behavior is the standard state of affairs. Most of us are alienated from the true causes of our behavior much of the time.

Freud derives his warrant to search for unconscious determinants of behavior from the notion of a “faulty account” (Freud 1901:Chapter 12). He believes he is entitled to carry out a dynamic analysis because the actor’s own explanation of why he or she behaved a certain way is patently deficient. The clearest case of a “faulty account” is an outright confession of ignorance by the actor (“I don’t know why I did it,” “I can’t seem to control my conduct,”
"It was accidental," or "It was inadvertent"). In all these instances the actor, in effect, admits that the causes of his or her behavior are unavailable to the actor.

But the notion of a "faulty account" can also be extended to include "erroneous accounts" of the type that so fascinate neo-Tylorians. Actors can often advance plausible explanations of their behavior which have little to do with the true causes. Nisbett and Wilson (1977), for example, review evidence on the causes of behavior in such diverse situations as selecting a product in a store, helping a person in distress, and evaluating applicants for a job. Most of the evidence suggests that subjects are unaware of the features of situation that actually influenced their behavior, although they are quite prepared to give plausible but, as it frequently turns out, erroneous explanations of why they behaved as they did. For example, female shoppers display a massive preference for stockings that happen to be on the right-hand side of the counter. They display this positional preference regardless of which particular stockings are on the right-hand side. Yet they explain their preference by reference to the quality of the stockings, not by reference to the stockings' position on the counter. Interviewers express more positive attitudes towards interviewees who happen to "accidentally" knock over a cup of coffee during the interview; interviewers are typically unaware of this influence on their judgment and deny it had any effect. As Nisbett and Wilson note, people "tell more than they know" when they try to explain their own behavior. With regard to their nonexplanatory behavior, however, people unconsciously "know more than they are able to tell." A major implication of Nisbett and Wilson's review is that the two information processing systems, the one producing an overt behavior and the other producing an explanation about why the behavior occurred, may be independent processes.

Research on subliminal stimulation tends to confirm the view that awareness of a stimulus "is neither a necessary consequence of effective stimulation, nor a necessary prelude to an overt response" (Dixon 1971:2). For example, although subjects are entirely unaware that a presentation has even occurred, subliminal presentations of emotionally loaded words (e.g., "penis," "vagina") produce significantly greater galvanic skin responses than do presentations of unemotional words (e.g., "line," "barn") (Dixon 1958). There is also evidence that such diverse response systems as mood (e.g., depression), imagery (e.g., Rorschach responses), and verbal behavior (e.g., word associations) can be influenced by a 4 millisecond (and
hence subliminal) presentation of a picture (e.g., "a snarling man holding a dagger") or verbal message (e.g., "murderer stabs victim") (Silverman 1976; also see Erdelyi 1974).

Moreover, research on "self-perception" suggests that actors arrive at a conscious understanding of their own motives not by direct access but rather by observing what they have overtly done. Bem (1972:2) proposes the following:

Individuals come to 'know' their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states [e.g., intentions?] by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs. Thus, to the extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable [or unconscious?], the individual is functionally in the same position as an outside observer who must necessarily rely upon these same external cues to infer the individual's inner states.

The information processing system relevant for overt behavior, other than overt explanatory behavior, seems to have an independent existence. To a hypnotist this will come as no surprise. Overt behaviors induced by posthypnotic suggestion can often be "explained," but such explanation does not typically include hypnotic causation. The work of Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Bem (1972) suggests that the posthypnotic suggestion model of social behavior may be more widely applicable than previously supposed.

Finally, split brain research dramatizes the capacity of the human mind to "know more than it can tell" (see Gazzaniga 1972:312). When a visual stimulus (e.g., a spoon) is presented exclusively to the right cerebral hemisphere via the left eye, subjects verbally deny they have seen anything. Yet, later when the same stimulus is tactiley presented to the same hemisphere, this time via the left hand, subjects can correctly identify the object they have previously seen. None the wiser, the subject's conscious verbal mind still denies knowledge of the object. They have knowledge of the stimulus, yet are not aware of their knowledge. In his paper "One Brain—Two Minds?", Gazzaniga (1972) also discusses evidence that logical operations can be performed by the human mind without awareness and without the assistance of our linguistic system (also see Sperry 1961, 1968).

Unconscious mental operations are an undeniable fact. Yet we know very little about the canons that govern their operation and the extent to which complex reasoning, problem solving, and decision making can go without a phenomenal representation. The position advocated here argues that unconscious thought processes frequently produce decisions that influence overt behavior. This overt behavior then becomes a primary event for the conscious intuitive mind to explain.
Are there conditions that induce a functional tie between the unconscious and conscious minds? Are there instances when unconscious processes directly influence conscious explanations, as is suggested by the Freudian notion of a "defense mechanism" (A. Freud 1966)? These questions cannot be answered at this time, primarily because research on defense mechanisms has not progressed beyond the illustration stage. But some observations are in order.

I see no reason to doubt the existence of unconscious wants, unconscious decisions, and unconscious conflicts. In fact, as I argued in Part I of this essay (Postulate 4), it is only by reference to such unconscious processes that one can, in certain instances, construct a rational account of why people do what they do the way they do it. However, difficulties arise as soon as one asks whether a person's conscious explanation of his or her own behavior is directly influenced by wants, conflicts, or accusations of which the person is unaware. Certainly most of us have experienced instances where a conscious explanation seemed, in some uncanny way, to disguise or obscure (by inversion, displacement, or whatever) what we ultimately came to accept as the true cause of our behavior. While such evidence is personally compelling, is it really sufficient?

