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Deconstructing the Emotions for the Sake of Comparative Research

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ABSTRACT

One of the central aims of the discipline of cultural psychology is to develop a theoretical language for the comparative study of mental states that makes it possible to understand and appreciate the mental life of members of other cultures. In this chapter the author suggests that the language of the emotions is not an ideal theoretical language for making progress on the study of mental states across human populations. It is argued that the idea of an emotion is a complex synthetic notion, composed of wants, beliefs, feelings and values; and that human mentalities may vary in how they give shape, and lend meaning, to the more fundamental and direct experience of wanting certain things, valuing certain things, knowing certain things and having particular somatic and affective feelings. The chapter considers the advantages of temporarily privileging the study of “feeling” over the study of the “emotions.”

What types of cross-cultural variations in “feelings and emotions” are we able to imagine, given our understanding of what it means to be a person (that is, a mentally endowed human being)? And what types of evidence on mental functioning in other cultures would we want to collect to convince us that those imaginable (and hence logically conceivable) variations in feelings and emotions are actually real? What predictions, if any, follow from the idea of having an “emotional” life? And what predictions, if any,

I wish to thank Agneta Fischer and Anna Wierzbicka for their timely and useful comments on the original draft of this essay. Thanks as well to my fellow participants in the “Cultural Psychology” reading group at the University of Chicago Committee on Human Development, where the issue of the cross-cultural diagnosis of mental states was critically examined and debated during the 2000-2001 academic year. Without in any way holding them responsible for my own views, I have gained much from my discussions of this topic with Bertram Cohler, Jennifer Cole, Raymond Fogelson, Joe Gone, Rebecca Lester, John Lucy, Tanya Luhrmann, McKim Marriott, Tanya Menon, and Debjani Mukerjee.
step is taken, cultural psychology will also have little hope of ever establishing that particular combinations of wants, feelings, beliefs, and values are distinctive of particular cultural mentalities and are unequally distributed across the mental lives of members of different cultural groups.

CULTURAL VARIATIONS IN FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS: WHICH ARE IMAGINABLE?

Before undertaking an empirical investigation aimed at documenting differences in psychological functioning across human populations, it is a useful exercise to identify types of mental differences that one might conceivably or plausibly discover. When trying to imagine possible cross-cultural differences in feelings and emotions, in particular, there is a continuum of hypothetical possibilities that runs from those which are easy to bring to mind to those which seem impossible even to conceptualize.

On the easy-to-imagine side of things, one can readily understand and accept that the particular “environmental determinants” or “eliciting events” for particular emotions may be different in other cultures; for example, that there are places in the world where receiving a compliment on one’s pregnancy may not elicit pride or gratitude but rather anxiety or fear (e.g., of the “evil eye” or of the effects of other people’s wicked intentions). Thus, we readily acknowledge and can easily see that the things experienced as “threatening” or the events experienced as a “loss” or as an “insult” or as the “blockage of one’s goals” may not be the same from place to place. No particular conceptual difficulties arise in this type of case, because we are confident that we can relate the differential “emotional” impact of the eliciting event to some variation in culturally endorsed beliefs or in the real or perceived consequence of the event in that local cultural context.

We also find it rather easy to imagine other types of differences in the psychological functioning of members of different cultural groups. We can quickly assent to the idea that in some other culture some particular emotion (say, anger or envy or sadness) may not be displayed, expressed, or communicated to others (or even to oneself). This might be so, we readily and coherently consider, even when the emotion is mentally active and consciously or unconsciously experienced by members of that society. Again, no particular conceptual difficulties arise in this type of case, because we imagine that we can relate the absence of any outward signs of the emotion to some anticipated advantage that follows from keeping the emotion hidden.

There are, of course, certain presuppositions upon which we rely when making this interpretation, viz., that people around the world anticipate the future consequences of their own expressive behavior and also want to have more of the things they desire or think of as “good.” Nevertheless,
some research, the mental experience of giving alms (or "charitable donations") to a beggar amounts to the feeling of a transfer of "sins" from the giver of the "gift" to the receiver. In this system for shaping and structuring one's feelings and emotions, the beggar plays the part of scapegoat, who by accepting material gifts (rice or money) from those who are better off, also takes on the burden (including the karmic consequences) of their sins. The giver, by means of the gift, feels relieved of his or her spiritual debts, and also somewhat cleansed because unburdened of some measure of accumulated transgressions against the moral order of things.

