As the moral philosopher David Wong has noted: “The standard characterizations of [moral] relativism make it an easy target and seldom reveal what really motivates people who are attracted to it. Introductory textbooks in ethics frequently portray the view as an extreme variety of subjectivism (or conventionalism) in which anything goes – a person’s (or group’s) accepting that something is right makes it right for that person (or group)” (2006: xi). This variety of moral relativism pictures human subjectivity in terms of human reactions of both acceptance (feelings of approbation) and rejection (feelings of opprobrium). Its central principle states that approving of some act or customary practice makes it right (good, virtuous, moral) and disapproving of the very same act or customary practice makes it wrong (bad, vicious, immoral); and this is so for any conceivable act or customary practice whether it is eating pork, terminating a pregnancy, drinking alcohol, spanking a child, banning a book, marrying a member of your own sex, marrying more than one member of the opposite sex, walking bare-breasted on a public beach, covering yourself with a burqa1 in the public square, conducting a brith,2 surgically reshaping the genitals of all the children in one’s family regardless of their gender, assisting someone in committing suicide, or immolating oneself on the funeral pyre of one’s husband. Writing more or less in this vein, the anthropologist Ruth Benedict once defined morality as “a convenient term for socially approved habits” (1934: 73).

It is not too surprising that this variety of moral relativism is viewed as extreme by many moral philosophers, if for no other reason than that moral relativism of this variety rejects the most basic principle of moral reasoning presupposed by each of the parties in any genuine moral dispute, namely the presupposition that if I am right in judging a particular course of action to be wrong, bad, vicious, or immoral then you cannot be equally right in thinking it right, good, virtuous, or moral (see, for example, Rashdall 1914; also Cook 1999). One implication of moral relativism so portrayed is
that the very same act or customary practice becomes right and wrong, good and bad, virtuous and vicious, moral and immoral, to the very extent that two people (or groups) disagree about whether it is right or wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, moral or immorl. This is because the extreme variety of moral relativism (as subjectivism or conventionalism) asserts that in fact there is nothing objective (impersonal, impartial) to be right or wrong about (no such thing as "natural" or "inalienable" rights, for example) when one person (or group) calls an action or custom or law right and another person (or group) calls it wrong. Instead, according to moral relativism so portrayed, when one person (or group) says such-and-such is right (good, virtuous, moral) and another person (or group) says the opposite they are merely expressing their feelings (for example, of pleasure or displeasure) or registering a difference in subjective preferences (desires, likes), in personal opinions, habits, or intuitions or in past collective choices as explicitly expressed through legal enactments or implicitly made manifest in inherited traditions and local social norms.

According to moral relativism so portrayed those feelings, preferences, tastes, opinions, habits, intuitions, enactments, traditions, and social norms are the only moral standards in town. They are constitutive of what is right and wrong. But their definitions of right and wrong are also subject-relative. Thus each moral standard applies only to the person (or group) in question and has no universal validity. Germany has its own moral standards concerning the separation of church and state in public schools and they are different from the standards in the United States; hence according to moral relativism (so portrayed) teaching religion in public schools is right in Germany and wrong in the United States and there is nothing more to be said. Saudi Arabia has its own moral standards concerning sex differences and they are different from the standards in the United States; hence according to moral relativism (so portrayed) a ban on issuing driver's licenses to women is right in Saudi Arabia and wrong in the United States and there is nothing more to be said. If the extreme doctrine of moral relativism as subjectivism or conventionalism is true, then genuine moral disputes can never even arise let alone be resolved through the intelligent use of evidence and reason.

This variety of relativism has become a frequent target in ethics textbooks largely because moral philosophy is about the proper use of the human intellect to resolve genuine moral disputes and because moral relativism (so portrayed) denies that it is possible to ever have a genuine moral dispute in moral philosophy, in public policy arenas, in courtrooms, in everyday life, or anywhere else. "It is all subjective and political, stupid!" is the eventual message of this variety of moral relativism. That message strikes many moral philosophers as the ultimate expression of irrationalism.

MORAL UNIVERSALISM: THE STANDARD CHARACTERIZATION

A point similar to the one made by David Wong might be made about standard characterizations of universalism, where moral universalism is sometimes portrayed in anthropological texts as an extreme variety of objectivism (or absolutism) in which only one thing goes. The easy target in that case is the view that there exists a single true and detailed moral charter for the organization of the ideal universal civilization. That detailed moral charter is a uniformly applicable set of authoritative prescriptions for kinship, marriage, and even cuisine. The validity of divergent, for example, on a

Moral universalism is a concrete in the sense that it provides definite answers to moral questions, and do "its" success is that it provides a moral map of the world, to which the moralists (in Africa, India, or the United States) view themselves as superior. The countenances, at least since the colonial intervention, are justified on the grounds of moral universalism.