I have argued that conscious and unconscious processes go on independently. Unconscious processes influence overt behavior directly, and this behavior and the observable circumstances in which it occurs become the basis upon which the conscious mind tries (often inadequately) to figure itself out. In the grand stochastic picture of things, given this view, it would be not at all surprising if random processes alone generated at least some instances where attempted explanations bore a hyperbolic, ironic, or analogical connection to the true account. Are such instances really anything more than highly memorable coincidences? The question seems open.

This brief "rereading" of Freud identifies three general questions for future research: (1) How do ordinary folk "discover" meaningful patterns in inchoate, ambiguous, and unpredictable events? (2) What principles govern everyday explanatory behavior? (3) To what extent is decision making an unconscious process? The third question remains, unfortunately, methodologically intractable. However, on the first two questions some progress has been made, especially among "neo-Tylorian" researchers. The results have been surprising.

THE NEO-TYLORIAN APPROACH

I prefer to be thoroughly old fashioned and go back to the sort of assumption that
guided Tylor, Frazer, and Van Gennep—that the really significant aspiration behind a great deal of African religious thought is the most obvious one; i.e., the attempt to explain and influence the workings of one’s everyday world by discovering the constant principles that underlie the apparent chaos and flux of sensory experience . . . I venture to suggest that, over much of Africa, Ritual Man is not really a distinctive being, but is rather a sub-species of Theory-building Man (Horton 1979:250).

One of the hazards of science is the ease with which it is possible to confuse propositions about the world with propositions about language (D’Andrade 1965:215).

Moral: You can fool too many of the people too much of the time.

James Thurber

All people are applied scientists. “Primitives” are just not very good at it. That, in a nutshell, is Tylor’s and Frazer’s view of the relationship between the “primitive” mind and the “modern” mind. The likeness shared by the “primitive” mind and “modern” mind is scientific intent. Both seek knowledge of what goes with what, what causes what, and what influences what in experience. Both pursue these scientific goals by engaging in such activities as gathering information, evaluating evidence, drawing inductive and deductive inferences, estimating likelihoods, making predictions, and constructing explanatory theories. The difference between the “primitive” mind and the “modern” mind is that the “primitive” mind suffers from a number of confusions; despite its best intentions, it practices a deficient science. Its procedures for acquiring, organizing, and evaluating evidence are faulty. It is prone to, what might be called, “cognitive illusions” such as magical thinking. For example, Frazer argues, the “primitive” mind does not distinguish such concepts as similarity and contingency from concepts such as causation and contingency. “Primitives” manipulate models and simulations (e.g., binding a wooden replica of an infant to a woman’s back) as though these analogs had causal power (e.g., to cure sterility).

Tylor and Frazer viewed the “primitive” as a deficient scientist. Neo-Tylorian researchers have universalized Tylor’s and Frazer’s perspective (Smedslund 1963; D’Andrade 1965, 1973, 1974; Chapman 1967; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Nisbett and Borgida 1975; Lyon and Slovic 1976; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandell, and Reed 1976; Ross 1977; Shweder 1977c). Neo-Tylorians have asked: How do normal adults in all cultures pursue their scientific goals? How do they acquire, analyze, and interpret evidence? What is revealed about the predilections and disinclinations of the “intuitive” mind by examining these everyday scientific activities? What has emerged is the view that the “intuitive” or “everyday” mind of normal adults in all
cultures is not unlike the “primitive” mind described by Tylor and Frazer.

Consider some examples of the shortcomings of the “everyday” (formerly “primitive”) mind.

Whenever we make a decision about what is appropriate evidence for testing a generalization, we place demands upon our deductive inferencing abilities. Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972; also Wason 1969; Wason and Shapiro 1971; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi 1972) have examined these abilities in college students.

Four cards are placed in front of subjects. The cards display the following symbols:

![Image of the cards: E, K, 4, 7]

The students are told that each card has a letter on one side of it and a number on the other, and that they are to evaluate the truth of the following proposition which refers only to the four cards: If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side. The task is to “name those cards and only those cards that need to be turned over in order to determine whether the rule is true or false.” Which cards would you select? An extraordinary feature of this task is that most people draw erroneous inferences about which cards are relevant for testing the generalization. A characteristic pattern of responses is shown in Table 1.

The correct answer is (I won’t say “of course”) E and 7. Over 95% of Subjects.

### Table 1: A Reasoning Problem

| Generalization: | If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side. |
| Task: | Name those cards, and only those cards which need to be turned over to determine whether the generalization is true or false. |

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<th>Results: Initial Selection Pattern</th>
<th>% of Subjects</th>
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<tr>
<td>E and 4</td>
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<td>E only</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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Note: Adapted from Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972:175, 182).
of us bungle the task. Many of us have some difficulty understanding the erroneous nature of our own inferences. Typically we recognize that the E card must be turned over (if it has an odd number on the back it would violate the generalization). But it is only with some effort that we come to realize that an E card with a 7 on the back (a violation of the generalization that is easy to recognize) is the same as a 7 card with a vowel on the back (hence turn over the E and the 7). In other words, we seem to lack reversible operations (in Piaget's sense); we are preoperational in our approach to the task. Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972:193) draw the more modest conclusion, that "formal operational thought is less general than Piaget supposes." Neo-Tylorians draw the conclusion that the intellectual predilections and disinclinations of the "everyday" mind interfere with the human being's deliberate attempts to exploit information about reality to an advantage. The conclusion is reminiscent of Frazer's and Tylor's view of the "primitive" mind as rational in intent yet limited in procedure. At least in this example we seem to lack insight into one of the most elementary features of conditional relationships in the logic of propositions, that is, if \( p \) is a sufficient condition for \( q \) (if \( p \rightarrow q \) then \( q \) is a necessary condition for \( p \) (if \( \neg q \rightarrow \neg p \)). Consequently, evidence that might disconfirm a generalization is overlooked.