Of course at this point I find myself wondering, am I really merely talking here of some universal emotion (named "guilt" in English), which is just coped with in different ways in different cultural communities? Or do all these special aspects - the idea of spiritual debts and the practice of transferring one's sins to others - suggest a different type of mental state? The first way of talking - guilt plus local coping strategy - surely is intellectually coherent, and the possibility that guilt might be unloaded in ways other than confession does seem, at the very least, imaginable.

The idea of gifts as transfers of guilt is coherent and intelligible, especially if one is prepared to assume three things. First, that the idea of "guilt" refers to an emotion caused or conditioned upon personal violations of the moral order or deviations from what one knows to be right, good, or dutiful. Second, that whenever there are personal transgressions of the moral order there is also going to be the mental experience of guilt, at least among "normal" human beings. Third, that people may differ in their metaphysical beliefs.

For example, some peoples may classify the experience of guilt as a purely subjective mental event existing "only in the head"; while other peoples may have a different metaphysical view of the "same" experience. They may classify the experience of guilt as the concomitant of a special type of event called the occurrence of a sin. Such an event (a sin) may be understood to have an objective or "thing-like" nature with causal properties of its own, which can weigh on your mind and influence your fate, until it is transferred to someone else. With regard to this example, of course, we may not subscribe to that particular metaphysical picture of the world, but that does not block us from understanding it. In fact, in this case we seem to have no difficulty making all three of the assumptions mentioned above, leading us to conclude that it is conceivable that guilt is coped with or managed in different ways in different parts of the world.

The application or use of the idea of guilt may not be the only way, or even the best way, to understand the mental life of Oriya Hindus in this instance. One might be tempted to argue in favor of an alternative approach in which differences between peoples in their metaphysical beliefs (e.g., the idea that "faults" are objective, not subjective) are used as one of several ways to identify differences in mental states. Nevertheless, the interpretation of universal guilt plus culture-specific coping strategy is certainly imaginable.

Not all claims about cultural variations in feelings and emotions are so readily imaginable. For example, I find it impossible to make much sense of the statement "X particular emotion [for example, sadness] does not have the same meaning in the culture in which I work as it does in your culture." Imagine an anthropologist who returns from years of field research and reports, "Among the people I studied in the highlands of New Guinea 'sadness' is the good feeling people have when they manage to acquire the things they most want." I find that statement incoherent because the idea of any particular emotion (for example, the idea of sadness) is what it is, and means what it means, and neither feeling good nor managing to acquire the things you most want is what "sadness" is about. In other words, the idea of (e.g.) "sadness" (that is, its meaning or definition) remains the same, regardless of where on the globe you happen to be when you find yourself thinking about it: it remains the same regardless of whose mental life (a New Guinea Highlander's or a Scotsman's) one is trying to understand when one decides to put the idea of sadness to interpretive use. Whether and when one should be inclined to put an emotion concept (such as "sadness") to use is quite another matter, to which I now turn.

THE USE OF EMOTION CONCEPTS IN COMPARATIVE RESEARCH: A MISGIVING

The idea of sadness can be used to illustrate some of the problems that arise if one uncritically adopts the theoretical language of emotion concepts as an analytic scheme for the comparative study of mental states (see Shweder, 1993). The idea of sadness, at least as I understand it, can be roughly defined as follows (concerning the definition of "sadness" see Smedslund, 1991, who discusses it as an example of "psychologic"; also Lazarus, 1991, who individuates emotions such as sadness by their "core relational themes"). "Sadness" refers to the particular way that a normal person will feel when the things he or she wants or likes are believed to be permanently unattainable or lost, and the distinctive way that a normal person acts when he or she has those beliefs and feelings.

Of course, to actually arrive at an adequate specification of the idea of sadness those particulars and also some of the presuppositions of the definition would need to be filled in. At a minimum they would include all of the following. Among the particulars we would want to know something about the quality of the feelings that are experienced by "normal" people when the things they want or like are thought to be permanently unattainable (or lost). This might include a description of both their somatic feelings...
(e.g., feeling tired, "chilled") and their affective feelings (e.g., feeling deflated, empty, passive, contracted). We would also want to know something about the quality of the actions toward which normal people incline (e.g., withdrawal from social interactions, ruminating about the futility of life) when they believe that the things they want or like have been lost forever. Among the various presuppositions of the definition is a utilitarian moral theory. Thus, it is presupposed by the very idea of sadness that human beings have wants and likes and that it is good for them to have the things they want and like.

Even this brief and superficial attempt at a definition of sadness suggests the richness and complexity of the meaning of a typical emotion concept. I have not even addressed the issue of whether the idea, concept, or definition of sadness includes (or ought to include) a reference to nonmental (physiological, neurological, hormonal) states. Should our attempt at a definition of the idea of sadness also say, "Sadness is the way a 'normal person' feels, thinks, and acts when their biological systems are in the following material states," followed by a list of brain states, hormone levels, and so forth?