Indeed that the doctrine of moral universalism has become a frequent target in ethics textbooks because the doctrine of moral universalism (as subjectivism and absolutism) is true, that genuine moral disputes can never even arise let alone be resolved through the intelligent use of evidence and reason.
for kinship, marriage, parent–child relations, sex roles, politics, economics, religion, and even cuisine which can and should be used as the global standard for judging the validity of diverse ways of life and ranking them in terms of their moral worth (for example, on a developmental scale from savage to civilized or backward to advanced).

Moral universalism, so characterized, is a doctrine positing the objective reality of concrete touchstones for judging what is right and wrong. Its posited moral charter is concrete in the sense that it sets forth clear and determinate instructions, principles, commands for the actual behavior of individuals and members of groups (do and don’ts such as “thou shall not bow down before carved images,” or “thou shall never use physical punishment to discipline a child,” or “thou shall always permit widows to marry if they want to, but never require them to do so”). Those concrete touchstones of the moral charter are then said to be objective in the sense that (according to the doctrine) their requirements (obligations, duties, rights, prohibitions) are, and always have been, binding on all persons (or groups) without exception, and are universally obligatory regardless of a person’s or people’s subjective or conventional acceptances, actual cultural practices, or historical circumstances.

At least since the early twentieth century most (although certainly not all) anthropologists have rejected extreme versions of moral universalism. Many anthropologists associate moral universalism with either religious missionary efforts or with secular colonial interventions (military occupation and/or direct or indirect political rule) justified on the basis of cultural superiority, the “white man’s burden” and “the civilizing project.” The suspicion was also in full evidence in 1947 when the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (whose membership included the avowed cultural relativist Melville Herskovits) refused to endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Man on the ground that it was an ethnocentric document. The members of the Executive Board asked: “How can the proposed Declaration be applicable to all human beings, and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of the values prevalent only in the countries of Western Europe and America?” (AAA Executive Board 1947; see also Engle 2002).

Indeed that distrust was so widespread and deep that one suspects if extreme versions of moral relativism have ever appealed to cultural anthropologists it is largely because the doctrine initially seems to offer an effective counter to this or that despised version of absolutism. Moral relativism as conventionalism or
of particular agents. The rub, of course, is that some of those proselytizing universalizers may also have the wealth, influence, or power to successfully project or spread their subjective preferences widely, even among local elites in other societies.

It should be acknowledged, however, that since the advent of global feminisms and the international human rights movement, the scene within the discipline of anthropology has become more complex. Some anthropologists have even begun to look more favorably on doctrines of moral universalism, especially versions of the doctrine formulated in the language of "natural rights" or as part of a moral critique of patriarchy aimed at liberating women (and children) and cleansing the world of so-called oppressive or harmful cultural practices: bride-price, polygamy, female genital surgery, child labor, arranged marriage, the sexual division of labor in the family, and "veiling" might be examples of customs disdained by contemporary versions of moral universalism within the profession of cultural anthropology. Nevertheless that historical distrust evidenced by the 1947 AAA Executive Board Statement is not just a thing of the past. A similar view was forcefully expressed in 1995 by Roy D'Andrade in his critical response to various re-emergent moral universalisms in anthropology when he remarked:

Finally, the current moral model [in the discipline of anthropology] is ethnocentric. It is strong for equality (the escape from inequality) and freedom (the release from oppression). In my opinion these are not bad values but they are very American. These are not the predominant values of modern Japan, India, China, the Middle East or Southeast Asia, but they are the predominant values in the United States and much of Europe. It is ironic that these moralists should be so colonialist in their assumptions about what is evil. (D'Andrade 1995: 408; see also Menon and Shweder 1998; Menon 2003)

Fortunately, those extreme characterizations of moral relativism and moral universalism are not the end of the story. Many so-called moral relativists in anthropology will recoil at extreme characterizations of their doctrine. They will recoil because in their own minds their primary aim is not to subvert the entire process of genuine moral debate by denying the existence of moral truths. By their lights their primary aims are to caution against haste (rapid, habitual, affect-laden, or spontaneous information-processing) and parochialism (assimilating all new experiences to readily available local frames of reference) and to lend credence to the general caution that one should be slow to make moral judgments about the customary practices of little-known others.

Many who embrace moral universalism in anthropology will recoil at extreme characterizations of their doctrine as well. They will recoil because in their own minds the primary aim of their objectivism (and invocation of moral absolutes) is not to congratulate themselves that their own way of life is the best or only way to live a moral life but rather to provide insiders and outsiders, minority groups and majority groups (in other words everyone), with a common frame of reference for engaging in genuine moral debates and for judging what is right and what is wrong in one's own society, and in other societies as well.

In the remainder of this essay I try to honor the aims of both camps by sketching a conception of relativism as "universalism without the uniformity." This is an approach to the anthropological study of morality inspired by Michel de Montaigne (and many others) in which one tries to credibly advance one particular type of answer to the central questi...
central question posed by the global diversity of concrete moral judgments. That central question, of course, is why the many peoples of the world disagree with each other so much in their concrete moral judgments and why those judgments don’t possess the universality that is characteristic of the idea of truth.