A second example suggests that most of us have difficulty discovering what goes with what in experience. To get a feel for this difficulty consider the evidence presented in Figure 1. Imagine you are a nurse in a hospital. In each of the rooms represented in Figure 1 there is a single patient. During your rounds you notice that the noses of some of your patients have turned red. Now you know that patients differ in their ailments, and you begin to wonder if there is a diagnostic relationship between the color of a patient's nose and his or her ailment. In particular you begin to suspect that knowledge of whether or not a patient's nose has turned red tells you whether or not he or she has a kidney problem. Given the evidence in Figure 1, to what extent is the presence or absence of a red nose diagnostic of the presence or absence of a kidney problem (Perfectly diagnostic? Very diagnostic? Moderately diagnostic? Slightly diagnostic? Not at all diagnostic?).

It is surprising how many adults lack a concept of correlation or contingency with which to make inferences about what goes with what (or diagnosis what) in experience. Smedslund's (1963) findings are characteristic. Swedish nurses are asked to infer whether or not a particular symptom is diagnostic of a particular disease. They are
Figure 1. To what extent is a red nose diagnostic of a kidney problem? Each square represents a hospital room in which there is a patient who either has a red nose or a nose of normal color and some kind of ailment. For the 21 patients represented above to what extent does knowledge of whether or not someone has a red nose help you predict whether or not he or she has a kidney problem?

presented with excerpts from the files of 100 patients in which the symptom and the disease are shown to either occur or not occur in the ratios indicated in Table 2.

Eighty-five percent of the nurses mistakenly infer that the symptom is diagnostic of the disease despite the fact that the probability of having the disease given the presence of the symptom (37/70 or .52) does not substantially differ from the probability of having the

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<th>Red Nose</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heart Problem</td>
<td>Kidney Problem</td>
<td>Kidney Problem</td>
<td>Stomach Problem</td>
<td>Kidney Problem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2**

A 2 x 2 Contingency Table Portraying Correlation Relevant Frequency Information About the Relationship Between a Hypothetical Symptom (S) and a Hypothetical Disease (D) in the Files of 100 Supposed Patients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symptom (S)</th>
<th>Disease (D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present (D_1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present (S_1)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent (S_2)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "Normal adults with no training in statistics" generally think this information reveals a connection between the symptom and the disease.
disease given the absence of the symptom (17/30 or .56). Most of the nurses reason that the symptom is diagnostic because the number of cases in which the symptom and disease are both present (87 patients) is the largest. There are other ways to misuse correlation relevant information and many of them are indulged in by the "everyday" mind (see Jenkins and Ward 1965; Ward and Jenkins 1965; Shweder 1977c). The crucial point is that the "everyday" mind boggles in the face of such a task. It has difficulty arranging and evaluating correlation relevant information. By the way, insight into the evidence in Figure 1 would reveal that red noses are "not at all" diagnostic of kidney problems. The probability of having a kidney problem given a red nose is 10/15 or .66. The probability of having a kidney problem given a normal nose is identical, that is, 4/6 or .66. Thus the contingent relationship between nose color and ailment is exactly zero. In a pilot study with 15 students at the University of Chicago only two gained insight into the problem. "Moderately diagnostic" was the modal response.

A third example suggests that we are limited in our procedures for estimating the likelihood of an event. The example is adapted from studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1977) and Lyon and Slovic (1976). Imagine you are a member of a jury in a case involving a hit-and-run accident. You are presented with the following evidence and then asked to estimate a likelihood.

1. It was a cab that was involved in the hit-and-run accident.
2. There are only two cab companies in your city, the blue and the green.
3. Eighty-five percent of the cabs in the city are blue; 15% are green.
4. An eye witness has testified that the cab was green.
5. The court has tested the reliability of the witness to discriminate blue cabs from green cabs. The witness correctly identifies 80% of the blue cabs and 80% of the green cabs.
6. How likely is it (expressed as a percentage) that the cab involved in the hit-and-run accident was green as the witness testified?

Subjects typically estimate that it is 80% likely that the cab was green. In fact it is more likely that the cab was blue than green! Table 3 portrays the relevant evidence in a way that makes it easier to gain insight into the problem. Out of any 100 cabs that might have been involved in an accident, 85 are likely to be blue; 15 are likely to be green. Of the 85 blue cabs that might have been involved, 80% or 68 cabs will be correctly identified as blue. This means that 20% or 17 blue cabs will be falsely identified as green.
Of the 15 green cabs that might have been involved, 80% or 12 cabs will be correctly identified as green by the witness. Thus, out of 100 cabs that might have been involved in the accident, the witness will identify 17 + 12 (or 29) as green, and of these only 12, or 41%, will actually be green.

What seems to happen in this problem is that subjects either (1) fail to appreciate the relevance of the base-rate information concerning the distribution of blue and green cabs or (2) lack the concepts required to assess the degree to which information about prior probabilities should influence their estimates (see Hammerton 1973; Nisbett and Borgida 1975; Nisbett et al. 1976). As Lyon and Slovic (1976:296-297) remark, although “experience should confirm the importance of base-rates” it appears that experience alone is not sufficient to arrive at a veridical understanding of the likelihood of events in one's environment.