An even deeper analysis might try to show the way the idea of an emotion contains within itself the notion that human beings will be motivated by their feelings and desires to maintain the social order as a moral order. Fear, for example, is an idea associated with issues of safety and harm, and the mental state it identifies is meant to motivate us to eliminate the conditions that produce that mental state by making our world safer. Anger, especially in the form of indignation, is associated with issues of fairness, equity, and just desert and is meant to motivate us to eliminate injustice from the world. Love and compassion are associated with protection of the vulnerable and are meant to motivate us to take care of others. Thus the semantic analysis of the idea of any particular emotion will reveal a good deal about the social, moral, and mental world of any normal human being whose wants, feelings, beliefs, and values are in fact packaged in that particular way.

But is it true that wherever you go in the world human mental life (decomposable into wants, feelings, beliefs, and values) is in fact packaged that way (as "emotions")? Which are the "emotionalized" packages of wants, feelings, beliefs, and values that actually play a part in the mental life of this or that people? And how can we find out? This is where I start to get nervous about the privileging of our received emotion concepts in research on cultural psychology. I get nervous because I think it is very hard to answer those questions if one begins one's comparative research by applying emotions as universally relevant theoretical categories. The prior adoption of such an analytic scheme makes it very difficult ever to conclude that the analytic scheme itself is either inappropriate or insufficiently revealing of the mental states of others.

Consider, for example, the observation made by several anthropologists about the ways people in some cultures respond to apparent loss (such as the death of a child). They do not respond with visible or direct signs of "sadness" — no tears, no subjective reports of deflation, no predicted facial expressions, no mournful retreat from life, and no use of a word for a negative emotion. Rather, they respond with "fatigue, sickness, or other kinds of bodily distress" (such as backaches and headaches). In the light of such anthropological observations (for the sake of argument let us assume that they are reliable) what should we say about the mental life of such a people? What should we say about the cultural relevance of the particular package of wants, beliefs, feelings, and values known as "sadness"?

Typically what happens in this case is that the theoretical idea of sadness is put to use, creatively generating various interpretive possibilities for making sense of what has been observed. The problem with this is that all the interpretations simply presuppose the relevance of the "idea of sadness," leaving us with no empirical basis for examining the validity of that presupposition.

For example, one possible interpretation is the following. Something the "native" very much wanted has become permanently unattainable (a child has died); therefore, he or she must be mentally experiencing sadness. According to this interpretation there is no visible and direct manifestation of mental sadness because the native either denies being sad, psychologically defends against it (for example, by "somatizing" the mental state), or does not have a language or vocabulary for describing, communicating, or expressing sadness; or any or all of the above. For those who elect to interpret things in this way, the somatization option is viewed as an unconscious psychological strategy or defense that makes it possible to retreat from daily life in a socially acceptable way (as "sick") without having to acknowledge feelings of demoralization.

A second possible interpretation is that the native shows no visible or direct manifestation of sadness because the significance of the eliciting event is other than it seems. According to this interpretation, the death of the child was not really appraised as a loss (for reasons yet to be discovered); hence there was no manifestation of "sadness," because there actually was no mental sadness in the first place. In other words, the set of things that might sadden the anthropologist are not necessarily coincidental with the set of things that might sadden the people whose behavior is being observed, whose mental states we are trying to infer, whose minds we are seeking to read.

A third possible interpretation is that something must be wrong with these "natives." Normal human beings, we suppose, here relying on our received theory of the emotions, are saddened to discover that the things they want and like have become permanently unobtainable. Various types
of psychopathology might be suspected. A pathology of knowing (that something of great significance has been lost), a pathology of wanting (to have the things you like), a pathology of feeling (appropriate feelings), a pathology of valuing (the right sorts of things), and so forth.

From the point of view of making progress in the field of cultural psychology, I think there is something a little troubling when interpretation proceeds in this way, although it is hard to say precisely what it is or to give the problem a name. Roughly stated, I think the difficulty is this. Under the theoretical influence of the idea of sadness far too many “top-down” interpretations of the mental states of the “other” can be generated. And all of these interpretations seem to presuppose the relevance of the idea of sadness without ever reconsidering that presupposition.

Moreover, the connection of actual evidence to any of these interpretations seems loose at best. The most manifest evidence, based on anthropological observation, suggests that apparent loss is not typically associated with sadness in some cultures, but rather with headaches or backaches or other forms of bodily distress. Nevertheless, the relevance of the emotion concept to the case at hand is never doubted. And, given the range and types of possible interpretations generated under the influence of the idea of sadness, it is not even apparent what would count as evidence that sadness is not the mental state of relevance in this case.