DESCRIPTIVE WORK IN MORAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND LIMITS

Here it may be useful in clarifying the doctrines of moral relativism and moral universalism to mention a few of the more robust findings from descriptive work in anthropology on the human experience of moral value. Descriptive fieldwork on a worldwide scale (including reports found in the writings of Montaigne and other early ethnographers) has of course demonstrated that moral judgments are ubiquitous in human groups. A moral judgment is the expressed or (more typically) implied judgment that person P ought to do X under such-and-such circumstances, where the doing of X under those circumstances is thought to be the right thing to do because it is presumed to be productive of some objective good. When it comes to the human perception of value, moral judgments are experienced as though they are judgments about the true nature of some posited objective moral charter (see, for example, Shweder 1982; Shweder et al. 1987; Shweder with Much 1991; Haidt et al. 1993; Beldo 2011).

This truth-seeking (or “cognitive”) feature of everyday moral judgments has been noted by the philosopher Arthur Lovejoy. He points out that when someone says “It is wrong to oppress the helpless” or “The conduct of Adolph Hitler was wicked,” they “do not in fact conceive of themselves merely to be reporting on the state of their own emotions” and mean to be saying something more than “I am very unpleasantly affected when I think of it” (Lovejoy 1961: 253, 255). On a worldwide scale it appears that when folk make a moral judgment (for example, “Male circumcision is an outrage,” “Abortion is evil”) they themselves believe there are matters of objective fact to which their judgment refers and that they are making a truthful claim about some impersonal or independently existing domain of moral reality.

Lovejoy’s observation is consistent with several classic ethnographically based research findings on moral norms and moral reasoning, including the work of Malinowski (1926), Read (1955), Fortes (1918 [1959]), Ladd (2004 [1957]), and Firth (2011 [1951]). Raymond Firth’s pithy remark about the people of Tikopia is typical of these ethnographers’ accounts of the objectivism characteristic of local understandings of the moral charter whether in New Guinea, West Africa, Melanesia, or among Native American populations in the USA: “The spirits, just as men, respond to a norm of conduct of an external character. The moral law exists in the absolute, independent of the Gods” (quoted in Nadel 1969: 270–271).

That observation is not meant to gainsay the fact that moral judgments (that’s good, that’s wrong, that’s sinful) around the world are also felt (see, for example, Rozin et al. 1999). They are often experienced as aesthetic and emotional reactions (that’s ugly, that’s odious, that disgusts me, “I am very unpleasantly affected when I think of it”) and not solely as objective representations of moral truths. Indeed, moral judgments are motivators of action in significant measure because they are
affect-laden and produce in people powerful feelings of arousal, distress, pollution, repugnance, guilt, indignation, pride, or shame. Characteristically, however, the moral judgments of the peoples of the world studied by anthropologists are truth-seeking judgments about some moral charter assumed to be “of an external character.”

At the same time, fieldwork by anthropologists has also documented that as a matter of fact many concrete moral judgments about actions and customs do not seem to spontaneously converge across autonomous or even semi-autonomous cultural groups. Actions and cultural practices that are a source of moral approbation in one community (for example, polygamy or female genital surgeries) are frequently the source of moral opprobrium in another, and moral disagreements can persist over generations, if not centuries. Indeed, the history of moral anthropology as an empirical undertaking is in some significant measure the history of the discovery of astonishing cultural variations in human judgments about the proper moral charter for an ideal way of life.

Nevertheless, the import of ethnographic findings of variability in concrete moral judgments for the doctrine of moral relativism is far from obvious. In and of itself the mere existence of diversity in moral judgments across (and within) cultural groups is not necessarily incompatible with the normative doctrine of moral universalism. From a strictly descriptive point of view Clifford Geertz (2000: 44) may have been on firm ground when he remarked that the encounter with anthropological evidence on other societies has seemed like “a massive argument against absolutism in thought, morals and aesthetic judgment” and that the message anthropologists have been thought to have is this one: “that, as they see things differently and do them otherwise in Alaska or the D’Entrecasteaux, our confidence in our own seeings and doings and our resolve to bring others around to sharing them are rather poorly based” (44). Nevertheless, from a strictly normative point of view both the argument and the message are far from compelling and are themselves rather poorly based. This is because according to the doctrine of moral universalism diversity in moral opinions is not necessarily a surprise and any failure of either individuals or groups to actually recognize the one true morality (or to abide by the moral charter once its requirements have been understood) is simply viewed as an index of the lower (or arrested) stage of moral development of that individual or group.