Another feature of the “everyday” mind is its proneness to cognitive illusions; it perceives coherencies and regularities in experience that are not there to objectively discovered. One prominent type of cognitive illusion has come to be known as the “illusory correlation” phenomenon (see for example, Chapman 1967; Chapman and Chapman 1967, 1969; Starr and Katkin 1969; Berman and Kenny 1976; Mirels 1976). It is a phenomenon that may well have contaminated and biased much of the extant scientific evidence supportive of a global trait approach to personality (see, for example, D’Andrade 1974; Shweder 1975, 1977a; also, Part 1 of this essay).

“Illusory correlation” is the modern name for a phenomenon which includes “magical thinking” as discussed by Frazer. It refers to consensually judged contingencies or correlations among classes of events that are not warranted by actual experience. A major determinant of such reliably invalid inferences are preexisting conceptual linkages (e.g., similarity and contiguity) among event classes. Items that conceptually resemble one another are judged to go together empirically or co-occur despite contradictory observa-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected Results From 100 Simulations of the Cab Problem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>True Color</th>
<th>Witness Says</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The probability that true color is green given that witness says green = 12/(17 + 12) = .41 (from Lyon and Slovic [1976:291] with slight modifications).
tional evidence. Likeness is confused with likelihood; similarity is utilized as a guide for estimating co-occurrence probability.

Consider a simple example of how preexisting conceptual linkages among event classes can interfere with the process of assessing correlation relevant frequency information. Which of the two following inductive arguments would you be more likely to endorse? (1) John has self-esteem. Therefore, he probably is not a leader. (2) John has self-esteem. Therefore, he probably is a leader. Most people endorse “argument 2.” Yet most of us believe that most people with self-esteem are not leaders (that is, there are many more people with self-esteem in the population than there are leaders). “Argument 1” is thus the argument that is consistent with our frequency beliefs, that John has self-esteem. Most people with self-esteem are not leaders. Therefore John is probably not a leader! In this instance our culture’s image of the ideal leader intrudes and interferes with our ability to draw an inductive inference.

I have enumerated all these neo-Tylorian examples to evoke an image of the “everyday” or “intuitive” mind as intentionally scientific yet limited in its scientific procedures, unsophisticated in abstract reasoning, and somewhat impervious to the evidence of experience. Within anthropology this is an image that has often been resisted. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to either ignore intentionally scientific activities or to interpret them as though they lacked scientific intent. For example, belief systems are often gratuitously interpreted as though they were mystical, religious, symbolic, poetic, or rhetorical (Lévy-Bruhl 1910; Beattie 1964, 1970; Leach 1967; Tambiah 1973). It is against this tendency that Horton (1964) argued that “ritual man is not really a distinctive being, but is rather a sub-species of theory-building man” (also see Horton 1967, 1968; Spiro 1968; Jarvie and Agassi 1970). Yet there has been a tendency within anthropology to compare the intellectual ideals (explicit canons of inference and normative models of the Western scientist, statistician, and logician) with the intellectual performances of preliterate peoples. Tylor and Frazer probably indulged in such misleading comparisons.

Few cultures have bothered to explicate or formalize the canons of inference that govern their thinking; certainly it is important to explain why we are exceptions in this regard (see Gellner 1973; Horton 1967; Lienhardt 1956). Nonetheless, it turns out that when we compare the intellectual performances of the American college student with those of the “primitive” horticulturalist, both are limited in

I have evoked a neo-Tylorian image of the “primitive” as deficient scientist. I have suggested that when we compare intellectual performances in everyday life we discover that the “primitive” mind is really the “intuitive” mind of normal adults in all cultures. What I would like to do now is discuss the implications of the neo-Tylorian approach.

THE ILLUSORY INTUITIONS OF THE EVERYDAY MIND

The everyday mind accomplishes a very difficult task. It looks out at a behavioral world of complex, context-dependent interaction effects and unsubstantial intercorrelations among events, yet it perceives continuities, neat clusters, and simple regularities. The everyday mind seems to fashion cosmos out of chaos. It constructs an illusory view of reality in which many of the postulates of classical culture and personality theory are used without hesitation to explain why people behave as they do. For example, despite the fact that there is little evidence to suggest that individual differences in conduct are widely generalized across situations (see Part 1 of this essay) a global trait theory approach to individual differences seems to be an ethno-psychological universal (see Valentine 1963; Shweder 1972b; White 1977; Kirk and Burton 1977; Shweder, Bourne, and Miyamoto 1978).

As we have seen in Part 1 of this essay (Postulate 1), the discrepancy between the unparsimonious, context-dependent facts of behavioral life and the coherent, context-free constructions of social cognition has received some attention by neo-Tylorian researchers. Such occurrences as the confusion of likeness and likelihood (“magical thinking”) draw our attention to the explanatory behavior and phenomenal representations of experience of our species and help us understand how the everyday mind can first construct an illusory symbolic world and then mistake its creation for a factual discovery. Besides “magical thinking” two other cognitive illusions should be mentioned, especially since they too may explain why the
classical postulates of culture and personality are so difficult to abandon.

**Retrospective Reinterpretation: The Past in the Present**

It is also a compelling intuition of the everyday mind that individual differences in behavior are longitudinally stable. Like many such "intuitions," the assumption that the ontogenetic past has a consistent causal influence over the present is resistant to change. It is not readily abandoned even in the light of contrary experience and evidence. For example, Caudill and Schooler (1975:357) have difficulty accepting their own evidence that the way children differ at age 2½ does not predict how they will differ at age 6. Instead of doubting that early influences are decisive they speculate about the methodological limitations of their study. (See Postulate 2, Part 1 of this essay.)