Imagine interviewing some apparently unsaddened native suffering from bodily aches and pains who, when asked, explicitly denies that the death of his or her child is a loss. Well, given that “denial” remains an interpretative option, we might certainly discount his or her testimony. On the other hand, imagine the opposite. A native explicitly confirms appraising the death as a permanent loss of something that was wanted and highly valued, yet he or she gives no signs of the mental experience of sadness. Given the way emotion concepts work as analytic tools, we are still free to assume that he or she really is sad, or else suspect some form of pathology. Notice that once we have presupposed the relevance of the idea of sadness, actual self-reports about wants, feelings, beliefs, and values appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient as evidence for or against our interpretations. But what conceivable evidence would convince us that it is possible for a normal person in another culture to lose something he or she truly wants and values without automatically activating the mental state we identify with the idea of sad? As far as I can tell, this entire exercise in “mind reading” the mental state of others in the circumstance described is constrained primarily by one’s prior commitment to the idea of “sadness” as a basic theoretical category for making sense of the mental life of all human beings. That seems to me a problem, because we seem to be blocked from ever even imagining that there might be other ways for “normal” human beings to package their wants, feelings, beliefs, and values.

PUTTING THE “EMOTIONS” TO THE SIDE IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

One of the several aims of cultural psychology as a discipline is to develop a language for the comparative study of mental states that makes it possible to understand and appreciate the mental life of others. “Others” refers to members of some different cultural community who by virtue of lifelong membership in that group ascribe meaning to their lives in the light of wants, feelings, values, and beliefs that are not necessarily the same as one’s own. Following Wierzbicka’s (1999) proposal, one might suggest that wants, feelings, values (evaluating things as good or bad), and beliefs be taken as fundamental or basic to the mental life of peoples in all cultures, indeed as constituent elements of what it means to have a mental life. Wanting, feeling, knowing, and valuing (as good or bad) would thus circumscribe cultural psychology’s “theory of mind.” But what about the emotions?

Setting aside the emotions in cultural psychology really amounts to decomposing them into more elementary or constituent meanings, for example, of the type proposed by Wierzbicka and Goddard. In earlier work of my own (Shweder, 1994; Shweder & Haidt, 1999; also see Menon & Shweder, 1994) it has been proposed that the idea of an emotion (e.g., sadness, fear, anger, envy, disgust, or love) is a complex. It is not something separable from the conditions that justify it, from the somatic and affective experiences that are ways of being touched by it, from the actions it demands, and so on. The emotion is the whole story. It is a kind of somatic event (fatigue, chest pain) and affective event (panic, emptiness, expansiveness). It is caused by the perception of some antecedent condition (e.g., the death of a friend) and by the recognition of the personal implications of the event for the self (e.g., loss, gain, threat, goal blockage, degradation, or elevation of status). This motivates a plan for action (e.g., attack, withdraw, hide, confess, celebrate) to preserve or enhance one’s sense of identity and purpose in life. The idea of an “emotion” is about the entire mental, moral, and social episode. It is about the unitary experience of the whole package deal or the simultaneous experience of all the components of meaning.

For analytic purposes and for the sake of cross-cultural research on the universality versus culture-specificity of human mental states, I have thus suggested that it might be helpful to decompose the idea of an emotion into various components of meaning. Many other theorists have done so as well (Ekman, 1980, 1984; Ellsworth, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Russell, 1991; Scherer, Walbott, & Summerfield, 1986). Paul Ekman, for example, talks of antecedent events, appraisal, behavioral response, physiology, and expression. I like to ask whether different members of different cultural groups are alike or different in mental functioning in this broad domain.
by dividing that question into several more specific ones, focusing on the following seven components of the meaning of an “emotion.”

1. Environmental determinants: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the antecedent conditions of the world (e.g., job loss, violating a rule) that elicit somatic and affective feelings? This is about what people know.

2. Self-Appraisal: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the perceived implications of those antecedent conditions for their personal identity and projects in life (e.g., status loss, fame, goal blockage)? This is about what people want, know, and value.

3. Somatic phenomenology: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in their somatic reactions (e.g., muscle tension, headaches) to 1 and 2 above? This is about what people feel.

4. Affective phenomenology: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in their affective reactions (e.g., feelings of emptiness, calm, expansiveness) to 1 and 2 above? This is also about what people feel.

5. Social appraisal: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the extent to which displaying those somatic and affective reactions has been socially baptized a vice or virtue or a sign of sickness or health? This is about what people value.