Among the most influential moral development stage theories in the history of social science research are those proposed by Leonard T. Hobhouse in his book *Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics* (1915) and by Lawrence Kohlberg in his collection of essays *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (1981). Both Hobhouse and Kohlberg subscribed to a doctrine of moral universalism. Both believed that liberal enlightenment thinking had come closest to discovering the terms of the one true moral charter. Both viewed tribalism (in-group favoritism) and hierarchy (which they viewed as incompatible with autonomy) as lower forms of social organization. Both argued that the moral consciousness of human beings had not only evolved over the course of cultural history but should be encouraged to continue to develop in what they viewed as the progressive liberated and liberal direction. Kohlberg went so far with his universalism as to suggest that the history of the cultures of the world (and the history of childhood in all societies) is (and ideally ought to be) a history of the discovery of the moral principles underlying the American Revolution, as expressed in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States (also see Rawls 1971; Turiel 2008).
Echoes of this liberal version of the doctrine of moral universalism can be readily found in contemporary public policy forums and throughout the academy in North America and Europe. Consider, for example, this resonant formulation by the former United States president George W. Bush, which he voiced in his first State of the Union Address to Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001:

America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture, but America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance. (January 29, 2002)

Those were weighty and portentous words expressing the foreign policy doctrine that American wealth and power should be used to make the world a better place by upholding what many American activists and interventionists (both on the Left and on the Right) view as an incontestable universal framework for promoting moral development and social progress on a global scale.

Thus the anthropological documentation of cultural variability in moral judgments is not an argument-ending discovery. At best it is just the beginning of a conversation, precisely because when “red state” evangelical Christians condemn gay marriage and “blue state” secular liberals condone it the difference in their judgments might just be a sign of the deficient moral development of one of the parties to the disagreement. Even self-evident moral truths might not be evident to those who live and think at a lower level of moral consciousness. That idea of an uneven or patchy moral development of the peoples of the world (or of the members of different factions within a society) is readily adduced by adherents of the doctrine of moral universalism as a compelling (and even compassionate) ground for supporting global moral education campaigns, cultural reform movements, and even (under special circumstances) forceful interventions into foreign lands.

Edward Westermarck, who is arguably the deepest and most philosophically sophisticated moral relativist (and subjectivist) in the history of anthropology and whose book-length critique of moral universalism titled Ethical Relativism (first published in 1932) should be mandatory reading in any curriculum on moral anthropology, describes the core idea of moral universalism as follows:

objectivity presupposes universality. As truth is one it has to be the same for anyone who knows it, and if morality is a matter of truth and falsity, in the normative sense of the terms, the same must be the case with moral truth. If a certain course of conduct is good or bad, right or wrong, it is so universally, and cannot be both good and bad, right and wrong. (Westermarck 1932: 183)

With regard to the doctrine of moral universalism Westermarck in fact concedes that “The universality of truth does not mean, of course, that everybody knows what is true and false. It has constantly been argued against ethical subjectivism that the variety of moral judgments no more justifies the denial of moral objectivity than the diversity in judgments about the course of things disproves the objectivity of truth” (Westermarck 1932: 183).
BACK TO MONTAIGNE: ON BEING SLOW TO JUDGE LITTLE-KNOWN OTHERS

If one wants to accurately understand the appeal of so-called moral relativism for many of those anthropologists who have in one way or another been attracted to some variety of it, it is not a bad idea to go back to the late sixteenth century, to the famous essay by Michel de Montaigne (1948) titled “Of Cannibals” (or “On the Cannibals”). In that essay Montaigne, who was an early ethnographer of sorts, tried to come to terms with the recently discovered cultural practices of the native peoples of La France Antartique (today known as the Caribs of Brazil). He describes and morally evaluates the beliefs, values, and customs of a people who believed that hosting a captive of war and then killing, roasting, and making a common meal of him, and “sending chunks of his flesh to absent friends” was right and good. That particular practice seemed shocking and repulsive to Portuguese and French moral sensibilities in the sixteenth century, just as many customary practices of peoples in the Southern and Eastern worlds of Africa, Asia, and the Americas south of the border seem barbaric, odious, and detestable to many peoples of the Northern and Western worlds today. Nevertheless, Montaigne dared to offer a critical (and ironical) response to the Portuguese and French opprobrium directed at the so-called cannibals of La France Antarctique.

It is noteworthy that early in his essay Montaigne cautions the reader to step back and be reflective about his or her own spontaneous aversive response to stories about Carib practices: “we should beware of clinging to vulgar opinions and judge things by reason’s way, not by popular say” (1948: 150). It is also noteworthy that there are many references throughout to the universal virtues and duties readily detectible by any human being open to being informed about the details of the Carib way of life: “their whole ethical science contains only these two articles: resoluteness in war and affection for their wives” (154) – which he also describes as “valor against the enemy and love for their wives” (158). Writing as an ironist, a skeptic, and a detached observer of human behavior, Montaigne was prepared to complicate the European colonial encounter with alien societies. He was not inclined to let the righteous elite moralists of the metropoles of the Western world make the world safe for condescension and for an imperial European rule justified under the banner of cultural superiority. Indeed, by means of various cultural comparisons, he invited his readers to see the dark side of their own way of life. He writes:

But there never was any opinion so disordered as to excuse treachery, disloyalty, tyranny and cruelty, which are our ordinary vices. So we may well call these people barbarians, in respect to the rules of reason, but not in respect to ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarity. Their warfare is wholly noble and generous, and as excusable and beautiful as this human disease can be; its only basis among them is their rivalry in valor. They are not fighting for the conquest of new lands ... they have no wish to enlarge their boundaries. (Montaigne 1948: 156)

Commenting on the customary practice of polygamy by the Carib he remarks favorably on the lack of jealousy among the women of the society and notes: “Being more concerned for their husbands’ honor than for anything else, they strive and
scheme to have as many companions as they can, since that is a sign of their husbands' valor" (158). And, perhaps most remarkably, he goes on to rebut the anticipated counterclaims (which are still commonplace today) that "all this is done through a simple and servile bondage to usage and through the pressure of the authority of their ancient customs, without reasoning or judgment, and because their minds are so stupid that they cannot take any other course" (158). In other words, for Montaigne the "cannibals" did not lack either agency or virtue, and by his lights their exercise of their agency was quite compatible with the embrace of their cultural tradition. The essay was written between 1578 and 1580!

Somewhat more recently, on the occasion of the 1984 Distinguished Lecture at the American Anthropological Association Meeting, the eminent cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz delivered an oration titled "Anti Anti-Relativism" in which he featured the following provocative (and often misunderstood) quotation from Montaigne's essay: "Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice . . . for we have no other criterion of reason than the example and idea of the opinions and customs of the country we live in." Geertz went on to say, "What the relativists, so-called, want us to worry about is provincialism — the danger that our perceptions will be dulled, our intellects constricted, and our sympathies narrowed by the overlearned and overvalued acceptances of our own society" (2000: 45).

But what precisely is that expressed notion of Montaigne's and how should cultural anthropology make use of it to sharpen our perceptions, expand our intellects, and widen our sympathies? Donald Frame's translation of Montaigne's essay renders the key passage this way:

Now, to return to my subject [namely the question, how should we go about thoughtfully evaluating our intuitive or spontaneous moral judgments about other peoples' customs?], I think there is nothing barbarous and savage in that nation, from what I have been told , except that each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in . There [in the country we live in] is always the perfect religion, the perfect government, the perfect and accomplished manners in all things. (Montaigne 1948: 185)

Even more recently Montaigne's essay (and that passage in particular) has been a subject for interpretation by the moral philosopher David Wiggins (2005: n. 15). Wiggins points to the obvious ironical tone in the quoted material. He then persuasively dismisses the interpretation that Montaigne was a relativist of the subjectivist or conventionalist variety. According to Wiggins, the overriding message of "On the Cannibals" is to caution us about a very general human liability. That liability is our unfortunate inclination to rush to judgment about others, especially when confronted with cultural differences that instantly flood and arouse us with unpleasant feelings. Hence, Wiggins avers, we are vulnerable to "mistakes and misapprehensions in findings of barbarity" (2005: 17). There in those particular ironic sentences, he concludes, "Montaigne is only reporting that he has the same difficulty as everyone else in fighting free of parochial misconceptions" (17).

Montaigne's essay not only remains a leading example of an admirable attempt to correct spontaneous misunderstandings when engaging cultural differences. His sixteenth-century critique of parochial misconstruing sets the agenda for all subsequent
discussions (including this one) of the scope and limits of moral relativism in cultural anthropology. Toward that end the remainder of this essay seeks to identify a hybrid variety of moral relativism (more accurately described as "moral universalism without the uniformity") that is appealing precisely because it embraces and puts to work that basic principle of all moral reasoning, namely that the very same act or custom cannot be both right (good, virtuous, moral) and wrong (bad, vicious, immoral) at the same time. That basic principle holds true even when the very same act or custom initially or habitually elicits pleasure from one person and disgust from another; that is to say, prior to thoughtful reflection upon the full and true nature of the act in question and before the correction of factual mistakes and/or parochial misapprehensions. And it is that basic principle that assists many thoughtful anthropologists in their own confrontations with cultural differences, because that principle cautions anthropologists to bracket or set aside their own initial or spontaneous reactions of aversion to alien customs, to seek a fuller and more objective understanding of the true nature of the act in question, and to press on, as Michel de Montaigne did, in their search for some universally recognizable moral goods promoted by the unfamiliar customs of little-known others.

Why do the many peoples of the world disagree with each other so much in their concrete moral judgments and why don’t those judgments possess the universality that is characteristic of the idea of truth? The challenge for cultural anthropologists who are inspired by Montaigne is to answer that question (1) without suggesting that objective reality is devoid of moral truths; (2) without suggesting that those who agree with our own judgments of right and wrong are either moral cretins or barbarians who fail to understand the requirements of the one true morality or demonic others who willfully seek to promote vice over virtue; and (3) without assuming in advance that one’s own way of life is the only possible flowering of the ideals of an objective moral charter. How might one proceed in meeting that challenge? Allow me to proceed by example.