An alternative strategy is suggested by neo-Tylorian research. The present may be less linked to the past than we have been inclined to suppose. Although the evidence is too scanty to permit any confident conclusions, the general absence of convincing evidence, from observation, of consistent individual differences over time suggests that it may be individual differences that are unstable, not our measuring instruments. The question then arises, Why is the "everyday" mind so reluctant to surrender Postulate 2? The answer may be quite simple. All men and women are able to look back on their personal biographies and they can do this with knowledge of how everything turned out. The persistent unwillingness to separate the present from the past may be a cognitive concomitant of the retrospective perspective. As Florovosky (1969:369) notes:

The tendency towards determinism is somehow implied in the method of retrospection... In retrospect, we seem to perceive the logic of the events which unfold themselves in a regular or linear fashion according to a recognizable pattern with an alleged inner necessity. So we get the impression that it really could not have happened otherwise.

The illusory cognitive effects of outcome information are substantial. Fischhoff (1975a, 1975b) experimentally investigates the effect of "knowing how things turned out" on the extent to which subsequent events are perceived as inevitable consequences of prior conditions. He documents three significant tendencies: (1) Outcome knowledge "produces an unjustified increase" in the perceived
predictability of events. After we "know how things turned out," prior conditions which were previously (prospectively) viewed as insufficient grounds for making an outcome prediction are now (retrospectively) perceived as sufficient causes of later events. (2) The perceived causal relevancy of various features of the prior conditions is altered by outcome knowledge. (3) Judges are unaware that outcome information has changed their earlier (prospective) assessments of the causal sufficiency and relevancy of prior conditions. In retrospect they are unable to reconstruct their own previous perception of the prospects of the situation. In hindsight, once they know how things turned out, events that they were in fact unable to foresee are said to be predictable.

The illusory clarity of hindsight is reminiscent of Escalona and Heider's remark (1959:67) that "the very discrepancies between what was expected and what had happened served to emphasize and crystallize for us the inherent consistency of everything a person does at any age and in any sort of circumstance." (See Postulate 2, Part 1.)

The "retrospective biographer" within us has no difficulty resisting evidence that early influences have little consistent effect on later behavior or that individual differences in childhood are not longitudinally stable. "Creeping determinism," the illusory impression that known outcomes are relatively inevitable is a cognitive fact of life. "Finding out that an outcome has occurred increases its perceived likelihood" (Fischhoff 1975a, my emphasis added). However, the "retrospective biographer" within each of us coexists with another identity, the "detached socialization researcher." Postulate 2 is the darling of the "retrospective biographer," but "detached socialization researchers" with access to information about variations in outcomes from common antecedents (and similarities in outcomes from different antecedents) should probably view the postulate with some skepticism. At the moment, no scientific fact warrants a deep involvement with the past.

But, why is the "retrospective biographer" so fascinated by origins? One reason may be that all outcomes, the undesirable and remorseful as well as the desirable, are perceived as inevitable consequences of prior conditions. Thus, personal reconstruction (to the extent it is sought) is thought to be possible only by means of a return to "the original time," that time which is itself prior to those prior determining conditions.
The idea of renewal via origins, the notion that symbolic rebirth is possible by recapturing the past, is a widespread mythological theme (Eliade 1975). The theme dominates psychoanalytic thinking and much of developmental psychology. As Eliade notes:

One of Freud’s discoveries above all has had portentous consequences, namely, that for man there is a “primordial” epoch in which all is decided—the very early childhood—and that the course of this infancy is exemplary for the rest of life. Restating this in terms of archaic thinking, one might say that there was once a “paradise” (which for psychoanalysis is the pre-natal period, or the time before weaning), ending in a “break” or “catastrophe” (the infantile trauma), and that whatever the adult’s attitude may be towards these primordial circumstances, they are nonetheless constitutive of his being (1975:86).

The “retrospective biographer” is probably more a mythmaker than a “detached socialization researcher.”

THE FUNDAMENTAL ATtribution ERROR: DIFFERENCES IN CONDUCT REFLECT DIFFERENCES IN CHARACTER

The intuitive mind also finds it easy to personify cultural differences and interpret them as differences in modal character. A principle of social cognition known as the “fundamental attribution error” may help us gain insight into this tendency (Ross 1977). The “fundamental attribution error” is the tendency to overestimate the causal relevance of dispositional factors versus situational factors when comparing differences in the behavior of two people. The intuitive mind seems to make “inadequate allowances for the role-biased nature of social data.”

In one study, Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) had pairs of students play a game in which one student was a “questioner” and the other student an “answerer” on general knowledge questions. The questioners were explicitly and publicly asked to “display their store of esoteric knowledge in composing questions.” Thus, they typically “stumped” the “answerers.” Despite the fact that the “answerers” knew they had been randomly sorted into their role, despite the fact that they were perfectly aware of the “role advantages” that had been deliberately contrived for the “questioner,” despite all this both the “answerers” and outside observers drew the unwarranted inference that the “questioners” were in fact more knowledgeable people than the “answerers.” The intuitive mind seems to erroneously conclude that a difference in the behavior of two people
is paralleled by a difference in their personalities, despite the non-comparability of the situations in which the behaviors are observed.