6. Self-management: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the plans for self-management (e.g., attack, withdraw, hide, confess, transfer sins) that are activated as part of an action routine? This is about what people want, know, and value.

7. Communication: Are members of different cultural groups alike or different in the iconic or symbolic vehicles (e.g., facial expressions, voice quality, posture) for expressing the whole package of interconnected components (1–6 above)?

If we proceed in this way, deconstructing the emotions and temporarily setting them aside as analytic or theoretical categories, it certainly seems possible that certain wants, feelings, beliefs, and values might be universal and similarly packaged together in all cultures. Many researchers will be betting on anger, fear, and sadness as mental states, as well as the prototypical symptom of wind as dizziness as resulting from an actual spinning of brain matter.

Work in medical anthropology focused primarily on what I would call emotions (what they call “sensations and symptoms”) rather than on emotions per se has uncovered several culture-specific coactivations of the sort I have in mind. For example, Hinton and Hinton (2002; also Hinton, Um, & Ba, 2001) have examined what they refer to as the “sore-neck syndrome” (mai go) among Khmer Cambodian populations. Their research is in the broad territory of anxiety experiences, feelings of panic and autonomic arousal. For Khmer Cambodians that experience is associated with a cluster of feelings and sensations including dizziness, ringing in the ears, blurred vision, joint pains, muscle aches, shoulder and neck soreness as well as anxieties about death. None of those feelings, sensations, or symptoms is a universal feature of autonomic arousal or panic attacks. During such mental episodes Khmer Cambodians also experience palpitations, shortness of breath, and profuse perspiration. As Hinton and Hinton point out, not all populations of peoples in the world are prone to “motion sickness” (for example, on a boat or in a car) or dizziness (for example, when quickly standing up) to the same degree.

Here I recapitulate Hinton and Hinton (2002, pp. 163–164) on how “each symptom of autonomic arousal will be appraised and apperceived given the local ethnophysiology.” “Wind” is one of the humors of the body, and the prototypical symptom of wind is “dizziness.” As the Hintons note, “the complaint of dizziness, immediately indicating wind illness, implies a complex physiology.” Khmer Cambodians believe, the Hintons note, that excessive “wind” can be caused by poor diet, little sleep, or wind penetrating the pores of the body. “If there is too much wind in the body, often the vessels carrying wind and blood become acutely blocked, especially at the knees and elbows, preventing outward flow along the limbs. The obstruction is said to cause hand and foot coldness, numbness, weakness, and muscle aches as well. . . . The Khmer believe that permanent limb paralysis may result from this tubal obstruction. Furthermore, according to the Khmer ethnophysiology, if wind is blocked at the limb joints, it tends to reverse its flow and surge toward the neck and head, possibly rupturing the neck vessels as well as causing a pressure increase at the head. Wind is said to shoot out the ears causing them to ring. Some patients describe dizziness as resulting from an actual spinning of brain matter.”
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References


One could go on—wind impeding breathing, compressing the heart, and then rushing to the head, "coining" as one of several measures to reduce the pressure of wind and alleviate the feeling of dizziness—but I hope the point has been made. Research of this type points us in the direction of a cultural psychology of mental states that is "bottom-up" (starts by identifying wants, feelings, beliefs, and values) rather than "top-down" (starts with the idea of "emotions"). It begins with the documentation of how particular wants, feelings, beliefs, and values get linked or co-occur during actual mental events or mental episodes in particular populations.

That is not to say that there are no universal emotions. It is to say that particular emotion concepts should be introduced into the theoretical language for comparative research on human mental states only after they have been induced and convincingly shown to be empirical universals. It won't do simply to presume the universal usefulness of particular emotion concepts, or to design research projects that offer no way to displace that assumption. It won't do to rely on judgments of bilingual informants or on dictionaries for evidence about the mental life of people in other cultures. One way to get from here to there might be to follow Anna Wierzbicka and Cliff Goddard's analytic proposal, adding to it an inductive step in which we actually document the distribution of particular wants, feelings, beliefs, and values across mental events or mental episodes in different cultural groups. Even to contemplate that step is fairly mind-boggling and reveals how far we have to go. It will require the development of an approach to the sampling of actual mental events or episodes across a chosen set of cultural groups that is representative of the major cultural regions of the world. It will require the interdisciplinary coordination of techniques and methods (from linguistics, ethology, ethnography, psychology, and biology) for assessing wants, feelings, beliefs, and values, including their content, and to do so "on-line" or in ecologically valid ways. Fortunately, this is a great moment for the coordination of interdisciplinary research in the area of feelings and emotions, and many of us are eager to take the step.