**Moral Judgment in Two Temple Towns**

Consider the following illustration of global diversity in concrete moral judgments drawn from my own collaborative research in the Hindu temple town (the so-called "Old Town") of Bhubaneswar in Orissa, India and in the Hyde Park community surrounding the secular temple known as the University of Chicago (see, for example, Shweder et al. 1987, 2003a, 2003b). Reflect on the following four courses of action and rank them in terms of your personal judgment of the seriousness of moral breach or ethical failure in each instance:

1. A poor man went to the hospital after being seriously hurt in an accident. At the hospital they refused to treat him because he could not afford to pay. (The reader is likely to judge this to be a very serious moral failure.)

2. In a family the firstborn son slept with his mother or grandmother until he was 10 years old. During these 10 years he never slept in a separate bed. (The reader is likely to judge this to be a moral breach, although perhaps only as a minor violation of the moral order, as moral attitudes toward cross-generational and even cross-gender co-sleeping may be changing in the reader’s cultural group.)

3. The reader would judge this to be a moral breach.

4. A wife judge this to be a moral breach.

The following town of Indian town of I do not judge this to be a moral breach.

1. The reader would judge this to be a moral breach.

2. A wife judge this to be a moral breach.

3. A poor hospital judge this to be a moral breach.

4. In a 10 year old judge this to be a moral breach.

David allows me to proceed by example.

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The following is the way most Oriya Hindu Brahmans, women and men, in the temple town of Bhubaneswar would rank these courses of action, with the most serious moral breach listed first.

1. The day after his father's death the eldest son had a haircut and ate chicken. (This would be judged a very serious moral breach, indeed one of the most serious moral failures imaginable.)

2. A widow in your community eats fish two or three times a week. (This would be judged a very serious moral breach.)

3. A poor man went to the hospital after being seriously hurt in an accident. At the hospital they refused to treat him because he could not afford to pay. (This would be judged a serious moral breach but not quite as serious as the other two.)

4. In a family the firstborn son slept with his mother or grandmother until he was 10 years old. During these 10 years he never slept in a separate bed. (This would not be judged a moral breach and might even be viewed as morally desirable.)

David Wong, the moral philosopher mentioned at the start of this essay, points to one possible way to rise to the challenge (answering the question why different peoples disagree in their concrete moral judgments) when he reminds his readers that it is not incoherent to "be a universalist and a 'situational' ethicist at the same time," holding that what is right, good, virtuous or moral "varies with context in such a way that anyone reasoning correctly [by which he means logically and consistently] and with all the relevant facts would judge in the same way, regardless of one's society or culture" (Wong 2006: xii). And David Wiggins, the moral philosopher inspired by Montaigne, provides a provisional account of situational ethics (he calls it "contextualism") in which he writes: "No act or practice can be assessed as right or wrong, good or bad, etc. without the full specification of circumstances and context (context embracing, in some versions, the identity of agents). An act or a practice is a response in some situation to something somehow discriminable in that situation or a framework that contains that situation." Wiggins cautions his readers that "properly to situate an act or a practice or an instance of a practice is the necessary preliminary to passing judgment on that act, that practice, or that instance. Unless we do this, we shall scarcely know what we are passing judgment upon" (2005: n. 17; emphasis added).

Indeed, what are we passing judgment upon when we learn that a typical Oriya Brahman, female or male, in an Indian temple town in the late twentieth century judges that it is a greater evil for the firstborn son to get a haircut and eat chicken the day after his father's death than for doctors in a hospital to refuse to treat an accident victim because he is too poor to pay? And what type of judgment should we make about the moral development of those Oriya Brahman adults? A primary task for a moral anthropology of the sort imagined (universalism without the uniformity) is to provision us with a "full specification of circumstances and context" in such a way "that anyone reasoning correctly and with all the relevant facts would judge in the
same way, regardless of one’s society or culture.” How might one proceed to do that in the instance of the firstborn son who eats chicken and gets a haircut the day after his father dies?7