**THE POTENTIAL FOR RATIONAL ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR**

Neo-Tylorians assume that normal adults in all cultures strive to make generalizations about the empirical relationships among objects and events in experience. Neo-Tylorians argue that many of the concepts needed to arrive at a veridical understanding of such relationships are not available to the everyday mind. Yet a perplexing question remains to be answered. To the extent that the human species has the potential for rational adaptive behavior, neo-Tylorian research would seem to suggest that this rationality cannot be derived from what we know about the inductive and deductive powers of the individual conscious mind. Is that a defensible position? If it is, can an affirmative view of the human potential for rational adaptive behavior be derived in another way? Let me present a simple list of hypothetical answers to this question. Such list making is a way of defining the broad outlines of a research agenda for a psychological anthropology that is concerned with the relationship between thought and adaptational processes. What follows are answers in search of phenomena (see Shwederm 1977d).

**Answer 1.** The notion that "organisms" become better and better fit to the contingencies of their environments may have only limited relevance to human learning. Normal adults certainly adapt their behavior, but only with respect to their conscious understandings of the contingencies of their environment, and these understandings can be quite mistaken. Hence, human behavior is "not even approximately optimal with respect to the real world" (Simon 1957:199). Answer 1 forthrightly declares that we don't adapt very well at all.

**Answer 2.** Adaptive processes do not require complex intellectual manipulations or the kinds of "higher" mental processing we often associate with "thinking" (and "theorizing") as opposed to "perceiving." For example, one can literally "see" that an axe works to split logs. All that is required is the perception of occurrences that are contiguous in time and space. Formal operational and hypothetical thinking are not required. Imitation and the intelligent use of one's senses may be all that one needs to acquire valid knowledge of one's world.
Answer 3. It may be a mistake to attempt to derive the potential of the human species for rational adaptive behavior from the deductive and inductive abilities of the individual mind. Intelligence may be more a property of organizations, groups, systems, traditions, contexts, or task environments than a property of individuals. Individual problem solving may be a relatively rare occurrence. As Dawes (1976:10) remarks, we may be inclined “to confuse the cumulative technological advances of our society with the power of the single human mind. The fact that a lot of us with the aid of a printing press, telephone, and verbal communication can create an H-bomb does not mean that any of us singly can think very straight.” Also see Gellner (1973).

Answer 4. It may be a mistake to attempt to derive the human potential for rational adaptive behavior from the deductive and inductive abilities of the conscious mind. Our intellectual shortcomings may be only a feature of our self-reflective and deliberate efforts at ratiocination. Unconsciously we may draw inferences and arrive at conclusions by means of relatively sophisticated intellectual procedures. As we have seen in the discussion of Freud, the dynamic perspective in psychology has always been concerned with the relationship between unconscious information processing and overt behavior, yet even today we know very little about the extent to which complex reasoning, problem solving, and decision making can go on without conscious or phenomenal representation. Perhaps in the next decade neo-Tylorians and Freudians will connect.

Answer 5. Prediction may not be among the primary intellectual goals of the intuitive mind. As we shall see in the discussion of “situations of accountability” and cultural dynamics, the activities that induce explanatory behavior in everyday life may only require that the uncanny or untoward be made “explainable within the accepted scheme of things” (Geertz 1973:101).

The Control Mechanism View of Culture, or Towards an Ethnography of the Superego

Culture is best seen . . . as a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call “programs”)—for the governing of behavior . . . man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms (Geertz 1973:44).

Anthropologists, like other social scientists, have been concerned with human
behavior and, like other social scientists, have reported norms and variations in the behavior of people belonging to various societies the world over. They have even at times been concerned with the behavior of individual members of these groups, as evidenced by the numerous biographies and life histories they have produced. Their methods of observing, recording, and assessing human behavior are not strikingly different from those of other behavioral scientists, such as sociologists and social psychologists. In fact, they generally have not been nearly as systematic in sampling and counting or describing the norms and variations of behavior. Where they have, however, made a unique conceptual contribution is in the formulation of the shared symbolic determinants of behavior, which, in our view, is the essential feature of the concept of culture. Although, as we explain below, this concept is often used to include overt behavior, and even the products of behavior such as artifacts, we feel that its essential contribution lies in providing a method for coding and classifying the shared ideas of the members of a society or group, rather than in describing norms of behavior, and it is this view of culture that we would like to present here (Whiting and Whiting 1960:918).

Tylor and Freud both subscribed to a control mechanism view of culture: both conceptualized “culture” as rules or standards for regulating conduct. Tylor identified various rule types, for example, law, custom, morals, belief, and knowledge. Freud identified a primary activity associated with cultural control, namely, criticism; the superego concept emerged. In this section I rethink Tylor’s question: What types of rules are there? I also rethink Freud’s: What activities are associated with cultural control? Both questions are examined with an eye towards a third problem: What is the source of authority for cultural rules? (For a more extensive treatment see Much and Shweder 1978; also Turiel 1978a, 1978b, 1979; Shweder, Turiel, and Much 1980.)

Psychological anthropologists have tended to conceptualize behavior as the result of either “external” environmental pressures (what Popper and Eccles 1977 call “World 1”) or “internal” psychological factors (what Popper and Eccles 1977 call “World 2”), or some combination of the two (see Sears 1961 for a representative statement). There is no easy place for “culture” in such a dichotomous scheme, thus its role is frequently overlooked or minimized (see Postulate 3, Part 1 of this essay). My goal in this section is to reintroduce the notion of “self-monitoring with reference to cultural standards” as a fundamental explanatory principle (see D’Andrade and Romney 1964; Kay 1966; Searle 1969).

**World 3: What Types of Rules Are There?**

First, there is the physical world—the universe of physical entities . . . . This I will
call "World 1." Second, there is the world of mental states, including states of consciousness and psychological dispositions and unconscious states; this I will call "World 2." But there is also a third such world, the world of the contents of thought . . . . By World 3 I mean the world of the products of the human mind, such as stories, explanatory myths, tools, scientific theories (whether true or false), scientific problems, social institutions, and works of art. World 3 objects are of our own making, although they are not always the result of planned production by individual men (Popper and Eccles 1977:38).

Table 4 presents a classification of rules constructed by Much and Shweder (1978). The classification is based on the way those subject to the governance of rules orient to rules of a given type. The scheme is derived from a "logico-grammatical" or ethno-scientific analysis performed by Black (1962).

At least five types of cultural control mechanisms seem to govern the conduct of competent members of our society (and perhaps all societies). They are (1) regulations (or laws), (2) conventions (or customs), (3) morals (or ethics), (4) truths (or beliefs), and (5) instructions (techniques, recipes, or "know-how"). Each cultural control mechanism has its characteristic evaluative modality: "It's legal"; "It's the done thing"; "It's wrong"; "It's true"; "It's effective." Table 4 relates the five rule types to each of six parameters of orientation and appraisal: (1) the historicity of the rule, (2) the source of the rule, (3) the potential alterability of the rule, (4) the method of rule validation, (5) the consequence of rule violation, and (6) the relevance of truth criteria. As Much and Shweder (1978:25) remark:

At any given time culture bearers perceive "moral" rules (e.g., "mothers and sons must not copulate with each other") as unalterable [Parameter 3] and ahistorical [Parameter 1]. Although in fact many moral rules change with time and vary cross-culturally, one can identify the moral status of a rule by noticing, in part, that questions such as "how do I go about changing the incest taboo" (alterability) and "in what year was the incest taboo created" (historicity) are thought peculiar, ill-formed or somewhat besides the point by any competent member of our culture.

On the other hand, regulation-type rules (e.g., "unsolicited manuscripts from persons who are not members of the Association must be accompanied by a nonrefundable processing fee of $25.00") present no such difficulties. They are historical. Some specifiable authority made them at some time, and some specifiable authority can alter them. It "makes sense" to ask "how do I go about changing the rule "unsolicited manuscripts. . . ."?" To a remarkable extent the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule Types</strong></td>
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<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Historicity</td>
<td>historical</td>
<td>potential but unclear: unspecifiable</td>
<td>ahistorical</td>
<td>ahistorical</td>
<td>ahistorical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Source</td>
<td>specifiable authority</td>
<td>supraindividual: unspecifiable</td>
<td>a priori</td>
<td>logic, reason, experience</td>
<td>experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Alterability</td>
<td>alterable: specified procedure</td>
<td>potentially alterable: no specified procedure</td>
<td>unalterable</td>
<td>unalterable</td>
<td>unalterable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Validation</td>
<td>relevant authority</td>
<td>consensus</td>
<td>intrinsic</td>
<td>empirical, consensus of experts</td>
<td>empirical, consensus of experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Truth-criteria</td>
<td>inapplicable</td>
<td>inapplicable</td>
<td>indeterminable</td>
<td>analytic or synthetic</td>
<td>synthetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mode of evaluation</td>
<td>“It’s legal (or illegal)”</td>
<td>“It’s the done thing (or it’s just not done)”</td>
<td>“It’s right (or wrong)”</td>
<td>“It’s true (or false)”</td>
<td>“It’s effective-useful (or ineffective)”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
taxonomy of rule types presented in Table 4 parallels Tylor's (1871) century-old definition of culture.

**Situations of Accountability: The Locus of Cultural Control?**

Accountability (and criticism) is perhaps the most human and most social of all activities. It presupposes that which is most distinctive of our species, language and a super-ego. Accountability is a domain of speech behavior. A "situation of accountability" occurs when conduct departs from standard or rule and becomes exposed to evaluative scrutiny. The most characteristic way to call attention to the fact that someone (including oneself) has done something amiss is by means of a speech act, namely, an "accusation." An accusation in turn is an invitation to "account" for (excuse, justify) one's conduct. "Accounts" are also speech acts; they function to "interpret behavior in such a way as to make it more understandable according to the criteria for expectable, approvable behavior" (Much and Shweder 1978; also see Scott and Lyman 1966). "Accusing" and "accounting" seem to be activities whose very possibility is dependent upon language.

Everett has brought a box to nursery school. Adelle takes it to use. Everett asks to have it back, but Adelle won't give it to him.

Everett: Well, it's my box and I can do whatever I want with it.
Adelle: Not if you bring it to school it isn't.
[Cultural Control Message: If you bring toys to school they become property for common use?] (from Much and Shweder 1978:25).

Situations of accountability are not only quintessentially linguistic; they are also eminently social. Dress codes, the rules of bridge, principles of justice, income tax regulations, and the canons of propositional calculus are human creations but not personal creations; they are supra-individual—even better, super-ego(tistical). Typically, it is with reference to collective standards that one's conduct is scrutinized.

It is to Freud's credit that, in his discussions of the superego, he identifies criticism (and related activities such as accusing and accounting) as the primary activity associated with rules. However, Freud seems to suggest that with the differentiation of the superego (the third and final structural component of the individual's psyche) and the defensive resolution of the Oedipus conflict, the issue of
cultural control ceases to be a social process and becomes, instead, an autonomous, intra-subjective process, a process of self-criticism.

An alternative view, adopted by many ethnomethodologists and symbolic interactionists (Scott and Lyman 1966; Mehan and Wood 1975) is that the superego is relentlessly inter-subjective and that interpersonal demands for an account of one's conduct are an incessant feature in everyday life and a necessary condition of social order. From this perspective, culture can be conceptualized as a loosely organized collection of rules or standards for regulating conduct which are continually negotiated, tested, clarified, exploited, and altered in everyday situations of accountability.