Here is a brief sketch of the intellectual framework (the goals, values, and pictures of the world) that contains the relevant situation and leads to the local moral condemnation reported above. Oriya Brahmans who live in the temple town generally believe that every person has an immortal reincarnating soul. They believe that when a person dies his or her soul strongly desires to detach itself from his or her corpse and go on its transmigratory journey. Nevertheless, the soul of the person finds itself initially trapped or attached to the corpse and held back by the so-called death pollution that emanates from the dead body and from its subsequently processed physical remains. As an act of beneficence, care, and reciprocity (all of which are assumed to be objective moral goods), relatives of the deceased (and especially the firstborn son, for whom this is a major and widely acknowledged moral duty and perhaps the most profound moment in the relationship of a son with his father) undertake the project of assisting the soul of the dead person to get free of its ties to the physical form it once occupied. Thus, some of the kinsmen of the dead person turn their own living bodies into what I as an outside observer have sometimes referred to as “death pollution collection sites.” They essentially suck up the death pollution associated with the corpse (and its cremation and disposal) into themselves. They believe that the most effective way to do this is by keeping all other types of pollutions away from their living bodies, thus providing maximal space for the personal intake of the death pollution. Among the most commonplace competing types of pollutions that might interfere with their project are sexual activities and the ingestion of “hot foods” (for example, fish and meat – the relevant social fact here is that chicken is a “hot food”). Thus for 12 days they stay at home fasting (maintaining a very restricted diet of “cool” foods) and practicing abstinence. They believe that on the twelfth day the soul of the deceased will have been released from its bondage to its bygone material form and is therefore free to proceed on its journey to the world of transmigrating spirits. On that day they cleanse themselves of the death pollution which they have absorbed into their own bodies and which has accumulated there. They believe that the pollution migrates to the extremities of the body and is especially concentrated in their hair and under their fingernails. On that twelfth day of abstinence and fasting the family barber cuts off all their hair and the barber’s wife cuts their fingernails. Then they take a ceremonial bath and go back to the workaday world, having fulfilled their moral obligation to the soul of the deceased.

“The day after his father’s death the firstborn son had a haircut and ate chicken.” To any Oriya Hindu Brahman in the temple town, this conduct signals a willful and horrifying renunciation of the entire project of assisting the soul of his father and places the father’s spiritual transmigration in deep jeopardy. No wonder they are morally distraught at the very idea of such behavior, and judge it more severely than nontreatment of the accident victim at the hospital who is too poor to pay. Wouldn’t you judge things that way too if that was your picture of the essential parts of the person (including the idea of an immortal reincarnating soul), of connections between means and ends (cause and effect with respect to death pollution and its absorption) and the objective moral charter for particular kinship relationships (the values ideally made manifest in father-son and other kinship obligations)?
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obligations)? And doesn’t David Wiggins make the decisive point – without such a
specification of the local framework we (as innocent and untutored outsiders) in
fact did not know what we were passing judgment on when we initially heard that
a firstborn son in an Oriya Brahman temple town got a haircut and ate chicken the
day after his father’s death.

The main point I wish to make with respect to this illustration is that the imagina­
tive framework used by Oriya Brahmans in discriminating aspects of the situation and
judging the son to have behaved immorally is a framework that provides reasons that
would justify anyone drawing that same conclusion if they adopted that Oriya world­
view. The framework of interpretation is, of course, contingent in this instance and
rests on a set of metaphysical, causal, and means–ends beliefs. The point, however, is
that if we don’t draw that conclusion (that the firstborn son committed a very serious
moral breach) it is because we don’t employ that framework of interpretation (and
hence don’t situate or even identify the course of action in the same way) and not
because either Oriya Brahmans or we ourselves fall short in our recognition of existing
universal values? Many cultural anthropologists who are attracted to cultural relativism
ultimately trace the source of cross-cultural diversity in concrete moral judgments to
differences in worldviews or beliefs and to the particular subset of universal goods
privileged in any particular cultural or historical tradition of values.

MORAL PLURALISM AS UNIVERSALISM WITHOUT
THE UNIFORMITY (IN BRIEF)

An alternative name for this version of relativism is moral pluralism. It is the doctrine
that human reason at some point reaches a limit that allows for discretion as to which
values or goods to privilege and how they should properly be applied in the light of
local beliefs, interests, and social facts. Indeed, it is out of respect for our rationality
that moral pluralists hold that there is no single and complete rational ordering of
morally relevant goods (see Gray 1996, 2000; Galston 2002 for a discussion oflsaiah
Berlin and his theory of the inherent multiplicity and irreducibility of the objective
domain of moral goods or values). And it is also out of respect for the limits of our
rationality that moral pluralists recognize that many universal existential and
metaphysical questions relevant to the organization of a social life are cognitively
undecidable and leave room for morally sensitive and reasonable truth-seeking mem­
bers of different cultural traditions to disagree about which interpretive framework to
employ in situating a course of action.