Two children talking in a nursery school:

Gary (to Sam): Why do you always dress up the same?
Sam: Uh-Uh.
Gary: You always dress up in that.
Sam: No, sometimes I wear blue.

[Cultural Control Message: Day to day changes of costume are required for public appearances(?)] (Much and Shweder 1978:27).

THE MORAL SENTIMENT: WHAT IS ITS SOURCE?

Where does a moral orientation come from in a 5 year old? Nucci and Turiel (1978) have shown that it is there, and other research (Much and Shweder 1978) supports their finding. When asked about the potential alterability of a rule (e.g., "If your teacher said it was all right to break Claire's toy, would it be all right?"; see Table 4, Parameter 3) 5-year-olds seem to distinguish morals from conventions and regulations in much the same way as adults (Nucci and Turiel 1978). Moreover, in situations of accountability, the way in which 5-year-olds defend themselves against accusations of wrongdoing seems to vary by rule type (Much and Shweder 1978). The distinction between a moral orientation, a legal orientation, a customary orientation, a scientific orientation, and a utilitarian orientation is surprisingly well developed in American preschool children. But, where do these distinctions come from? If culture is to be construed as a control mechanism, a major challenge for a psychological anthropologist is to identify various control mechanisms (e.g., Are the five rule types in Table 4 universal?) and explain their origin.

Turiel (1978a, 1979; also Nucci and Turiel 1978) has argued that
certain types of experiences are inherently prescriptive. He credits these experiences with the power to universally elicit a moral orientation, which he identifies with the concept of “justice” or “fairness”: “In those cases (as an example, one child hitting another), the individual’s view of the events as transgressions and his formulation of prescriptions can originate from the events themselves (e.g., from the perception of the intrinsic consequences of an act).” Thus Turiel predicts that moral rules (rules perceived as unalterable and nonrelative) will cluster around a universal content—the value of life, physical and psychological harm to others, retribution, and the sharing of goods.

Turiel’s prediction is a challenge to psychological anthropologists. Throughout Part 1 and 2 of this essay I have argued that stimuli, in and of themselves, do not have a determinant effect on behavior. Turiel’s approach to “inherently prescriptive experiences” escapes some of the difficulties of an environmental determinist position by introducing the notion of “justice” or “fairness” as an intuitive normative concept available to children and adults in all societies, which mediates the experience of, for example, physical harm to others. However, there remain at least two critical questions one might ask of Turiel’s approach to morality: (1) Are moral sentiments reducible to the concept of “fairness” or “justice”? (2) Does the principle of justice provide us with a guide to conduct? Hart (1961:153-164) has persuasively argued that “moral criticism” (is it right or wrong?) need not be made in the name of “justice” (is it fair or unfair?):

A man guilty of gross cruelty to his child would often be judged to have done something morally wrong, bad, or even wicked or to have disregarded his moral obligation or duty to his child. But it would be strange to criticize his conduct as unjust... “Unjust” would become appropriate if the man had arbitrarily selected one of his children for severer punishment than those given to others guilty of the same fault (p. 153-154).

Hart also notes that the principle of justice “cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct.”

“Treat like cases alike and different cases differently” is the central element in the idea of justice [but] it is by itself incomplete... This is so because any set of human beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from each other in others and, until it is established what resemblances and differences are relevant, “treat like cases alike” must remain an empty form (p. 155).
In other words, there is nothing inherently unfair about denying a young child the right to enter into contract. The "truths" of our culture tell us that, in certain crucial respects, a young child is different from an adult. If moral sentiments cannot be equated with "justice" and if the concept of "justice" does not provide us with a guide to conduct, it seems unlikely that experiences of a certain kind (e.g., a father whipping a child) are inherently prescriptive. Nonetheless it is conceivable that there are certain "truths" (e.g., that all sentient beings are alike in crucial respects) that are intuitively available to children in all cultures, only to be later altered or amplified as the child is exposed to the received wisdom of his or her elders. Are there universal intuitive "truths" of childhood which support a determinate moral orientation? If there are, then one should predict that children around the world will agree more in their moral judgments with each other than with the moral judgments of the adults of their respective societies (Shweder, Turiel, and Much 1980). As far as I know, moral development researchers have not addressed this question. One can only look forward to future research on the ontogenesis of cultural control mechanisms.

CONCLUSION

The time has probably come for psychological anthropologists to reexamine their involvement with genesis (origins) and individual differences. The involvement has been less profitable than many suppose (see Part I); a shift in theoretical emphasis is called for (see Part 2). It is time for us to rekindle anthropology's early concern with phenomenal representation and conscious explanatory behavior, as in the work of E. B. Tylor, and the unconscious determinants of nonexplanatory behavior, as in Freud. It is also time for us to take "culture" seriously. My conclusion can be summarized in the form of a slogan: From Genesis and Typology to Hermeneutics and Dynamics. I do hope some readers find the prospect exhilarating, as I do.

REFERENCES


In Ralph Bolton's article “Machismo in Motion: The Ethos of Peruvian Truckers” (Ethos, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 512-342), diacritical marks were uniformly not included with the Spanish words and phrases listed in Tables 1-7. These omissions were not the fault of the author, who had cast his tabular material entirely in upper case letters, which, in Spanish, do not carry diacritics. During the production process, this material was transposed, for stylistic reasons, to the lower case and subsequently published without the proper diacritical marks.