Writing as a moral pluralist I once referred to those universal existential and
metaphysical questions as social existence themes (Shweder 1982). The variations in
concrete moral judgments of the many peoples of the world can be viewed, in part, as
expressions of the many answers that are possible to those universal questions or social
existence themes. Questions such as these: What is me and what is not me (the
question of personal boundaries)? What is male and what is female (the question of
gender identity)? Who is one of my kind and who (or what) is not one of my kind (the
question of in-group versus out-group identity)? Who is up and who is down
(the question of hierarchy)? How should the burdens and benefits of life be distributed
(the question of justice)? And others.
Those in the social sciences who have over the decades engaged in descriptive research in the cultural psychology of morality investigate local answers to those unavoidable and hence universal existential and metaphysical questions. And, as noted throughout this essay, what they have discovered is that many of those answers have local authority because of their perceived connection to an imagined objective moral charter mediated by local beliefs or worldviews. What they have discovered is that moral judgments around the world are ubiquitous, passionate, motivating, truth-asserting, and divergent, and that in all cultures there is some sense of natural moral law and the development of some kind of normative language of rights, duties, obligations, or values for regulating and justifying action (see, for example, Kroeber 1952; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961; D'Andrade 2008).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, human beings are not typically extreme relativists of the subjectivist variety. Values or moral goods are universally viewed as such undeniably good reasons for engaging in a course of action that once a moral end is the perceived result of a course of action nothing more needs to be said by way of its justification. Nevertheless, at the same time, the imagined moral truths or goods asserted in deliberative moral judgments around the world are many, not one. Researchers who study moral discourse and the reflective application of human intelligence to evaluate spontaneous or intuitive moral judgments have discovered that the objective moral character of an action or practice (e.g., voluntarily ending a pregnancy) is typically established by connecting that action through a chain of factual, means-ends, and causal reasoning to some argument-ending terminal good, for example personal freedom, family privacy, or the avoidance of physical or psychological harm. On a worldwide scale the argument-ending terminal goods of deliberative moral judgments privileged in this or that cultural community are rich and diverse, and include such moral ends as autonomy, justice, harm avoidance, loyalty, benevolence, piety, duty, respect, gratitude, sympathy, chastity, purity, sanctity, and others. Several proposals have been advanced in the social sciences for classifying these goods into a smaller set, such as the “Big Three” ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity proposed by this author and his colleagues and the four-dimensional classification of types of interpersonal relationships and associated duties and moral responsibilities proposed by Alan Fiske (1993) and his colleagues.

Universalism without the uniformity is one way to describe the variety of relativism characteristic of all these proposals. The “Big Three,” for example, propose that the human self or subject can be represented and experienced as either an autonomous preference structure seeking to maximize the satisfaction of its wants, or as an officeholder or social status bearer in a bounded community (a family for example) defined by role-based and often hierarchically interdependent duties and responsibilities, or as a free will or spirit whose capacity to initiate action and experience things of value derives from some kind of elevating connection to something that is inherently higher, dignified, pure, or divine. These pictures of the self are probably present to some degree in all cultural groups but they are emphasized to different degrees and made manifest or institutionalized in different ways. So too the values associated with them: the moral goods favored by the ethics of autonomy and by many liberal societies...
RELATIVISM AND UNIVERSALISM

Many descriptions of cultural and subcultural differences in moral orientation and judgment utilizing this framework or similar frameworks (for example, the “Big Five” proposed by Jon Haidt and his colleagues) are available in the moral anthropology and moral psychology literature (see Shweder et al. 1987, 2003a; Haidt et al. 1993; Miller 1994, 1997a, 1997b; Jensen 1997, 1998, 2008; Menon 2003; Haidt & Joseph 2004; Haidt & Graham 2007; Beldo 2011; and Hickman 2011; for an influential discussion of culture and the self, see Markus & Kitayama 1991). The development and defense of this type of moral pluralism is an ongoing process and will face many challenges. But perhaps its most basic principle (and its Montaigne-like caution for researchers in moral anthropology) is that the illiberality of a cultural practice is not necessarily an index of its immorality.

NOTES

1 The enveloping outer garment and face cover worn by women in public spaces in some Islamic traditions.
2 The Jewish ritual in which the foreskin of a male infant is surgically removed eight days after his birth.
3 For a useful historical and critical discussion of debates about the “natural” or objective status of human rights see Moyn (2010).
4 For a useful sampling of answers to this question see the collections edited by Wilson (1970) and Hollis and Lukes (1992). For a sample of key readings in the history of moral anthropology and contemporary discussions of moral relativism see Herskovits 1960; MacIntyre (1984); Levy-Bruhl (1985); Fischer (1989); Shweder with Bourne (1991); Shweder and Haidt (1993); Mead (2001 [1935]); Shweder et al. (2003b); Sumner (2007); Lukes (2008); Shweder (2008); and Boas (2010 [1911]).
5 Those concrete moral judgments are not typically uniform within cultural groups either and the challenge of factions, sections, interest groups, or “wings” for the organization of a viable society is a classic issue in the social sciences dating from at least the brilliant treatment of the topic by James Madison in the Federalist Papers (Federalist 10). See, for example, Jensen (1997, 1998) and Haidt and Graham (2007).
6 Westermarck of course believed this was a big “if” and he contested it.
7 This is a situation, a framework and a moral judgment I have discussed in other writings.
8 It should be noted, of course, that there is considerable cross-cultural and intracultural variation in the extent or degree to which all social norms are moralized and viewed as manifestations of an objective, external, or sacred charter (see, for example, Shweder et al. 1981, 1987; Turiel 1983; Haidt et al. 1993).

REFERENCES


